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of the summer is to be renewed," wrote Hay. "The President defended McClellan's deliberateness.' On going over to the General's headquarters the "Jacobins" were discussed. "The President deprecated this new manifestation of popular impatience but said it was a reality and should be taken into the account:-'At the same time, General, you must not fight till you are ready.' 'I have everything at stake,' replied McClellan; 'if I fail I will not see you again or anybody.' 'I have a notion to go out with you,' said Lincoln, 'and stand or fall with the battle.'" 1

On October 31, Scott voluntarily retired from active service and McClellan succeeded him in the command of all the armies of the United States. Next evening, at his headquarters, he read to Lincoln and Hay his General Order in regard to Scott's resignation and his own assumption of command. The President said, "I should be perfectly satisfied if I thought that this vast increase of responsibility would not embarrass you." "It is a great relief, Sir!" replied McClellan, between whom and Scott there had been friction. "I feel as if several tons were taken from my shoulders to-day. I am now in contact with you and the Secretary. I am not embarrassed by intervention." "Well," rejoined Lincoln, "draw on me for all the sense I have and all the information. In addition to your present command, the supreme command of the army will entail a vast labor upon you." "I can do it all," said McClellan quietly.2

The country had a right to expect an offensive movement. Inasmuch as McClellan was apt to underestimate the number as well as the fighting quality of his soldiers, his 76,000 disposable for an advance" could likely enough have been increased to 100,000. He ought to have fought Johnston, 2 J. Hay, I, 50.

1 Ibid., 48.

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[1861 or manœuvred him out of Manassas, or raised the Confederate blockade of the lower Potomac or taken Norfolk.1 Any one of these movements attempted in the autumn of 1861 would have satisfied the country and maintained their confidence, as well as the President's, in McClellan; and this would have been an asset of great value. But he was no fighter and at this time could not have handled 100,000 men. It is doubtful if any other general in the Union army could have done so. Long after the war, Grant referred to the "vast and cruel responsibility" devolving upon McClellan at the outset and added, "If McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high a distinction as any of us."2 In McClellan's army was Colonel William T. Sherman, who in 1864 led an army of 100,000 with great ability; but at this time he told the President that his "extreme desire" was "to serve in a subordinate capacity and in no event to be left in a superior command." 8 To march, manœuvre, feed and fight to the best advantage an army of 100,000 comes near being the highest executive achievement of which man is capable. Joseph E. Johnston "quiet and sad" 5 thought that he could now conduct 60,000 in an offensive campaign, but he had had the invaluable experience of commanding half that number at Bull Run.

3

If McClellan had shown modesty, so striking a charac

1 During October the Confederates "had blocked the navigation of the Potomac by planting batteries on the Virginia side twenty or thirty miles down the river." Webb 13, 168 et seq.; Ropes I, 181, 222; N. & H., IV, 450.

2 Young, II, 217.

3 W. Sherman, II, 193.

4 Written before the European War of 1914.

5 McClellan, 85. J. D. Cox wrote, "Johnston by common consent stands second and hardly second, to Lee alone of the Confederate generals." The Nation, XVIII, 333.

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teristic of Lincoln and Grant, criticism would be tempered, but he was one of the men who cannot stand prosperity. Rapid advancement had swelled him with conceit; one manifestation of this was discourtesy to the President, of whom he once wrote in a patronizing way, "he is honest and means well." On the evening of November 13, the President, Secretary Seward and John Hay called at McClellan's house and were told by the servant at the door that the General was at an officer's wedding and would soon return. "We went in," as Hay recorded the incident in his diary, "and after we had waited about an hour, McClellan came in, and without paying any particular attention to the porter who told him the President was waiting to see him, went upstairs, passing the door of the room where the President and Secretary of State were seated. They waited about half an hour, and sent once more a servant to tell the General they were there; and the answer came that he had gone to bed. I merely record this unparalleled insolence of epaulettes without comment," continued Hay. "It is the first indication I have yet seen of the threatened supremacy of the military authorities. Coming home I spoke to the President about the matter, but he seemed not to have noticed it specially, saying it was better, at this time, not to be making points of etiquette and personal dignity." 2 On another occasion when the General failed to keep an appointment with the President, he said, "Never mind; I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success." 3

In December, McClellan fell ill with typhoid fever. The President, the Army of the Potomac, the country waited on his recovery.

1 McClellan, 176.

2 J. Hay, I, 52.

3 N. & H., IV,

468.

4 O. R., V, XI, Pt. III; III, I; N. & H., IV; J. Hay, I; III; Ropes, I; Webb; Johnston; B. & L., I.

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[1861

To Great Britain, it seemed that "as a question merely of fact a war existed" 1 between the North and South which must be officially recognized. Davis had invited applications for letters of marque and Lincoln had proclaimed a blockade; both acts being permissible only in war seemed to indicate that the conflict would extend to the ocean where it would concern all maritime nations. As a matter of course, Great Britain issued a Proclamation of Neutrality [May 13], but this natural step was by no means acceptable to the North since the Proclamation by its terms recognized the Confederate States as a belligerent power. The theory of the United States Government that the Southerners were rebels against their authority was undermined as soon as these rebels became belligerents in the eyes of Europe.2 The censure of this declaration by Seward and by Adams was therefore in conformity with diplomatic usage. Nor was the sentiment of Boston as reported by Motley surprising. "The declaration of Lord John Russell," he wrote, "that the Southern privateers were to be considered belligerents, was received with great indignation by the most warm-hearted, England-loving men in this England-loving part of the country." 3 In other sections of the North where England was less liked, the feeling of resentment was still more acute; and the sum of this dissatisfaction may have served a useful purpose in helping to prevent Great Britain from acknowledging the Southern Confederacy in the following year. Nevertheless, a calm survey of the facts can hardly lead to any conclusion but that Great Britain was

1 Lord Russell, III, 418, n. 2.

"The other maritime powers waited for Great Britain to take the lead, because the extent of her dominions and commerce in North America made the question most important to her. Within a few weeks France, Spain, the Netherlands, Prussia and other nations followed her example." Bancroft, II, 176. $ III, 421.

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abundantly justified for her recognition of the belligerent rights of the Confederate States. The cogent argument for it was put in a nutshell by the foreign secretary who issued the Proclamation. "Upwards of five million free men," wrote Lord Russell in a private letter to Edward Everett, "have been for some time in open revolt against the President and Congress of the United States. It is not our practice to treat five millions of free men as pirates and to hang their sailors if they attempt to stop our merchantmen. But unless we meant to treat them as pirates and to hang them we could not deny them belligerent rights.

The concession of belligerent rights to the Confederate States was made with no unfriendly purpose; and as repeated assurances to that effect were received from both public and private sources in England, and as a proper comprehension was gained of the wide difference between the recognition of the belligerency and acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederate States, the irritation of the North began to subside. The President showed his understanding of the attitude of England and other European powers and believed that his government had their sympathy. "The feeling toward the United States," wrote Adams from London on May 31, "is improving in the higher circles here. It was never otherwise than favorable among the people at large.

The division of English sentiment was well expressed by Palmerston, the Prime Minister, in his words, "We do not like slavery, but we want cotton and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff."3 Punch declared sympathy with the North but confessed,

1 Bancroft, II, 178 n.; C. F. A. M. H. S., XLV, 77.

2 III, 429.

3 This act approved March 2, 1861, was considered a measure of high

protection by the English.

F