126 MCCLELLAN BEFORE YORKTOWN 3 [1862 Clellan, "I think you better break the enemy's line at once,' a suggestion which the General received with contempt, writing to his wife, "I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself."2 Three days later the President wrote to him in great kindness: "Once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this." Suggestion and entreaty were of no avail. "Glorious news comes borne on every wind but the South Wind," wrote Hay to Nicolay [April 9]. . . . "The little Napoleon [McClellan] sits trembling before the handful of men at Yorktown, afraid either to fight or run. Stanton feels devilish about it. He would like to remove him if he thought it would do." 4 "No one but McClellan," wrote Joseph E. Johnston to Lee, "would have hesitated to attack." 5 It is the mature judgment of almost all military authorities that, outnumbering the Confederates as he did three to one, he could at this time have broken their line from the York river to the James and have reached his position on the Chickahominy a month earlier than he did. He missed his opportunity. By April 17, the Confederates at Yorktown numbered 53,000, and Johnston himself was in command. From this time on, nothing but scientific siege operations was feasible and, as McClellan was a capable engineer, these were undoubtedly as good as could have been devised. On May 3, Johnston evacuated Yorktown; he was followed on the retreat by the Union forces who brought on a battle at Williamsburg resulting in their defeat. On May 21, McClellan was in camp on the Chickahominy, seven to twelve miles from Richmond; he had in the meantime received a reënforcement by water of Franklin's division of McDowell's 10. R., XI, Pt. I, 14, the line between the York and James rivers. 2 McClellan, 308. 4 J. Hay, I, 57. 3 O. R., XI, Pt. I, 15. Сн. ІІІ] ALARM IN RICHMOND 127 corps and the promise of the rest of this body, 35,000 to 40,000 strong, who were now opposite Fredericksburg preparatory to joining him by an overland march. Shortly previous to this, directly after the destruction of the Merrimac, an advance of the Monitor and a number of gunboats up the James alarmed Richmond. Fearing the fate of New Orleans, people packed their trunks and crowded the railroad trains in their flight from the city. The government archives were packed for removal to Lynchburg and Columbia. The families of the Confederate cabinet officers fled to their homes and Davis sent his wife and children to Raleigh. He himself received baptism at his house and the rite of confirmation in St. Paul's Church; he appointed by proclamation a day for solemn prayer. The Richmond Examiner, a bitter critic of Davis's acts, spoke of him as "standing in a corner telling his beads and relying on a miracle to save the country." Had McClellan realized the importance of celerity as did Grant and Farragut, he would have made an attack upon Richmond in cooperation with the Navy. He had a good chance to take it but in case of failure he had behind him the authority of the President who had written to him that he must strike a blow.1 2 While McClellan dallied before Richmond, Robert E. Lee 2 planned, and Stonewall Jackson conducted, a series of manœuvres in the course of which, playing on Lincoln's anxiety for Washington, they succeeded in bringing to naught the plan for the reënforcement by McDowell of the Army of the Potomac. On May 8, Jackson defeated a detachment of Frémont's, sending this word to Richmond, "God blessed our arms with victory." Having bigger game in sight than 1 The Monitor and gunboats were repulsed in their attack on the batteries at Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond [May 15]. 2 Lee at this time was military adviser to President Davis. 128 STONEWALL JACKSON [1862 Frémont's army, he retraced his steps for the purpose of cooperating with Ewell in an attack upon Banks in the Shenandoah Valley; when he made this junction he had 17,000 men. An index of Jackson's character is to be found in two of the books he had constantly with him, the Bible and Napoleon's Maxims of War.1 He interpreted the Bible literally and was guided by its precepts. Piety pervaded his being; religion was the affair of every moment; he prayed frequently for divine guidance in the most trivial affairs of life. But for his strategy he had recourse not, to Joshua but to Napoleon. He read and re-read these Maxims so that he had for the theory of his profession, the best of masters.2 The result of his study was seen in the Shenandoah campaign, which was truly Napoleonic. Celerity and secrecy were his watchwords. He sometimes marched with his whole army thirty miles in twenty-four hours and his infantry became known as "Jackson's foot cavalry." Himself apparently incapable of fatigue, he seemed to think that everybody should equal his endurance. "After a sleepless night, a long march, hard fighting, he would say to his officers, 'We must push onwe must push on!" Moreover, he converted his cavalry into mounted riflemen. "To mystify, mislead and surprise" was his precept; "to hurl overwhelming numbers at the point where the enemy least expects attack" was his practice.3 On May 23, he swooped upon a detachment of Banks's 1 He carried these two, and one other, Webster's Dictionary, in his haversack. 2 "Read and re-read," said Napoleon, "the eighty-eight campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugène and Frederick. Take them as your models, for it is the only means of becoming a great leader and of mastering the secrets of the art of war. Your intelligence, enlightened by such study, will then reject methods contrary to those adopted by these great men. Lieut. Col. Henderson, I, 504. Lieut.-Col. Henderson, I, 308, 518, 519, 539. CH. III] JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN 129 force at Front Royal and put it to rout, capturing a large part of it. Banks himself was then at Strasburg with 6800; but next day, fearing that his retreat would be cut off, he "ran a race" with Jackson to Winchester. The pursuit was hot, but the fighting of his rear-guard prevented his capture, and he reached Winchester first. During these two days, however, Jackson had produced big results. The War Department in Washington received despatch after despatch from the theatre of operations, each more alarming than the last. Reënforcements were ordered to Banks from Baltimore; Harper's Ferry sent him a portion of its garrison. Until May 24, the faulty disposition of the Union forces was largely due to orders from the War Department, coming in Stanton's name. Now the President tried his hand at strategy. He directed Frémont to move into the Shenandoah Valley to a point in Jackson's rear. He suspended the order which had been given to McDowell to unite with McClellan and instructed him to send 20,000 men to the Shenandoah Valley to assist Frémont in the capture of Jackson; or, if Frémont should be late, he suggested that McDowell's force alone would be sufficient to accomplish the object. At daybreak, on Sunday, May 25, Jackson routed Banks at Winchester, gave hot pursuit to the "mass of disordered fugitives," was at one time on the point of destroying the entire force and finally drove them across the Potomac river. "There were never more grateful hearts in the same number ," wrote Banks, "than when at midday of the 26th we stood on the opposite shore." 1 of men, The despatches sent to Washington on the Sunday came chiefly from panic-stricken men and greatly alarmed the President and Secretary of War. The main objective, 1 O. R., XII, Pt. I, 551. K 130 "THE GREAT SCARE" [1862 which on Saturday had been the capture of Jackson's army, was now mixed with fear for the safety of the capital. "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching on Washington," telegraphed Stanton to the several governors of the Northern States. "You will please organize and forward all the militia and volunteer force in your State." This despatch and the response to it reflecting the alarm at the capital, caused wild excitement at the North which was afterwards spoken of in Massachusetts as "the great scare," elsewhere as "the great stampede." The militia and home guards of many of the States were called out; a number of regiments, among them the Seventh New York, were hurried to Baltimore and to Harper's Ferry; it was called the "Third uprising of the North." The President took military possession of all the railroads in the country. "I think the time is near," said Lincoln in a despatch to McClellan, "when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington." Part of McDowell's force was recalled to the capital city. "Our condition is one of considerable danger," wrote Stanton, "as we are stripped to supply the Army of the Potomac and now have the enemy here." 1 By May 26, the President and Secretary of War deemed Washington secure. In fact, the capital had at no time been in danger. Lee and Jackson had no further design than to threaten it and so cause the President to withhold the reënforcements intended for McClellan. The result fully realized their expectation. But now Jackson himself was in danger. Hearing of the movements for his capture, he began on May 30 a rapid retreat. "Through the blessing of an ever kind Providence," he wrote, "I passed Strasburg before the Fed 1 IV, 19; General Meade, I, 269. |