system of so-called Law, whether International or otherwise, to be satisfied merely with the ostensible or apparent destination of contraband goods, without venturing to ascertain whether it is also the real destination intended by the owner. To thus limit a belligerent's rights would be to stultify the Law of Contraband altogether. It would be sufficient for all contraband goods to be labelled and addressed to a completely innocent destination in order to free them from all risk of capture.

This is what actually happened in the Italian case of the Doelwyk in 1896. The facts as to this interesting case are admirably and fully stated in an article by M. Giulio Diena in the Journal du Droit International Privé for 1897, pp. 268 et seq.; and another by M. Prosper Fedozzi in the Revue de Droit International, vol. xxix., pp. 55 et seq. The case also indirectly came before our own Courts in Ruys v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 131.

The facts were, shortly, as follows: A Dutch ship, the Doelwyk, sailed from Rotterdam on May 17th, 1896, ostensibly for Kurrachee in India, with a large cargo of rifles and ammunition. Italy was then at war with Abyssinia. The ship was seized by Italian cruisers in the Red Sea, as she was bearing towards the French port of Djiboutil, with the avowed purpose of disembarking one passenger there. She was taken to Massowa, and ultimately the Italian Prize Court decided that the capture of both ship and cargo was justifiable on the ground that the latter was contraband of war. The ship and cargo were in fact released because Peace had since been made; but the Court dismissed the owner's claim for damages. The evidence clearly showed that the cargo was really destined for the Abyssinian army, and was intended to be unloaded at Djiboutil, and from thence transmitted by land to its ultimate destination. The Court refused to admit that the fact of the final transit being by land instead of by sea affected the question. In this respect, it will be observed, the case resembled the Peterhoff. The decision of the Italian Court was based on the provisions of the Italian Shipping Code, which must be taken to represent the Italian view of the rule of International Law on the subject. Article 215 of this Code provides that "neutral ships, laden wholly or in part with contraband, and destined for an enemy country, shall be captured. ." It is worthy of remark that the Dutch Government made no protest against the seizure or the judgment. The case is most interesting as being the first one in which the doctrine of "continuous voyages" has been raised since the Peterhoff case.

The "Bundesrath Case. With regard to the seizures of German ships during the present war with the South African Republics, the circumstances have been almost precisely similar. The Bundesrath, Herzog, and General were seized by British cruisers off the South-East Coast of Africa, and were bound for Delagoa Bay. They were brought into Durban. for examination, on suspicion of having on board contraband destined ultimately for the Boer armies. The suspicion proved unfounded, and

the ships were released. This fact does not, however, affect the principle. involved.

One conclusion to be drawn is, that the British Government has adopted finally the doctrine of "continuous voyages," or as it might more correctly be called, the doctrine of Ultimate Destination. It has therefore made, and, it would seem, properly made, an advance upon the principle laid down more than thirty years ago by its own Courts in Hobbs v. Hemming, 17 C.B., N.S. 791. It also seems to be beyond doubt that the German Government has acquiesced in the principle. From the negotiations which have occurred relative to the seizures, and from the pronouncement by Count Bülow in the Reichstag on January 19th last, it is clear that the objections raised by Germany with regard to the seizures were solely concerned with the fact that the latter were effected on inadequate suspicions and in an inconsiderate manner, and not with the fact that the ships were bound to a neutral port. It is to be observed, however, that, owing to no contraband being discovered on board, the question in all its aspects did not arise. If, for instance, Mauser rifles had been found on board in large quantities, but ostensibly consigned to a neutral subject living at Lorenço Marques, it is interesting to speculate as to whether the German Government would have acquiesced in their confiscation. It is clear that upon the Springbok and Doelwyk principle, if the evidence sufficiently showed that the goods were ultimately destined for the Boer armies, such confiscation would be justifiable.

There seems, however, some reason for saying that the British authorities acted altogether too hastily in capturing and unloading the Bundesrath and other vessels. At the same time, if the statements contained in a letter in the Times of January 20th with regard to Samoa are reliable, an interesting light is thrown upon German methods in similar circumstances.

Attitude of the German Government. With regard to the general position taken by the German Government in relation to Contraband, it appears that, in the course of the recent negotiations, the British Government was invited to give its assent to the wide principle that "neutral goods carried on a neutral ship between neutral ports are not contraband." This was of course refused, and it would seem that the German Government regarded the proposition rather as a starting-point for further negotiations than as a serious statement of its own views.

Ultimately it propounded a series of six principles purporting to be "based on German naval and legal authorities." The fourth of these, broadly defining contraband, has been above referred to. The other five are not open to much criticism. They were as follows:

I. "Neutral merchant vessels on the high seas or in territorial watersapart from the right of convoy, which does not affect cases in point-are

Times, January 17th.

subject to the right of visitation on the part of ships of war of belligerents. This undoubtedly holds good as regards waters which are not too far distant from the seat of war. At present there are no special agreements with reference to mail steamers.

2. "The right of visitation must be exercised as considerately as possible, and without unnecessary annoyance. The proceedings may be divided, according to circumstances, into two or three acts: stopping the ship; examining the papers; searching the ship. The first two of these acts can be carried out at any time without further ado. If they afford grounds for suspicion the ship may be searched.

3. "If the neutral vessel has offered resistance when it is being stopped, or if an examination of its papers reveals irregularities, or if contraband is discovered on board, the ship-of-war of the belligerent may take the neutral ship into port in order that the matter may be examined and decided by a competent Prize Court.

5. "If contraband is found it may be confiscated, but it depends upon the circumstances of each case whether indemnification is to be granted or not.

6.

"If it was unjustifiable to take the vessel into port the belligerent state is bound to set the ship and its cargo at liberty without delay, and to give complete indemnification."

The six principles enunciated by Count von Bülow are, of course, in no sense exhaustive, but they might well serve as the text for more elaborate international discussion upon the subject.1

Since this article was in type and too late for purposes of reference, the Correspondence respecting the Action of Her Majesty's Naval Authorities with regard to certain Foreign Vessels has been published as a parliamentary paper (Africa, No. 1, 1900). It appears that the German Government did not finally acquiesce in the Ultimate Destination principle, but "reserved to themselves the right to raise the question in the future."-J. M. G.

THE TEACHING OF LAW IN FRANCE.

[Contributed by THOMAS BARCLAY, ESQ.1]

Introductory Remarks.-In venturing to address your honourable body on the subject of legal education in France, I must express my regret that I am unable to make any comparisons from personal knowledge with the condition of legal education in the United States. I hoped had I been able to address you in person, to cure that defect by a visit to one or more of your law schools. If I then speak of American schools, I do so subject to correction.

Law teaching according to English ideas is necessarily associated with the organisation of the legal profession. In England, as you know, the two branches of the profession are still distinct. The barristers obtain their professional education under an arrangement, entered into among the four corporations known as Inns of Court, into which they are divided. By this arrangement lectures are provided for the students, though they are little attended by them, and qualifying examinations are held in the chief branches of the law preliminary to admission to practice in the Courts. A Corporation of Solicitors also provides lectures and examinations, which, combined with compulsory clerkship in practising solicitors' offices, qualify for the exercise of the solicitors' branch of the profession.

Apart from the professional studies and examinations, we have law classes at our universities where some law is taught, but generally without reference to practice, and degrees in law are granted which the Inns of Court recognise only to a limited extent.

I gather from the synopsis published in your most interesting Report on Legal Legislation of 1893 that, apart from the fusion of the two branches of the profession, legal education is in much the same condition in the United States as in England-that is, with a few exceptions, the law studies and examinations are expressly directed to the training of Court practitioners, whether counsellors or attorneys, the exceptions being that some special lectures are provided by certain universities on Roman law, general jurisprudence, and international law which have no reference to any professional course.

A paper read before the American Bar Association at Buffalo, U.S.A.

In France the system is totally different.

Branches of the Legal Profession in France. There the legal profession is divided into a great number of different branches. There are avocats admitted to plead before the Courts, avocats not admitted to plead before the Courts; avoués who have the monopoly of the procedure in Courts of First Instance; another set of avoués who have the monopoly of the procedure in the Appeal Courts, and a third class who combine the functions of avocat and avoué before the Court of Cassation. There are notaries who have the legal monopoly of drawing certain deeds and of delivering certified copies of documents of all kinds, and who, through this partial monopoly, have practically drawn all the conveyancing into their hands; there are huissiers who have the monopoly of process-serving of all kinds, including certain functions of notaries public in Anglo-Saxon lands; there are agréés, who have the monopoly of pleading before the commercial courts; and, lastly, there is the magistracy, not usually recruited from the Bar,1 but forming a separate class of lawyers, who, again, are subdivided into the parquet, or public procurators-salaried public officials entrusted with the prosecution of criminal and correctional offences, and with the protection of the public interest whenever it is involved in a private action, and amongst whose powers are included the protection of women, children, and persons of infirm mind—and the bench, forming a hierarchy of judges who, in the French system, never sit less than three in judgment, two of them practically taking the place of the jury in civil causes in England.2

Different qualifications are required for these different branches of the legal profession, but the studies necessary for their attainment are in every case provided by the same schools of law. The student selects for himself, amongst the professors and lectures delivered, the particular professors and lectures on the subjects in which he must be qualified. In the case of avoués, notaries, and huissiers, the qualification of legal study is confined to the practical part of the law in which they will be called upon to exercise their functions, though it is customary for students studying for the lower branches of the law, who can afford the expense, and who have the preliminary education enabling them to enter the university, to take the same degree in law as that which is required for those who

'The magistracy is recruited from graduates in law who have passed through their three years' stage (see infra). They begin by being appointed supplementary judges or assistant public procurators in Courts of First Instance, and rise from these to higher appointments. The law, however, does not prevent the appointment of advocates to all posts in both branches of the magistracy, though there are relatively few instances of this having been done.

? I should mention that under French law the jury is a part of the system for the trial of criminal, as distinguished from correctional and civil, causes. The Correctional Court sits for the trial of délits, the nearest equivalent of which in English is misdemeanour, without a jury.