232 MEADE'S ACCOUNT [1863 my record evidences. The only thing that can be said, and I am willing to admit the justice of the argument, is that it remains to be seen whether I have the capacity to handle successfully a large army. I do not stand however any chance, because I have no friends, political or others, who press or advance my claims or pretensions, and there are so many others who are pressed by influential politicians that it is folly to think I stand any chance upon mere merit alone." 1 . Meade can best tell the story of his promotion. "It has pleased Almighty God," he wrote to his wife on June 29, "to place me in the trying position that for sometime past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning at 3 A.M. I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought it was either to relieve or arrest me. He handed me a communication to read, which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. . . . As it appears to be God's will for some good purpose at any rate as a soldier, I had nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. I am moving at once against Lee. . . . A battle will decide the fate of our country and our cause. Pray earnestly, pray for the success of my country (for it is my success besides)." Frank Haskell, a staff officer in the Second Corps, who wrote during July, 1863 a graphic account of the Battle of Gettysburg, recorded his belief that "the Army in general, both officers and men, had no confidence in Hooker, in either his honesty or ability." When the change of command became known, he wrote: "We breathed a full breath of joy and of hope. The Providence of God had been with 1 General Meade, I, 388. CH. VI] us tomac. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 233 General Meade commanded the Army of the Po The Army brightened and moved on with a more elastic step.' Reynolds at once went to see Meade and assured him of his hearty support.2 The President conferred upon his general full power. Meade advanced northward in his aim "to find and fight the enemy." He had been prompt to command, his subordinates zealous to obey. The officers, sinking for the moment all their rivalries and jealousies, were careful and untiring in their efforts, while the soldiers showed extraordinary endurance in their long and rapid marches in the hot sun and sultry air of the last days of June. Meade's advance northward caused Lee to concentrate his army east of the mountains; he called Ewell back from his projected attack on Harrisburg to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg "as circumstances might require." 3 In the meantime Hill and Longstreet had been ordered to Cashtown, which was eight miles west of Gettysburg. Both Lee and Meade hoped and expected to fight a defensive battle and their manoeuvres were directed to this end. The circumstances that led to a collision at Gettysburg on July 1 between a number of the Confederates and Reynolds commanding the left wing need not be detailed. Reynolds was killed and afterwards his troops met with a serious reverse. When Meade heard of his death, which was for him as great a disaster as the loss of Stonewall Jackson had been to Lee, he sent forward to take command, Hancock, who restored order out of the existing confusion. Nevertheless, the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg was a decided Confederate success. By six o'clock on the afternoon of July 1, Meade had 2 General Meade, II, 33. 3 O. R., XXVII, Pt. II, 317. 1 Frank Haskell, 3, 6, 8. 234 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG [1863 arrived at the opinion that "a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on us";1 and he issued orders to all of his corps to concentrate at that point. He himself arrived on the battle-field about midnight, pale, tired-looking, holloweyed and worn out from loss of sleep, anxiety and the weight of responsibility. At about eight o'clock on the morning of July 2, accompanied by a staff-officer and orderly, he rode forth on a visit to his right wing. Schurz, who spoke with him on this occasion, was struck with "his long-bearded, haggard face, his care-worn and tired" look, "as if he had not slept that night." "His mind was evidently absorbed by a hard problem," Schurz went on. "But this simple, cold, serious soldier with his business-like air did inspire confidence. The officers and men as much as was permitted crowded around and looked up to him with curious eyes and then turned away not enthusiastic but clearly satisfied. With a rapid glance he examined the position of our army and nodded seemingly with approval. After the usual salutations I asked him how many men he had on the ground. I remember his answer well, 'In the course of the day I expect to have about 95,000 enough I guess for this business.' After another sweeping glance over the field, he added, as if reflecting something to himself, 'Well we may fight it out here just as well as anywhere else.'" 2 By the afternoon of July 2, Lee and Meade had their whole forces on the field, Lee mustering 70,000, Meade 93,000,3 less the losses of the first day, which had been much greater on the Union than on the Confederate side. The armies were about a mile apart, the Confederates occupying the eminence concave in form called Seminary Ridge, whilst 10. R., XXVII, Pt. III, 466. 2 Schurz, Reminiscences, III, 20. T. L. Livermore, 102; The Nation, July 11, 1901, 36. |
