to health. Yet the court sustained the law as a proper exercise of the police power. In Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, a State law prohibited the sale of oleomargarine artificially coloured to resemble butter. The law was sustained in its application to an article imported from another State, on the ground that the resemblance of oleomargarine so coloured to butter, led to deception and was in the nature of a fraud. The importation of an article coloured to resemble butter could, in the opinion of the court, be prohibited so long as the introduction of uncoloured oleomargarine was not interfered with. This doctrine was carried a step further in the Armour Packing Co. v. Snyder, 84 Fed. Rep. 136. In that case a law of Minnesota forbade the sale of oleomargarine unless coloured bright pink. An attempt was made to apply this law to goods which had been shipped from Kansas into Minnesota, and which were marked as required by federal law, and sold only in original packages. It was contended that the State law prevented deception in the retail sale, and on this ground the requirement as to colour was sustained. This reasoning was, however, disapproved of in the case of Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30, in which it was held that a State could not prohibit the sale of an article of inter-state commerce, nor attach to it a condition which would render it unsaleable. In Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, the court clearly expressed the opinion that a State could not pass regulations excluding articles of commerce which are actually fit for and belong to the domain of commerce. In the late case of Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,

171 U.S. 1, decided by the Federal Supreme Court in 1898, a statute of Pennsylvania was challenged which forbade the introduction, in its pure and unadulterated condition, of oleomargarine from another State, and its sale in original packages. It was held that the statute was invalid so far as it applied to inter-state commerce. The difference in principle between Plumley v. Massachusetts and Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania is obvious; in the former case the article prohibited was coloured in imitation of butter, and consequently was liable to deceive the public; in the latter case it was a pure and harmless article of commerce which could not be either honestly or legally excluded by the State. In The People v. Hawkins, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 115, it was held that a State law requiring goods made by convict labour in other States to be so labelled when exposed for sale was unconstitutional.

POLICE POWERS AFFECTING COMMERCE.-The following laws passed by States have been held to be a proper exercise of their police powers, viz., a law excluding passengers, animals, and goods infected with disease, passengers known to be convicted criminals, paupers, idiots, lunatics, and persons likely to become burdens on the State, held constitutional (Bowman r. Chicago R. Co., 125 U.S. 465); a law forbidding the entrance into a State of cattle likely to communicate fever, unless carried in cars subject to certain precautions, held constitutional (Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Missouri, 168); a law for the protection of persons and property, regulating the introduction and transportation of nitro-glycerine and other dangerous explosives, held constitutional (Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501); a law imposing a license tax for the purpose of excluding an obscene paper, held constitutional (Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. Rep. 850); a law forbidding the transportation or exportation of diseased sheep, cattle, and meats; a law forbidding the importation of goods tending to spread disease, held constitutional (Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100). The reasons and principles of these decisions are, that such persons, animals, and commodities are not legitimate subjects of commerce.

The several States have power to pass laws regulating the internal police of their own territories, which territories include navigable rivers and harbours, as well as unnavigable streams, and the land itself. These police measures are not, in any true sense of the term, regulations of commerce, although they may sometimes have direct reference to shipping, to the condition of harbours, and other instruments by which commerce is carried on, or to the commodities themselves which are the objects of interchange and traffic. They are simply a part of the general system by which each State endeavours to protect the good morals, lives, health, persons, and property of its inhabitants. Thus, if a State legislature, deeming it dangerous to permit poisons to be sold without restriction, should pass a statute requiring a license from the druggist, or placing him under any other species of restraint, such law would be unobjectionable,

The municipal authorities of a State can regulate laundries, and prohibit washing and ironing within defined districts during certain hours of the night. (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703.) Such authorities can also abolish bone factories in specified districts (Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659); and breweries (Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 14 Wall. 26; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201). See, however, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100; Wilson Act (America), and sec. 113 of this Constitution.

A State can pass a law providing that any person introducing cattle which have not wintered north of a certain line shall be liable to an action for damage done by the introduced cattle, in spreading and communicating disease to other cattle. (Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217.)

Dr. Von Holst, referring to the commerce clause of the American Constitution, says: "In inter-state or international commerce, neither the goods nor the transportation of property or persons can be taxed by the States. But the business as such and the capital used in it are subject to the State's right of taxation. The correctness of this principle certainly cannot be attacked, but just as little can it be disputed that it gives the States the power of encroaching very seriously upon the congressional domain, if they are only careful about the way in which they do so. The Courts, indeed, are in no wise bound to permit the simple question of the sufficiency of the form, in which a State carries out its right of taxation, to determine their decisions; and they do not do so. As soon as they enter upon the question, whether the tax-laws of a State materially encroach upon the right of regulating international and inter-state commerce, subjective views are given more or less away." (Const. Law of the U.S., p. 143.) In support of his suggestion as to the power of the States to encroach on the Federal domain the learned author cites the decision in the case of Liverpool Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, according to which a State can tax foreign corporations at a higher rate than similar corporations created by its own laws. That was the case of an insurance company, and it has been held that insurance is not commerce, and is consequently not within the protection of the commerce clause. No such discrimination would be permissible in the case of a commercial corporation, either in America or in the Australian Commonwealth.

LIMITS OF THE POLICE POWERS.-The right of exclusion is founded on the vital necessity of self-defence and self-protection. A State could not exclude persons, animals, or merchandise unobjectionable in character, health, and quality, and fit subjects of commerce. (Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78.) In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, the extent to which a State could exclude paupers and criminals was not clearly decided. A State law which forbids the entrance into the State of persons who are not paupers, vagabonds, and criminals, and who are not unsound in body or mind, is not a right exercise of the police power. (State v. Steamship " Constitution," 42 Calif. 579.)

PORTS, HARBOURS, AND PILOTAGE.-Until the Federal Parliament assumes the control and management of ports, harbours, wharves, beacons, buoys, lights, and pilotage, the State authorities, boards, and trusts, at present charged with the administration of these works, will continue to exercise their functions and powers within the limits assigned to them by State laws. Harbour and port dues, wharfage rates, light dues, will be collected by the local authorities according to local laws; they are not taxes on commerce or in any way affecting the freedom of commerce, but merely compensations for services rendered. (Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545; Steamship Co. v. Jollife, 2 Wall. 450; Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299.) States may regulate wharves at which vessels receive passengers and cargo, and disembark and discharge same, and may impose dues and rates sufficient to pay the expenses of executing the wharfage regulations. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196-214; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691.) But the wharfage charges must be imposed and collected without discrimination, and according to the value of the services rendered, or they will

The pestro whether wharfage, quarantine, and ither sath dues, fees and tharges, demanded by a State, are boun f1⁄2 ompensatires de services rendered, or are mere CIARA DIA he letern bed asuming to the tacts and un omstances

= CANE. nik exactions must be fair, reas cable and moniem.

the reya recents of the case Charges which the spatia f the Federal Carts momating o uld be declared unconstitutical, as involving violations

of the role of inter-state a amemul treedte.

FISHERIES AND GAME LAWS-Control over game and Sibenes within the limits State is reserved to the State. In the enfielement of its gine laws, a State onli pecintat all traf, in the meat of game within its limits, without reference to the place where the animal was captured Magner People, PT ILL. 33. As to whether & State cold prohirm the exportation é animals petented by its game laws, there is a ovnfict of Authority. Freer in Lussects at, US 319. A State law problisting the sale of Esh and game, at a time when they would out, ander the law, he caught within the lim f the State, has heen beul to be perative spic the sale of gods slipped from souther State, the reas a given being that the statute suald not be entirel with reference alone to fish or game aight in the State Freative and Egan, Oezerve Cause, p. 152 EX IT—It has been already stated that, in the Constitutia of the Comc credit, freed a Inter-state trale ni ummene is secured by tw. onstitutional 1 by the express declaration of sec. 92, that trale si ce merce between by the withdrawal from the States of the power to impose intues of customs and excise In Decussing the foregoing cases we hate teen sackering marry the pro wile efect of the o nstitut, nal ifra the flute a menia tree = tetween the States. It remains wasder b.w far the m it inter-state trale and a sistere this State tarit is secured rough the extinse satr lof exuse being vested in the Feleral Parlament. This depends upon the meaning to he assumed to excee In var i tes to sec. 9, the VARIOUS EMADIngs of textile have feet referred to the rst and unmal one being that in which it is resta tel to lanes on the micoticture ani prviota of summ ties in a State; whilst at ther sense it has fera exteniei a ofer & List of adimi nal injustead is latest as to beers, pawnini kers, perl lers, dealers, and persons permitted to any gas and men arrijas The talk of auth mty is in favour of the limited sunn tation the term: ati it that mOUT DE OCZEct the States of the Commonwith win retain ainst the same ja kods to the American

the States shall be atuately tree; and