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Union, and the doctrine established by the leading cases, such as Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, will be of some assistance in determining the extent to which State taxation of mixed inter-state and domestic commerce could go. On the other hand, if “excise” were held to be capable of the wider signification alluded to, including all kinds of inland licenses, then the States of the Commonwealth would be deprived of vast powers and sources of local revenue, not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. If such an extended meaning were annexed to the term “excise” none of the American cases would, in the interpretation of sec. 92, apply, except those supporting the principle of State taxation of incomes derived from domestic and interstate business combined, and the taxation of incomes derived from properties employed in both domestic and inter-state business.

INSPECTION LAWS.--Charges covering the cost of inspecting goods, on their entrance into a State, may be imposed and collected under the authority of State laws. (See sec. 112.)

STATE BUSINESS, INTERNAL AND LOCAL. --The Federal Legislature has nothing to do with the purely internal commerce of a State, carried on between different parts of the same State, and confined exclusively to the jurisdiction and territory of the State without affecting other nations or States. (Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541 ; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 33.)

Commerce upon lakes lying within a State is not within federal regulation. The internal commerce and navigation of a State is exclusively subject to State regulation. (Moore v. American Transp. Co., 24 How. I. Id. p. 38.)

A law of Iowa authorizes the manufacture of alcohol within the State for the purposes of sale for mechanical, medicinal, culinary, and sacramental purposes ; and prohibits its manufacture within the State for the purpose of exportation to, and sale within, other States and foreign countries. Held, that the statute is not repugnant to the commerce clause. (Kidd 1. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 19. Id. p. 40. See Note, “State Tax on a State Business or Profession," infra.)

LANDING PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT. - Foreign or inter-state commerce cannot be carried on with a State without a wharf or other place within its limits on which passengers and freights can be landed. The use of such a landing place in a State does not confer upon the State a right to tax the capital of corporations engaged in such commerce, unless the same are domiciled within the jurisdiction of the State. The only permissible interference by a State with such commerce is contined to port regulations, and such measures as will ensure safety and prevent confusion in landing and receiving freight and passengers. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196. Id. p. 37.)

State Tax ox PASSENGERS. --A State cannot impose a tax on passengers arriving in its ports from a foreign country ; such tax is a regulation of commerce and void. (Passenger Cases. 7 How. 283 ; Baker, Annot. Const. p. 26 )

Where the object of a State law is to force the owners of vessels cari ying passengers from foreign countries to the ports of the State to pay a tax on such passengers, its effect is to tax commerce, and so it is vozil (Henderson 1. Mayor of New York, 9:2 U.S 259 ; Chy Lung ". Freeman, 92 U.S. 275. Id. p. 27.)

The constitutional disability is not removed by calling the law an inspection law to prevent the admission of criminals, paupers, lunatics, &c. (People 1. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59. Id. p. 28.)

Transportation means the taking up of persons or property at one point an, putting them down at another. A tax upon such transportation between two States is a tax upon inter-state commerce. The character of this commerce between two States is not changed by the character of the means of transportation. The power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce includes the power to determine when it shall be free and when subject to duties or exactions. (Gloucester Ferry Co. 1. Pennsylvania, '114 U.S. 196. Id. p. 28.)

STATE Tax on FREIGHT. -A tax on freight transported from one State to another State is a regulation of inter state commerce ; when levied by a State, it is void so far as it applies to articles carried through the State, or to articles carried into the State, or to articles taken up withm the State and carried to points without. (State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232; Baker, Annot. Const. p. 26.) But a tax levied on the gross receipts of a railroad company is not a tax on inter-state transportation, and is not in contlict with the commerce clause. (State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts Case, 15 Wall. 282, 281. Id. p. 20.)

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A tax imposed by a State upon a carrying company incorporated under its laws, and levied directly upon the fares and freights received by the company for the carriage of persons and goods between ditferent States, and between the status and foreign countries, is a tax upon inter-state and foreign commerce, and is unconstitutional. (Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 ; Baker, Annot. Const.

P. 29.)

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STATE Tax on A STATE Business or PROFESSION.--A State has a right to tax its own citizens for permission to prosecute any particular business or profession within the State. (Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. Id. p. 26.)

A license tax imposed by a city for the privilege of selling beer in casks manufactured in the same State is not obnoxious to the Constitution.°(Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 Wall. 173. Id. p. 26.)

A by-law of a city requiring every railroad company or express company transacting business in such city, and having a business extending beyond the limits of the State, to pay an annual license fee, and imposing penalties for violation, is not repugnant to the commerce clause. (Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479. Id. p. 26.)

A law of Texas levied a tax on persons selling wine and beer manufactured out of the State, but exacted no such tax from those engaged in the sale of similar liquors manufactured within the State : Held unconstitutional. (Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123. Id. p. 27.)

When a State grants to a city the right to license, tax and regulate ferries, the city may impose a license tax on the keeping of ferries, although their boats ply between landings lying in two different States. This is one of the undelegated powers reserved to the States. (Wiggins Ferry Co. r'. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365. Id. p. 29.)

The taxation of goods coming into a State from other States is inconsistent with freedom of trade. But if after their arrival in the State, either for use or for trade, they are subject to any general tax laid alike on all property, such taxation is not unconstitutional. (Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622. I. p. 28.)

A State tax on persons engaged in selling liquors not manufactured in the State, when no such tax is imposed on persons selling such liquors manufactured in the State, is a discriminating tax, contrary to freedom of commerce among the States, and therefore void. (Affirming Welion v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 416.

Id. p. 29.) A law of Tennessee imposed a tax of $50 upon each sleeping-car used by any railroad company within the State and not owned by the company; it was made unlawful for railroad companies to use such cars unless such tax was paid. Held, that the Act was a regulation of inter-state commerce, in so far as it applied to sleeping-cars used upon trains which ran between points within the State and points without the State, or which ran through the Staie. (Pickard 1. Pullman Car Co., 117 U.S. 34. Tennessee v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 51. Id. p. 29.)

The commerce clause is not violated by a law of a State which exacts a license fee from a corporation organized under the laws of another State, to enable such corporation to have an ottice within the limits of the State enacting such law, provided such corporation is neither engaged in carrying on foreign or inter-state commerce, nor employed by the Government of the United States. (Pembina Mining Company v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 191. I. p. 30.)

A State cannot, for the purpose of protecting its people against intemperance, enact laws which regulate conmerce between its people and those of other States of the Union, unless the consent of Congress, express or implied, is first obtained. (Bowman v. Chicago and N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 467, Id. p. 36.)

RailwayS, STATE CONTROL OF. -A State law requiring railway companies operating within its territory to fix their rates, annually, and to keep printed copies thereof posted at all stations, is not unconstitutional ; it is a valid exercise of the police powers of the State. (Railroad Co. 1. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 38.)

The power to regulate commerce among the several States was vested in the Federal legislature in order to secure equality, and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating State legislation ; it was never intended to interfere with private contracts not designed at the time they were made to impede such intercourse." (Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584. İd. p. 38.)

A law which fixes the minimum rates on a railroad extending from one State to another is not repugnant to the commerce clause, although incidentally it may reach beyond the limits of the State. (Peik v. Chicago and NW.R. Co., 94 U s. 164. Overruled in part by Wabash Railway Co. 1. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557. Id. p. 39.)

A railroad company whose charter of incorporation does not exempt it from State control may be required by State legislation to convey when called upon, and to charge no more than a reasonable compensation, which may be limited by statute. (Winona, &c., R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180. Id. p. 39.)

A statute of Illinois, enacting that any railroad company within that State which charges for transporting passengers or freight of the same class, the same or a greater sum for any distance than for a longer distance, shall be liable to a penalty for unjust discrimination, is, when applied to contracts for shipment beyond the State limits, a regulation of commerce among the States, and is so far void. (Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Chicago Burlington, &c., R. Co. v. Iowa, id. 155 ; Peik v. Chicago and N. W.R. Co., u. 164, examined and explained and partly over-ruled ; Wabash, &c., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 587. Baker Annot. Const. p. 39.)

CANVASSING AGENCIES. -An agency for a line of railroad between Chicago and New York, established in San Francisco for the purpose of inducing passengers going from San Francisco to New York to take that line froni Chicago, but not engaged in selling tickets for the route, or receiving or paying out money on account of it, is an agency engaged in inter-state commerce ; and a municipal license tax sought to be imposed upon such agency is unconstitutional. (McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 ; Norfolk and W.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 42.)

LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS. —A State statute which requires locomotive engineers, engaged in running locomotive engines on railroads which are operated in and through ditferent States, to be examined as to their power of distinguishing the colours of signals, and which requires the corporation whose trains are so operated to pay a fee for such examination, is not repugnant to the commerce clause until Congress legislates upon the subject. (Nashville, &c., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 36.)

QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.-A statute of Missouri which prohibited Mexican, Texas, or Indian cattle from being driven or conveyed through the State between March and December of each year is in conflict with the commerce clause. It is more than a quarantine law, which a State in the exercise of its police powers may enact. (Railroad Co, v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465. Baker, Annot. Const, p. 29.)

A law of Iowa, which provides that a person having in his possession within the State " Texas cattle” which have not been wintered north of the northern boundary of Missouri and Kansas shall be liable for any damage which may accrue from spreading the disease known as “ Texas cattle fever,” is not in conflict with the commerce clause. (Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 40.)

The laws of the States on the subject of quarantine, while they may in some of their rules amount to a regulation of commerce, though not so designed, belong to that class of laws which a State may enact until Congress interposes by legislation over the subject, or forbids State laws in relation thereto. Congress has not done this, but has adopted the State laws upon that subject. (Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 40.)

The statute of Minnesota providing for inspection within the State of animals designed for meat, by its necessary operation practically excludes from the markets of that State all fresh meat slaughtered in other States, and directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals whose meat is to be sold in Minnesota to persons engaged in such business in that State. This discrimination is an incumbrance on commerce among the States, and is unconstitutional. It is not a rightful exercise of the police power of the State. (Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 41.)

State Tax on COMMERCIAL AGENTS.-A State law imposing a license-tax upon peddlers selling goods not grown or manufactured in the State is in conflict with the commerce clause. (Following and re-affirming Welton v. Missouri. Morrill v. Wisconsin, Book 23, p. 1009, L.C.P. Co. Ed. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 28.)

No State may impose upon the products of other States brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens engaged in the sale therein or the transportation thereto of the products of other States, more onerous public burdens or taxes than are imposed upon like products of its own territory. (Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434. Id. p. 28.)

A law of a State requiring a person engaged in peddling goods, wares, and merchandise, not produced in the State, to take out a license and pay a tax thereon, where no such license or tax is required of persons selling similar articles which are the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, is in contlict with the commerce clause. (Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275. Id. p. 27.)

A tax on the amount of sales made by an auctioneer is a tax on the goods sold. And if the tax is upon sales of imported goods sold in the original packages, and for the importer, it is a regulation of commerce ; and such tax, if laid by a State or under its authority, is invalid. (Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 366. Id. p. 27.)

A State law which exacts a license from persons to enable them to take orders for the sale of goods for persons residing in another State is repugnant to the commerce clause. (Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129. Id. p. 30.)

STATE TAX ON VESSELS. —A vessel is subject to taxation only in its port of register. That is its situs. A law of another State, therefore, which assumes to levy a tax on such vessel, is void as a regulation of commerce. (Hays i'. Pacitic Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596. Baker, Annot. Const. p. 26.)

A State tax on a vessel by a State other than that in which it has its home port and situs, when the vessel is lawfully engaged in inter-state transportation over the navigable waters of the nation, is an interference with commerce. (Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. Int. p. 26.)

DAMS AND BRIDGES ACROSS NAVIGABLE STREAMS. - In the absence of Federal legislation upon the subject a State may authorize the construction of a dam across a navigable stream within the State. (Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459. Baker, Annot. Const p. 35.)

A State Legislature may, in the absence of a federal law, authorize the construction of a bridge across a navigable river wholly within the State ; such law being local in its nature and a mere aid to commerce. But when the Federal Legislature intervenes, its authority is supreme and its regulations are exclusive. (Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205. Id. p. 35.)

A State Legislature may determine the form, character, and height of railroad bridges crossing its navigable waters. Until the Federal Legislature intervenes, the State's powers in such cases is plenary. (Hamilton 1. Vicksburg, &c., R. Co., 119 U.S. 280. Id. p. 38.)

The power to authorize the building of bridges is not to be found in the Federal Constitution ; it has not been taken from the States. (Gilman 2. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Id. p. 38.)

Pending a suit to have a bridge across the Mississippi River declared a nuisance, it was competent for the Federal Legislature, under the power conferred by the commerce clause, to interfere and legalize the bridge. (The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454.

Id.

p. 38.)

OTHER STATE TAXES. -A State cannot, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of quarantine regulations, levy a tax on a vessel entering her harbours in pursuit of commerce, and owned in foreign ports. (Peete . Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. Id. p. 106.)

State tonnage duties upon all ships plying in the navigable waters of the State are a breach of the commerce clause. The prohibition applies to all ships engaged in the coasting trade, whether trading between ports in different States, or between ports in the same State. Tonnage duties are taxes, and are within the prohibition against State duties on imports and exports. (State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204. Id.)

State taxes imposed on ships, owned by its citizens, as property, and upon a property valuation, are not in conflict with the commerce clause. The enrolment of a ship does not exempt the owner from taxation of his interest as property. (Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273. Id.)

A duty, or tax, or burden imposed upon vessels under the authority of the State, and measured by the capacity of the vessel, and which is in its essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States, is within the prohibition against State duties on imports and exports. (Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577. ld.)

A law of Pennsylvania providing that vessels neglecting or refusing to take a pilot shall forfeit a certain sum for the use of the society for relief of distressed and decayed pilots, &c., is not within that prohibition. (Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299. Id.)

$ 390.

“Goods Imported before the Imposition of

Uniform Duties of Customs."

The object of the second paragraph of this section is to prevent merchants, before the imposition of the uniform tariff, from “ loading up” imported goods in a Colony or State where there are no duties, or where the duties arc light, in the expectation that as soon as the border customs are abolished such goods will be free of the whole Commonwealth. With the present free-trade tariff of New South Wales, importers in every colony would have been able, but for this provision, to evade customs duties on general merchandise altogether, for the first year or so of the uniform tariff, by

warehousing everything at Sydney in advance of the tariff, and not distributing into the State of destination until the intercolonial customs barriers were down. This section checkmates any such device by retaining the intercolonial barriers for two years after the uniform tariff, so far as imported goods are concerned, to the extent to which those goods have not paid the Commonwealth tariff.

This section only prevents the “ loading up,” in one State, of goods for distribution in another ; it does not prevent, for instance, the importation into New South Wales, in the expectation of an increased tariff, of goods to supply the New South Wales market. That is an operation which is always possible when there is a prospect of increased customs taxation ; and it can only be met by the recognized constitutional practice of collecting the new duties from the date on which the House of Representatives passes the preliminary resolution to impose the duties, and making the subsequent Customs Act take effect retrospectively from that day. As to this practice, see Exp. Wallace and Co., 13 N.S.W. L. R. 1, and the authorities there cited. In that case the applicants, before the passing of the Customs Act, applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to sign bills of entry for certain goods without paymeut of the new duties. The court, in the exercise of its discretion, refused the writ on the ground of established constitutional practice ; though it was admitted that, pending the passing of the Customs Act, an action would lie against the Government. (See Stevenson v. The Queen, 2 W.W. and A'B., L. (Vic.) 143.)

IMPORTED. – After the establishment of the Commonwealth the Constitution does not speak of “imports” or “exports from one State to another, but only of imports into, or exports from, the Commonwealth ; and in the case of inter-state trade the phrases used are goods passing into,” or “ goods passing out of”a State. (See p. 845, supra ; and secs. 93, 95, 104, 112.) In other words, the Constitution is careful to regard the Commonwealth, so far as imports and exports are concerned, as a single whole, and to regard the movement of trade within the Commonwealth as internal trade merely.

The word “imported” in this section is not confined to imports after the establishment of the Commonwealth, but includes all goods imported before the imposition of the uniform tariff. That it is intended to apply to goods imported before as well as after the establishment of the Commonwealth, is shown by the words “ or into any colony which, whilst the goods remain therein, becomes a State.” This application of the section to imports made before the commencement of the Constitution is not really retrospective in character; it merely means that certain intercolonial duties previously chargeable continue to be chargeable on certain goods.

Questions may arise as to the meaning of the word “imported,” and fas to the precise time when the importation of goods is to be deemed completed. On this point some assistance may be derived from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of the Canada Sugar Refinery Co. v. The Queen (1898), App. Ca. 735. By the Canadian Tariff Act, 1895, which came into force on 3rd May of that year, a duty of one-half cent per pound was imposed on raw sugar “imported into Canada." On 29th April the Cynthiana, from Antwerp, carrying a cargo of sugar consigned to Montreal, put into the port of North Sydney, Cape Breton, Canada, in order to coal, and the master made his report inwards of his ship and cargo in compliance with the 25th sec. of the Customs Act. On the same day he made his report outwards and obtained the Customs certificate of clearance for Montreal. On 2nd May the importers of the sugar made an entry at the Montreal Customs House of the sugar, and a warrant was issued for its landing duty free. On 3rd May the new duty came into force. The Cynthiana reached the wharf in the port of Montreal on 4th May. The Collector of Customs then cancelled the free entry, and claimed that the goods were liable to duty. On his behalf it was contended that the goods were not imported into Canada until they were landed, or at any rate until they arrived within the port of Montreal ; that the goods were not imported into Canada by the mere fact of the vessel entering a port of call within the

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