CH. III] GRANT AND HALLECK 97 both written after he had seen the whole correspondence, he criticised Halleck severely. Halleck, however, at this time had the confidence of the War Department in Washington and had been appointed to the sole command of the United States forces in the West;1 on March 13, he restored Grant to the active command of the Army of the Tennessee from which he had been temporarily suspended.2 In 1884 Grant wrote: "My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the Southwest without much resistance. If one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them." 3 As a matter of fact when, after the inexcusable snubbing he had received from Halleck, Grant was again placed at the head of his army, he had an opportunity for action which, if he had availed himself of it to the best of his ability would, by common consent of government and people, have pointed to him unmistakably as the one man for this work. During the last days of March, Grant's headquarters were at Savannah. He had five divisions in camp at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles higher up and on the west side of the Tennessee river, the side toward the enemy; and also Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing five miles below Pitts 1 March 11; assumed command March 13. 2 This was the army of Donelson with reënforcements. The title was not formally given until April 21. 3 Grant, 317. H 98 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON [1862 burg Landing and on the same side of the river. General Buell, in command of the Army of the Ohio, about 36,000 strong, was marching toward Savannah to join Grant in an offensive movement against the Confederates, who were at or near Corinth. Albert Sidney Johnston, grieved as he was over the disaster at Donelson, was always cheered by the support and friendship of Jefferson Davis, who wrote to him, "My confidence in you has never wavered."1 Beauregard, then the idol of the South, had been persuaded to leave Virginia and go to the Southwest to the aid of Johnston in the hope that, by his personal popularity, he might succeed in arousing the people to resist the invasion of their territory.2 Through the exertions of these two, an army of 40,000 was collected at Corinth. "What the people want," said Johnston, "is a battle and a victory"; and he hoped to crush Grant before Buell could join him. Leaving Corinth 3 on April 3, with the idea of surprising the Union forces, he expected to make the attack two days later, but owing to a number of delays, was unable to deliver the blow until the early morning of Sunday, April 6. On the eve of this battle, called Shiloh, Grant's remarkable faculty of divining the enemy's movements, displayed at Donelson and later during his military career, seemed to be utterly in abeyance. Grant never studied the opposing commander with the thoroughness of Lee, and this time he failed to guess that desperation would drive Johnston to the offensive. He had made up his mind that the enemy would await his attack and so obstinate was he in this belief as to ignore certain unmistakable signs of a projected movement. 10. R., X, Pt. II, 365. 2 This was in January after the "crushing disaster" [Beauregard's words] of Mill Spring, Ky., when General George H. Thomas defeated the Confederates. It was before Donelson. 3 Twenty-two miles from Pittsburg Landing. CH. III] GRANT SURPRISED 99 On the day before the attack (April 5) he telegraphed to Halleck: "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth." "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." 1 At three o'clock that afternoon, he said to a Colonel of Buell's army, "there will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth where the rebels are fortified." 2 At this hour Johnston's advanced corps was two miles from the Union camp and the rest of his 40,000 within supporting distance.3 4 William T. Sherman, who, in addition to his own division had general command of three others at Pittsburg Landing, was even more careless than Grant, for he was in close contact with the evidence; he had, however, received no order to throw up intrenchments, although Halleck had directed Grant to fortify his position. While "the utility of hasty intrenchments on the field of battle was not yet appreciated," 5 it is remarkable that with an enemy estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000 and, located according to their own guess, not farther than twenty-three miles away, generals as resourceful as Grant and Sherman did not put their soldiers to work with the pick and spade. "At a later period of the war," wrote Sherman, "we could have rendered this position impregnable in one night."7 Sherman, "restless, ardent and enterprising" felt the enemy more than once; on the afternoon of Friday, April 4, he made a reconnaissance and captured ten prisoners, who 10. R., X. Pt. I, 89, Pt. II, 94. 2 Ibid., 331. Henry Stone, Milt. Hist. Soc. VII, 52. 4 McClernand's was not under him. 5 Wagner, Ropes, II, 97. Grant, O. R., X, Pt. II, 93. 7 W. Sherman, I, 229. • Henry Stone, Milt. Hist. Soc., VII, 51. 100 SHERMAN SURPRISED [1862 said they were the advance-guard of an army commanded by Beauregard that was marching to attack the Union camp; one, who was mortally wounded, told the colonel of an Ohio regiment that the army was 50,000 strong and would certainly attack within twelve hours; of this Sherman was promptly informed. Pickets of this Ohio regiment called the attention of their Captain to "the rabbits and squirrels that were running into the lines"; they saw a body of cavalry and a large infantry force in line: these and other facts were reported to Sherman who, clinging stubbornly to his own conception of the situation, refused to regard them as indicating anything more formidable than a reconnaissance in force. Beauregard will not attack, he said. I know him and his habit of mind well. He will never leave his own base of supplies to attack the Union army at its base.1 On Saturday, April 5, he sent this word to Grant: "The enemy has cavalry in our front and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about two miles out." "The enemy is saucy but got the worst of it yesterday and will not press our pickets far. . . . I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position.' At this moment one corps of the Confederate Army "was deployed in line of battle, not two miles from his camp, and the other three corps were in supporting distance." 3 If Beauregard had been in command, Sherman's conjecture would not have been far wrong. He had agreed to the attack on the Union force but, when it proved impossible to make it on the Saturday, he feared that the skirmish of the day before, the drum-beat and bugle calls had given them 1 Dawes, Milt. Hist. Soc., VII, 115 et seq. 2 O. R., X, Pt. II, 93. 3 Henry Stone, Milt. Hist. Soc., VII, 52. CH. III] BATTLE OF SHILOH 101 a sufficient warning, and that they would be found intrenched "to the eyes" and ready for an attack; he accordingly advised that the Confederate Army be withdrawn to Corinth. Two of the corps commanders differed with him and Johnston closed the discussion with: "We shall attack at daylight to-morrow. I would fight them if they were a million." 1 Even if Sherman had realized that Johnston was in command, he, like Grant, would have had no idea of the desperate energy that was pushing him forward. An incident will show the proximity of the armies. Hearing the drum-beat at the hour of tattoo, Beauregard ordered it suppressed when, after investigation, his staff officer informed him that the drumming was in the Union camp. After the downpour of Friday and that midnight's violent storm, the sun rose on Sunday in a cloudless sky. From student to student of military campaigns went the word, "the sun of Austerlitz." Johnston in the bracing air shared the exultation, declaring, "To-night we will water our horses in the Tennessee river." 3 Better informed than Grant and Sherman, he knew the exact position of the Union Army and planned to turn their left, cut off their retreat to the Tennessee river and compel their surrender. While taking his coffee at 5: 14, he heard the first gun, the prelude to a vigorous attack that surprised Grant, Sherman and nearly all their officers and men. A major of an Ohio regiment was still in bed; officers' servants and company cooks were preparing breakfast; at least one sutler had opened his shop; "the sentinels were pacing their beats, the details for brigade guard and fatigue duty were marching to their posts."4 All 1 W. P. Johnston, B. & L., I, 555. Dawes, Milt. Hist. Soc., VII, 136; Roman, Beauregard, I, 277. |