CH. IV]

LINCOLN AND SLAVERY

153

the object of the war was the restoration of the Union, he proposed emancipation "as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object." Seward pleaded for delay, fearing that on account of the depression of the public mind the proclamation might "be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help, the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia" in a "last shriek on the retreat. Now while I approve the measure," he added, "I suggest sir that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war." The President had not seen the matter in this light; struck with the wisdom of Seward's objection, he “put the draft of the proclamation aside waiting for a victory."

The secret of this conference was well kept and the Radicals, not knowing that Lincoln was disposed to go as far as they wished, continued their criticism. "What a pity," wrote Charles Eliot Norton, "that the President should not have issued a distinct and telling Proclamation!" 2 Thaddeus Stevens characterized Lincoln's proposal of compensated emancipation as the "most diluted milk-and-water gruel proposition that was ever given to the American nation," and declared that "the blood of thousands . . . moldering in untimely graves is upon the souls of this Congress and Cabinet." The administration, he said, should free the slaves, enlist and arm them and "set them to shooting their masters if they will not submit to this government." Sumner, restlessly pacing up and down his room, exclaimed with uplifted hand: "I pray that the President may be right in delaying. But I am afraid, I am almost sure, 2 July 31, C. E. Norton, I, 255.

1 Carpenter, 22.

he

3 March 11, July 5, 1862. Globe, 1154, 3127; Woodburn, 183 et seq.

154

LINCOLN AND GREELEY

[1862 is not. I trust his fidelity but I cannot understand him." 1 Carl Schurz sympathized with Sumner and criticized the President for not adopting the policy of immediate emancipation, but afterwards frankly confessed that Lincoln was wiser than he.2 Greeley, in his "Prayer of Twenty Millions," printed in the New York Tribune, said to the President, "We complain that the Union cause has suffered and is now suffering immensely from your mistaken deference to rebel slavery." This gave the President an opportunity for a public reply [August 22]. "My paramount object in this struggle," he wrote, "is to save the Union and is not either to save or destroy slavery. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I'do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."

Lincoln and Greeley may be looked upon as representative exponents of the two policies. There was in their personal relations a fundamental lack of sympathy; they could not see things alike. Lincoln knew men, Greeley did not; Lincoln had a keen sense of humor, Greeley had none; indeed, in all their intercourse of many years, Lincoln never told the serious-minded editor an anecdote or joke, for he knew it would be thrown away. Greeley and the Tribune, though not so powerful at this time in forming public opinion as they had been from 1854 to 1860, exerted still a farreaching influence and gave expression to thoughts rising in the minds of many earnest men. No one knew this better than the President, who, in stating his policy in a public despatch to Greeley, complimented the editor and those for whom the Tribune spoke. Lincoln's words received the widest publication and were undoubtedly read

1 Schurz. Reminiscences, II, 314.

2 Ibid. Schurz. Speeches, etc., I, 206; Schurz's Lincoln, 93.

CH. IV]

ADDITIONAL TROOPS

155

by nearly every man and woman at the North. They were sound indeed. His position could not have been more cogently put. His policy was right and expedient, appealed to the reason of his people and inspired their hopes.1

The months of July and August, 1862, were one of the periods of gloom when the Northern people would probably have abandoned the contest had they not had at their head an unfaltering leader like Abraham Lincoln. The retreat to the James was a rude shock to their confidence in McClellan and the Army of the Potomac. When Norton asked George William Curtis, "Do you think the Army on the James river is safe?" he was expressing the anxious solicitude of many, as Lowell put into words the apprehensions of countless others when he wrote, "I don't see how we are to be saved but by a miracle." 3

2

Is

History has answered Norton's question, "Will Lincoln be master of the opportunities or will they escape him? he great enough for the time?" 4 Schurz wrote to Lincoln that his "personal influence upon public opinion," his "moral power" was immense: 5 this he now used to raise the men necessary to continue the war. From McClellan's despatch of June 286 he was convinced that the plan for taking Richmond had failed and that the Union armies must be increased. With a view to starting fresh enlistments he furnished Seward with a letter, making clear the need of additional troops. This letter was used by the Secretary, during his journey to New York City, Boston and Cleveland, in his conferences with men of influence and with the governors of several States. In it Lincoln declared,

1 IV; Lect. with their references. 3 Lowell, I, 322.

2 July 31.

4 July 31.

5 May 16. Schurz, Speeches, etc., I, 206.

C. E. Norton, I, 255. C. E. Norton, I, 255. 6 Ante.

156

THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND

[1862

"I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsakes me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is." The result of Seward's conferences and of his counsel by wire with the President and Secretary of War was a telegram to the governors of the States of the Union, asking them to unite in a letter to the President, in which they should request him to call upon the several States for men enough "to speedily crush the rebellion." The governors fell in with the plan; the President accepted the "patriotic" offer and, after a free interchange of thought between him and Seward and between Seward and the governors, made the call for 300,000 men. 1

1

From June 28 to July 1, Lincoln had no news of McClellan, and was in doubt as to the safety of his army for yet two more days; during this period, he grew thin and haggard. Sumner in despair wrote to Schurz: "I wish you were here to tell the President the true way. In vain will he appeal for troops at the North, so it seems to many of us. I have insisted that the appeal shall be made to the slaves and the rear-guard of the rebellion be changed into the advance-guard of the Union." 2 A month later, Sumner appreciated the hold Lincoln had on the people, writing to John Bright: "The last call for three hundred thousand men is received by the people with enthusiasm, because it seems to them a purpose to push the war vigorously. There is no thought in the Cabinet or the President of abandoning the contest." "We shall easily obtain the new levy," wrote Lincoln in a private letter (August 4). In spite of the mis1 July 1. The call was for three years' men.

2 July 5, Schurz, Speeches, etc., I, 209.

CH. IV]

POPE AND HALLECK

157

fortunes of the Army of the Potomac, he had the support of the plain people, who shared the enthusiasm of a mass meeting in Chicago that listened to the reading of a poem whose theme was, "We are coming Father Abraham three hundred thousand more." 1

Gloomy as was the outlook, worse was yet to come owing to further blunders in generalship. What General Meade wrote in May, "We must expect disaster so long as the armies are not under one master mind," 2 Lincoln knew perfectly well, and gladly would he have devolved the military conduct of affairs on one man could he have found that "master mind" for whom he made a painful quest during almost two years. The armies of the West, as contrasted with the Army of the Potomac, had accomplished positive results and to the ability there developed he looked for aid. He brought John Pope from the West where he had achieved an inconsiderable victory and made him commander of the Army of Virginia, composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks and Frémont. At the same time he appointed Halleck General-in-chief of the whole land forces of the United States with headquarters in Washington. If is difficult to comprehend the assignment of Pope, whose reported "wonderful military operations on the Mississippi and at Corinth had not somehow been fully substantiated." Admiral Foote "used to laugh at his gasconade and bluster." 3 Halleck's promotion is easily understood. He had received much more than his share of the glory for the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson: this and his advance upon Corinth gave him the confidence of the country and of most of the army. It is remarkable that there was apparently

1 On Aug. 4 the President ordered a draft of 300,000 nine-months' militia additional to call mentioned page 156. This brought 87,588.

2 General Meade, I, 269.

3 Welles's Diary, I, 120.

4 See W. Sherman, I, 254; Sherman Letters, 153.