and the teste of the magistrate should show the date of its issuance. 1

4. Effect of Irregularities.-If any of the statutory requirements be omitted, the writ is invalid, the officer acts without authority, and the prisoner will be released upon habeas corpus. But where such requisites are omitted as to make the writ only voidable, it may be amended or a new writ may be issued, but the prisoner will not be discharged.3

MIXED ACTIONS (See also EJECTMENT; WASTE).-Mixed actions are those which are brought for the specific recovery of lands, as in real actions, but have joined with this claim one for damages in respect to such property, as action of waste, where, in addition to the recovery of the place wasted, the demandant claims damages.1

MIXED JURY-(See also JURY AND JURY TRIAL).-Every colored man is entitled to this right, viz: “that in the selections of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them because of their color." But this is a different thing from the right to have the jury composed in part of colored men. mixed jury in a certain case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws, and the right to it is not given by any federal statute, and it is not guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution.2

A

MIXED LARCENY.-Mixed or compound larceny is such as has all the properties of simple larceny, but is accompanied with either one or both of the aggravations of a taking from one's house or person.3

MIXED LIQUOR.-An indictment in the words of the statute, viz: for selling mixed liquor, is not sufficient. The indictment must be for selling mixed liquors by which the particular mixture is generally known.4

MIXED MARRIAGE.-See MISCEGENATION.

MIXED PROPERTY (See also CONFUSION OF GOODS).-Mixed property is property, which, though falling under the definition of things real, is attended with some of the legal qualities of things personal. Also property, which, though falling under the definition of things personal, is attended with some of the legal qualities of things real.5

Permission to Go at Large.-A person having been brought before a justice charged with threatening an assault, his examination extended late into the night, and the justice decided that he should give bond to keep the peace, which he refused to do. The justice stating himself to be too ill to make out a warrant for his commitment then, told the plaintiff he might go where he had a mind to that night. The plaintiff went home, and the justice next morning issued a warrant of commitment against him, under which he was arrested and imprisoned. It was held in an action against the justice for false imprisonment that the permission given to the plaintiff to go at large was not a discharge, and that the subse

MIXED QUESTION.-A question involving matters of law and fact.1

MIXED WAR.-A war which is made on one side by public authority and on the other by mere private persons is called mixed war.2

MOB.--The term "mob" has been defined as an unorganized assemblage of many persons intent on unlawful violence, a riot involving a multitude.3 The terms "mob" and "riot " in Scotch law, though often used together, have distinct meanings and are sometimes used separately in legal language,-the word mobbing being used particularly applicable to the unlawful assemblage and violence of a number of persons, and that of rioting to the outrageous behavior of a single individual. But they do not have this signification in English jurisprudence in which riot is the technical term, and three persons is the least number that can compose one; and "mob" is not strictly a legal term, but a vernacular word descriptive of a large and aggravated "riot." Yet the word "mob" is used to some extent in decisions in consequence of statutes making cities and counties liable for injuries to property committed by "mobs and riots," and also because insurance policies have accepted losses occasioned by " mobs" or "riots." (See also RIOTS.)

MOBILIA.-Movable things. (See also MOVables.)

MOCKING. To mock, according to the lexicographers, is to deride, to laugh, to ridicule, to treat with scorn and contempt. And where a statute has made the following or mocking any person. with scurrilous or abusive or indecent language, or gestures, or noise, an offence, the assailing of any person with scurrilous,

ing the facts, where the application of the law to the ascertained facts admits of no doubt; in another, the facts may be clear and simple, and their legal effect doubtful; but still in each case the provinces of the court and jury are perfectly plain and distinct. It is true that, in some instances, the court could not, without the aid of a conclusion of fact drawn by a jury, apply the law;

the net income of the trust fund so constituted to the testator's wife during her natural life for her sole and separate use and benefit. Held, that a leasehold estate could not be regarded as mixed property, and that the widow was only entitled to interest on its value at the time of the testator's death until it was sold. And after it was sold to the income of its proceeds. Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. but this consideration does not properly 583.

1. Anderson's L. Dict. 682.

Yet the terming any question a mixed question of law and fact is chargeable with some degree of indistinctness. Questions of law and fact are not in strictness ever mixed. It is always for the jury to decide the one, and the court the other, however complicated the case may be. In some cases, the main difficulty may consist in ascertain

occasion any intermixture of a confusion of the respective functions of the court ard jury; for the latter, in drawing their conclusion, still confine themselves to mere matters of fact. Wharton Law Lexicon.

2. People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N.' Y.) 377; S. C., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 483. 3. 2 Abb. L. Dict. 115. 4. 2 Abb. L. Dict. 115. 5. Anderson's L. Dict. 682.

abusive and profane language clearly amounts to a “mocking” within the purview of the statute.1

MODE (See also PATENT LAW).-The manner in which a thing is done, as the mode of proceeding, the mode of process.2 The power given by congress to the United States courts to make alterations and additions in the process, as well as the "modes" of proceeding in suits is perfectly constitutional, and the power to alter and add to the process and modes of proceeding in a suit embraces the whole progress of proceeding in such suit and every transaction in it from its commencement to its termination.3 The term "modes of process" may be considered as equivalent to "modes and manner of proceeding" and is applicable not only to writs and executions, but also to every step taken in a cause. It indicates the progressive course of the business from its commencement to its termination.4

MODE OF PROCESS.-The term "mode of process," as used in the United States statutes, is synonymous with mode of proceeding, and includes power to let to bail.5

MODEL (See also PATENT LAWS).-A model is a copy or imitation of the thing intended to be represented.

MODERATE.-See ASSAULT AND BATTERY; NAVIGATION. MODERATE TERMS.—An agreement to sell goods on "moderate terms" satisfies the statute of frauds as to the price.

MODIFY.-See note 8.

MOIETY.-Half, but generally spoken of an undivided half. Two joint tenants are said to take by moieties, that is, each is entitled to half. The duty laws of congress have sometimes pro

1. State v. Warner, 34 Conn. 276. 2. Anderson's L. Dict. 683.

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3. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 329-360; Wayman v., Southard, Wheat. (U. S.) 1; The Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 51.

The term "mode" as used in the act of congress of March 3rd, 1875, which provided for proceedings to be had for the compensation of owners of land flowed or taken in the improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers was construed by the court as follows, viz: "In the mode" and in "like manner," as used in the act of congress, refer only to the method, form or manner of the proceedings themselves and do not embrace the tribunal in which they are instituted and do not impart any direction or permission that such proceedings may be taken in the courts of the State in which the lands over

flowed are situated. Jones v. United States, 48 Wis. 385.

4. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 1-29.

5. United States v. Rundlett, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 41; 5 U. S. Stat. at Large 91; 5 U. S. Stat. at Large 516; 1 U. S. Stat. at Large 91; United States v. Case, 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 250; United States v. Horton, 1 Dill. (U. S.) 94.

6. State v. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566, 602.

When a witness states on a murder trial that he exhibits a model of wounds inflicted upon the deceased, it is to be inferred in the absence of all proof to the contrary that the model is correct. If otherwise, the fact should have been shown upon the trial. State v. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566, 602.

7. Aschcroft v. Morrin, 4 M. & G. 8. The word "modify," as used in

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vided, that on a successful prosecution for smuggling, one-half the penalty or forfeiture should be divided among the informers and officers through whose efforts the whole was secured. These perquisites have been called informer's moieties, and the acts have been called "the moiety acts."2

MOLEST.-See note 3.

MOLESTATION.-" Molestation," in contravention of a covenant in a separation deed, is an act done by the person contracting (or contracted for), or her or his authorized agent. It must be an act the natural tendency of which is to injure or annoy the Covenantee. The mere adultery of a wife, even though she have a bastard child, is not a "molestation " by her of her husband. But adultery might be done under circumstances of aggravation towards the covenantee as would amount to molestation; e. g., if a wife caused her bastard child to be called by her husband's name, or by one of his titles, and (especially) if she held out that such child was her husband's son and heir, that would amount to "molestation" of the husband.4

the State constitution of Indiana which authorizes the general assembly to "modify" in its discretion prior acts of incorporation for municipal purposes, expressly authorizes the general assembly to amend an act of incorporation or special charter for municipal purposes even where the effect of the amendment is to enlarge the jurisdiction territorially or otherwise of the corporate authority of the municipality. Wiley v. Corporation of Bluffton, 2 N. E. Rep. 165. 1. 2 Abb. L. Dict. 118.

I

"Although the proper meaning of 'moiety' is a half part, it is here in my opinion used by the testator, who seems to have been an ill educated person, in the sense of an equal part or share. am not aware of any judicial opinion, having been expressed on the meaning of this or a similar word; in the imperial dictionary, I find one of its meanings given as a part or share as distinguished from a half part." Morrow v. M'Conville, 11 L. R. Ir. 252. In this case the testator had made provision for three separate moieties, adding "the several moieties to be arranged by the executors."

A devise of" my moiety "even before 1 Vict., ch. 26, would generally pass the fee. 2 Jarman on Wills 285.

When a person goes into an auction room, where a "moiety" of a piece of ground is being sold, and bids for the same at so much per yard, that means that his bids are for the interest in the property (i. e., the half part thereof)

which is being sold at so much per yard, not that he is bidding for the entirety of the property at so much per yard; his purchase money will, accordingly, be the amount of his successful bid multiplied by the number of yards, not half that amount. Chamberlain v. Lee, 8 L. J. Ch. 266.

2. United States v. Auffmordt, 19 Fed. Rep. 893.

3. A deed of separation between husband and wife contained a covenant by the husband that he would not molest or disturb his wife in her person or manner of living, nor institute any suit to compel her to cohabit with him, and a covenant by E that the wife should not at any time thereafter molest or disturb the husband, or require, by any means whatsoever, either by ecclesiastical censure or otherwise, or in any other manner endeavor to compel the husband to cohabit with her, or to enforce any restitution of conjugal rights. Held, that a suit by the wife in the divorce court for a judicial separation was not any breach of the covenant not to molest or disturb the husband. Thomas v. Everard, 6 H. & N: 448; 30 L. J. Exch. 214.

As to an agreement with a tenant "not to molest, disturb or raise the rent," see Woodf. 90, 91, citing Kusel v. Watson, u Ch. 129; 27 W. R. 714; Wood v. Davis, 6 L. R. Ir. 50; Roberts v. Tregaskis, 38 L. T. 176.

4. Fearon v. Aylesford, 12 Q. B. D. 539; 14 Ib. 792.