CH. III] BATTLE OF DONELSON 89 exhausted by the severe battle to retreat in order over a road covered with snow and ice. Nor were all the men provided with rations; nor had certain other precautions been taken that are generally deemed indispensable for a retreat in the face of the enemy. Early that morning Foote had requested Grant to come to his flag-ship for a consultation, he himself being too badly injured to leave the boat. Having complied with this request, the commanding general of the Union army was not in the field when the Confederates attacked; on going ashore after his conference with Foote, he met a Captain of his staff "white with fear . . . for the safety of the national troops." 1 He rode back with the utmost speed over the four or five miles of icy roads. Here was a critical moment in Grant's life. The war had given him an opportunity to mend a broken career; should he fail in this supreme hour, another chance might never come to him and his unfortunate absence during the morning's battle would certainly be misconstrued. Anyone used to affairs knows that there are times when, after a bad beginning everything seems to go awry, perplexity reigns and no remedy appears; when ordinary men are bewildered and know not what to do. All at once the Master appears, takes in the situation, cheers up his associates, gives a succession of orders and the difficulty is unravelled; failure gives way to success. Such was the case on the field of Donelson. Grant arrived; out of confusion came order; determination out of despair. When he learned of the disaster to his right wing, his face flushed slightly and he crushed some papers in his hand; but, saluting McClernand and Wallace, he said in his usual quiet voice, “Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken.' Then galloping 1 Grant, I, 306. 90 BATTLE OF DONELSON 2 [1862 towards his left, he stopped somewhere to send a despatch to Foote, requesting his assistance.1 While on the way he heard some of the men say that "the enemy had come out with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations." This was evidence to him that the sortie of the Confederates amounted to nothing less than an attempt to escape from the fort and he said to the staff officer who was riding with him: "Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out but has fallen back; the one who attacks first now will be victorious. Call out to the men as we pass, 'Fill your cartridge boxes quick and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so."" Wherever Grant appeared confidence followed in his train. He rode quickly to Smith's headquarters and ordered him to charge, assuring him that he would have only a thin line to contend with. Through abatis which looked too thick for a rabbit to get through, Smith led the charge with unusual energy and courage, carried the advanced works of the enemy and "effected a lodgement in his intrenchments," securing “a key to his position. After the order to Smith, Grant commanded McClernand and Wallace to charge; they advanced with vigor and recovered their position of the morning, regaining possession of the Nashville road. There was now no way of escape for the Confederates from Fort Donelson 1 This is the despatch: "If all the gunboats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy, it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats do not show themselves, it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge to save appearances. I do not expect the gunboats to go into action but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range." O. R., VII, 618. 2 Grant, I, 307. Сн. ІІІ] SURRENDER OF DONELSON 91 except by the river and by a road that had been submerged by the river's overflow. Grant made arrangements for an assault at daybreak the next morning. Hardly a doubt of its success could exist. Inside the fort the general discouragement that prevailed led the Confederate generals to the same opinion. The two ranking officers turned over the command to Buckner.1 One of them escaped with a number of his troops in two small steamboats that had just arrived with reënforcements; the other crossed the river in a skiff. The cavalry rode out over the submerged road finding the water "about saddleskirt deep." At an early hour next morning [February 16] Grant reeeived a note from Buckner proposing to capitulate and suggesting an armistice until noon. To this he made his famous reply: "Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."3 Buckner was compelled to accept what he called "the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms." Grant, in his despatch to Halleck of that day, said that he had taken "12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2000 to 4000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores." 4 'Judged by its moral and strategical results," wrote Ropes, "the capture of Fort Donelson was one of the turning points of the war." 5 It caused the evacuation of Nashville and resulted in a Union advance of more than two hundred miles of territory before the enemy could rally or reorganize. It 1 See III, 592. 2 Forrest, O. R., VII, 295. O. R., VII, 161. 4 O. R., VII, 625. 5 Ropes, II, 34. |