lien exists for taking down houses for temporary bridges, sewers, water and gas pipes, necessary while constructing a turnel. Andrews v. St. Louis Tunnel R. Co., 16 Mo. App. 299.

Cooking for Workmen.-A person is not entitled to a lien on a reservoir for the value of his services rendered in cooking for the men employed in constructing the reservoir, notwithstanding the cooking was done on the ground as the work progressed. McCormick v. Los Angeles W. Co., 40 Cal. 185.

Cultivating Land.-A laborer who cultivates land, or clears and prepares it for cultivation, is not entitled to a lien thereon for his wages. Brown v. Wyman, 56 Iowa 452; s. c., 41 Am. Rep. 117.

Flagging of Sidewalk.-The act giving a lien to mechanics, etc., for work performed in the "erection, construction or finishing" of buildings, does not give a lien for flagging of sidewalks, yards and areas of buildings in the process of erection. McDermott v. Palmer, 4 Selden (N. Y.) 383; Knaube v. Kerchner, 39 Ind. 217; State v. Borough Commission (N. J.), 15 Atl. Rep. 529; Smith v. Kennedy, 89 Ill. 485. See Karr v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188; Coenen v. Staub. 74 Iowa 32. But see Henry v. Plitt, 84 Mo. 237.

In Pennsylvania, a lien cannot be filed for bricks furnished for paving the footway. Cloud v. Kendrick, 1 W. N. C. (Pa.) 601; Webster v. Wakeling, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) III.

Furnishers.-Scenery, seats and pulleys furnished and placed in a theatre create a lien on the house and lot in favor of the mechanic and the furnisher of materials. Halley v. Alloway, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 523.

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Furnishing Lumber. A lumber dealer, furnishing materials to a contractor, is not a person "doing or performing work towards the erection of the building" within the meaning of the act respecting mechanics' lien, notwithstanding he caused a portion of the lumber to be dressed at a saw mill in a particular way to meet the order of the contractor. Burst v. Jackson, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 219.

Grading Around Building.—The statute does not authorize a lien for filling in and grading the earth about a building already erected, the work being unconnected with the erection, alteration or repair of any building or structure upon the premises. Pratt v. Duncan, 36 Minn. 545.

Hammering Stone.-If a subcontractor agrees to furnish all the hammered granite for a building for an entire sum of money, he has no lien for the stone on account of his failure to give the owner the notice required by the statute of 1872, ch. 318, § 1, for the labor performed in hammering the stone. Donaher v. City of Boston, 126 Mass. 309.

Hauling Lumber and Sand.-Under the Pub. Stat., ch. 191, no lien can be maintained for labor performed in hauling lumber and sand to the premises upon which the lien is sought to be enforced, although the lumber and sand are intended to be used in the construction of a house, and portions of them are actually so used. Webster v. Real Estate Improvement Co., 140 Mass. 526.

Hauling Ore from Mine.-- A mechanics' lien under the statute (Laws 1872, p. 147) will not lie for hauling ores from a mine to a quartz mill. The statute contemplates a lien only for such labor or material as may have been performed or furnished in the development, improvement or conservation of the mine which has become incorporated with and constitutes a part of its value. Barnard v. McKenzie, 4 Colo. 251.

Hauling quartz to a quartz mill was held to be "performing labor for carrying on the mill" within the meaning of the Nevada Mechanics' Lien Law (Nev. Stat. 1869, 61). Re Hope Mining Co., 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 710.

Lightning Rods.-The statute in Illinois does not give a lien to a party furnishing the materials and placing a lightning rod on a house, as this is neither building, altering, repairing nor ornamenting the same. Drew v. Mason, 81 Ill. 498.

Making Doors.-A person employed to make the doors for a house by the carpenter engaged by the owner to do the carpenter work thereon, the lumber for the doors being delivered by the owner of the carpenter and the latter to the person so employed, the work being at the latter's shop, has a lien upon the doors when finished for the value of his labor. McIntire v. Carver, 2 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 392; s. c., 37 Am. Dec. 519.

Mining. One performing labor in and upon a mine is entitled to a lien therefor, though called the superintendent of the mine. Palmer v. Uncas Mining Co., 70 Cal. 614; Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291; Silvester v. Coe

Quartz Mine Co. (Cal.), 22 Pac. Rep. 217; Quale v. Moon, 48 Cal. 478. Compare Williams v. Santa Clara Min. Assoc., 66 Cal. 193; Hicks z. Murray, 43 Cal. 515.

And the lien is not restricted to the personal property of their employers at the mines, but extends to their personal estate generally. Reed's Appeal, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harris) 235

Moving Building.— A mechanics' lien does not lie for the price of a building already constructed to be moved onto a lot unless it is to constitute part of a larger structure. Selden v. Meeks, 17 Cal. 129.

Planing Mill.-One who furnishes material for a planing mill is an original contractor and material-man within the Alabama statute. Lane v. Jones, 79 Ala. 156.

Oil Refinery.- Under Pa. Act of June 16th, 1836, which does not designate the character of the buildings to which a mechanics' lien may attach, a lien may be claimed for lumber furnished for and about the construction of buildings constituting the plant of an oil refinery. Short v. Miller, 120 Pa. St. 470.

Paper hangers had a lien under the act of 1836. Freeman v. Gilpin, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 23; s. c., 4 Clark (Pa.) 411.

Painting Fence.-If a judgment for a lien claim on a house include labor and materials for painting a fence and varnishing carpets, the lien is thereby defeated. First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Redman, 57 Me. 405.

Painting House.-House painters are within the protection of the mechanics' lien law which secures a lien to persons who furnish labor or materials for erecting or repairing a building. Martine v. Nelson, 51 Ill. 422.

Powder and Fuses.-Where a building contract (in the city of New York) requires the rock upon land to be

blasted and removed, preparatory to building, powder and fuses necessarily used for that purpose come within the term "materials in building" within the meaning of the lien of 1851. See also Keystone Min. Co. v. Gallagher, 5 Colo. 23.

Railroad Ties.-The word timber in the Wisconsin statute includes railroad ties. Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393.

A

Services in Paying for Labor. charge of commission for services in paying for labor and materials used in erecting buildings would not come within the letter or spirit of the act. Edgar v. Salisburg, 17 Mo. 271.

Shingles. The word lumber in section 3341 R. S. of Wisconsin includes shingles. Gross v. Eiden, 53 Wis. 543

Sashes, blinds, doors, etc., sold by dealer under contract and used in the construction of houses, held nonlienable. Arnold v. Budlong, 11 R. I. 561.

Upholstering. Materials furnished for upholstering boxes in a theatre are not the subject of a lien under the Delaware mechanics' lien law. McCartney v. Buck (Del.), 12 Atl. 717.

Terracing.-Laws N. Y. 1885, ch. 342, § 1, providing that anyone who shall perform any labor, or furnish any materials to be used in altering or repairing any "building or building lot, including fences, sidewalks, paving, fountains, fish ponds, fruit and ornamental trees," shall have a lien, includes a claim for terracing and sodding a building lot. Pickett v. Gollner, 7 N. Y. Supp. 196.

1. Woodward v. American Exposition R. Co., 39 La. An. 566.

2. Willamette etc. Co. v. Remick, I Oreg. 169.

.3. Central Trust Co. v. Texas etc. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 673. See Watts v. Whittington, 48 Md. 353.

In a suit to enforce a mechanics' lien for materials set forth in a running account, the date of the last item fixes

the "time of payment" within the meaning of § 984 of the Code, limiting the action to one year from the time payment should have been made. Merchant v. Cook, 4 Greene (Iowa) 115.

Where the account on which a mechanics' lien was claimed amounted to about $800, and was carried along with reasonable continuity until Aug. 5th, 1882, and here was but one other charge, which was dated March 27th, 1883, as to the mortgagee under a mortgage executed more than ninety days after August 5th, 1882, the account was properly held to close on that date, and not on March 27th. 1883, the date of the last charge. Gilbert v. Tharp, 72 Iowa 714.

1. Wiles Laundry Co. v. Hahlo, 105 N. Y. 234; Hill v. Callahan, 58 N. H. 497; Diller v. Burger, 68 Pa. St. 432.

A mechanics' lien is enforceable for all the items of an account furnished by the original contractor, for supplying the articles needed in the construction of the building and machinery in which they were used, where it is inferrible from the evidence that they were furnished under one contract. Fulton Iron Works v. North Center Creek, Minn. etc. Co., 80 Mo. 265.

The Pennsylvania act of April 14th, 1850, which provides that whenever the items of a mechanic or materialman's bill for work done or materials furnished continuously toward the erection of any new building, are in any part bona fide within six months before the claim therefor, the lien shall be valid for the whole,-was intended to do more than merely link together the items of a bill by means of a contract or a single order for the whole. Its

purpose was, when the materials were in part furnished for a single building, to the same contractor, in the ordinary progress of the work upon it, thus giving to them a unity of purpose, if not of contract, to correct that apparent want of continuity which exists when there is no contract or general order for the whole bill. Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. St. 9.

2. Fulton Iron Works V. North Center Creek Mining etc. Co., So Mo. 265.

In a mechanics' lien proceeding, instituted for materials furnished by a subcontractor, it appeared that the only things furnished within six months were two hearths, supplied gratuitously in the place of defective hearths furnished more than six months before, and a portable stove. Held, that these items of charge would not save the rest of the account from the six months' statutory bar. Women's Homeopathic Assoc. v. Harrison, 120 Pa. St. 28.

Where the partnership for which materials are furnished under a contract is dissolved, the continuity of the running account is broken; materials furnished the new firm must be deemed furnished under another contract. Henry v. Mahone, 23 Mo. App. 83.

3. Wiles Laundry Co. v. Hahlo, 105 N. Y. 234..

4. Wetherill v. Ohlendorf, 61 Ill. 283; Muhlenberg v. Schreiner, 8 L. Bar. (Pa.) 50; Hills v. Elliot, 16 S. & R. (Pa.) 56; Shriver v. Birchall, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) 172; Early v. Albertson, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) 369.

Materials furnished solely on the credit of the contractor, do not constitute a lien. McDonald v. Williams, 2

Leg. Gaz. (Pa.) 121; s. c., 4 Leg. Gaz. (Pa.) 338; Davis v. Stratton, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 289.

1. Poole v. Union Pass. R. Co. (Pa.), 16 Atl. Rep. 736; Wisconsin Planing Mill Co. v. Grams, 72 Wis. 275.

2. Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. St. 9; Odd Fellows Hall v. Masser, 24 Pa. St. 507; Presbyterian Church v. Allison, 10 Pa. St. 413; Hinchman v. Graham, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 170; Olympic Theatre, 2 Browne (Pa.) 275; Wallace v. Melchior, 2 Browne (Pa.) 104; Chicago Art. Well Co. v. Corey, 60 Ill. 73; Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 296; Morrison v. Hancock, 40 Mo. 561; Marble v. Jones etc. Lumber Co., 19 Neb. 732; Daniel v. Weaver, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 392; Esslinger v. Huebuer, 22 Wis. 632; Thielman v. Carr. 75 Ill. 385; Croskey v. Coryell, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 223. Compare Holmes v. Richet, 56 Cal. 307; Houghton v. Blake, 5 Cal. 240; Perkins v. Pike, 42 Me. 141; Taggard v. Buckmore, 42

Me. 77; Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318; Phillips . Wright, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 342; Hill v. Bishop, 25 Ill. 349; Weaver v. Sells, 10 Kan. 609; Oppenheimer v. Morrell, 118 Pa. St. 189; Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, 61 Mo. 515; Hill v. Ryan, 54 Ind. 118; Hill v. Braden, 54 Ind. 72; Talbot v. Goddard, 55 Ind. 496; Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. Car. 337; Coates v. Shorey, 8 Iowa 416.

The mechanics' lien extends to all the material in good faith furnished for the purpose of erecting or repairing the building, in pursuance of an agreement with the owner, though a part should be otherwise appropriated, if so appropriated without the consent of the furnisher. Beckell v. Petticrew, 6 Ohio St. 247.

In Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. St. 9, it was held that materials not used in the building, but bona fide and properly furnished for it, may be charged. See Odd Fellows Hall v. Masser, 12 Harr. (Pa.) 508; Gaule v. Bilyeau, 25 Pa. St. 521; Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. St. 511.

In Harker v. Conrad, 12 S. & R.

(Pa.) 301, it was held a lumber merchant has a lien whether the material furnished be used in a usual or necessary manner or not.

So in Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. St. 511, it was held that a material-man, who deals with a contractor, can only acquire a lien for materials suitable for the building, and apparently adapted to it. Boyd v. Mole, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 118. Lumber furnished for a building, though delivered at the carpenter's shop, at a distance from it, and not used, creates a lien under the statute, Hinchman v. Graham, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 170; White . Miller, 18 Pa. St. 52; Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. St. 9.

To sustain a mechanics' lien under the lien law of Minnesota (as under that of Ohio, Choteau v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114, and Iowa, Coates v. Shorey, 8 Iowa 416), for materials furnished towards repair of a building, it is not necessary that the articles should have been furnished by the materialman with knowledge of the identical building for which they were intended. If the understanding was that they were purchased for building purposes, this is enough. Atkins v. Little, 17

Minn. 342.

In California, to entitle a materialman to enforce a lien upon a building for materials furnished, it must not only be alleged and proved that the materials have been used in the construction of the building, but that they have been, by the express terms of the contract, furnished to be used in the building. Holmes v. Richet, 36 Cal.

307.

În Kansas, it must appear that the materials were used in the building, yet when it is satisfactorily shown that the materials were sold to be used in such building, that they were delivered to the builder and that the building was actually built, and when there is testimony showing that some of the materials were actually used in the construction of the building and there is

nothing even raising the suspicion that the materials after having been delivered for the purpose were used elsewhere by the builder, or that an unnecessary amount of material was purchased for such a building; held, that a finding of the trial court sustaining the lien will not be disturbed although it was not affirmatively and specifically shown as to each article that it went into the building. Rice v. Hodge, 26 Kan. 164; Sturges v. Green, 27 Kan. 235; Weaver 7. Sells, 10 Kan. 609.

In Missouri, where only part of the materials furnished the contractor are used in the construction of the work, the lien exists only for that part. Heltzell v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 435.

Where the statute provides that "every person who shall do or perform any work upon or furnish any materials for any building," etc.. shall have a lien, a material-man is not entitled to a lien for lumber furnished a subcontractor to be used in the construction of a building unless it was actually so used. Simmons v. Carrier, 60 Mo. 581; Schulenberg v. Prairie Home Inst., 65 Mo. 295; Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, 61 Mo. 515.

In New Jersey, it is no objection to the validity of a lien claim for materials furnished for the erection of a building, that such materials were not actually used in the erection of any building. When it appears that the materials were furnished for the building, and delivered to the defendants or their agents in good faith, it is immaterial to the validity of the lien whether they were used in the building or not. Morris Bank v. Rockaway etc. Co., I McCarter (N. J.) 189.

In Texas, there may be a lien for materials sold although they are not delivered at the building if the owner of the building refuses to receive them as he has agreed to do. Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210.

In Wisconsin, as between themselves, the material-man has a lien for materials sold to the owner of the building with the understanding that they were to be used in erecting the building, although the latter make a different disposition of them, and procured materials for the building elsewhere. Esslinger v. Huebner, 22 Wis. 632.

v.

labor or services in cutting, falling, driving, running, rafting, booming, cribbing, or towing in logs or timber,' "tor the amount due for such supplies, labor or services." Although the court in that case sustained a lien in favor of a person employed to cook the food of the lumbermen, the decision was based, not only on the ground that the services rendered were rendered in cutting, falling, driving, etc., the logs or timber, but also upon the ground that he who cooks the food "furnishes supplies" equally with the person who furnishes the raw materials. In McCormack Los Angeles City Water Co., 40 Cal. 185, the court adopted a view diametrically opposed to the decision of the Wisconsin court, and held that a lien for services rendered in cooking for men employed in constructing a reservoir, was not conferred by a statute which declared that every mechanic, etc., performing labor upon, or furnishing materials of any kind to be used in, the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, etc., "shalb have a lien for the work or labor done, or materials furnished." In this case the cooking was done on the ground as the work progressed, but the court held that the fact that the cooking was done at that particular place was entitled to no consideration as affecting the question of lien. CROCKETT, J, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The proof shows that the plaintiff was employed by the contractor, or superintendent, to cook for the men engaged in excavating the reservoir, and that the cooking was done on the ground as the work progressed. But the fact that the cooking was performed at that particular place is entitled to no consideration as affecting the question of lien. If any lien exists, it arises not from the place where the cooking was done, but from the nature of the services and its relation to the work which was being constructed. If the plaintiff can assert a lien on the facts proved, he could as well have done so if the cooking had been performed at any other place; and if the mere fact that a person is employed to cook for the laborers engaged in erecting a building entitled him to a lien, the same result would follow if he had furnished the provisions also. On the same theory a blacksmith who shod the horses, or a grain dealer who furnished them forage whilst employed on the work, or a wagon maker who repaired the carts of the contractor, would

In Winslow v. Urquhart, 39 Wis. 260, the statute conferred a lien in favor of any person "that shall furnish any supplies or that may do or perform any