244 LEE MEADE [1863 said, "You and your men have crowned yourselves with glory." 1 Pickett's charge, though a hazardous enterprise, was by no means a hopeless one and might well have succeeded had not Meade and Hancock been thoroughly prepared for it and had they not shown generalship of a high order. With Hooker in command the irresolute Hooker of Chancellorsville- there would have been a different story to relate. A comparison of the management of the two battles will confirm Halleck's judgment that Hooker “would have lost the army and the capital." 2 Moreover, Lee had to decide between an attack and an inglorious retreat. Divided, his army could live upon the country, but during a prolonged concentration it could not be fed. His decision was in keeping with his aggressive disposition, and his mistake seems to have been in underrating Meade's ability and in overestimating both the physical and moral damage done by his artillery fire. If the Confederates, who made the breach in the Union line could have held on, adequate support would undoubtedly have been given and Lee's idea of "one determined and united blow" 3 delivered by his whole line might have been realized. And if he could have thoroughly beaten the Army of the Potomac, Baltimore and Washington would have been at his mercy. Perhaps the risk was worth taking. Whether Meade should at once have made a countercharge across the valley, or attacked the Confederate right before dark on July 3, or occupied Lee's line of retreat that afternoon and made a general advance early next morning are questions frequently discussed by military writers. 10. R., XXVII, Pt. III, 987, 1075. 2 O. R., XXIV, Pt. III, 498. 3 Rec. and Letters of R. E. Lee, 102. CH. VI] MEADE 245 Meade's own idea is disclosed in these words of July 5 to his wife. The Confederates "awaited one day expecting that flushed with success, I would attack them when they would play their old game of shooting us from behind breastworks." 1 "Under the cover of the night and heavy rain" of July 4, Lee began his retreat. Meade followed. The strain on a commanding general during such a campaign is shown by these words to his wife on July 8: "From the time I took command till to-day, now over ten days, I have not changed my clothes, have not had a regular night's rest and many nights not a wink of sleep and for several days did not even wash my face and hands, no regular food and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety. Indeed I think I have lived as much in this time as in the last thirty years." In this letter, which was written from Frederick, he said, "I think we shall have another battle before Lee can cross the river." 2 The heavy rains and resultant high water prevented Lee from crossing the Potomac at once and, by July 11, Meade in his pursuit had come within striking distance of the Confederate Army. While proceeding with great caution, he had determined to make an attack on July 13; but as he was wavering in mind and feeling oppressed by his great responsibility he called a council of war. Five out of six of his corps commanders were opposed to the projected attack, which caused him to delay giving the orders for it. Meade devoted July 13 to an examination of the enemy's position, strength and defensive works; and the next day, advancing his army for a reconnaissance in force, or an assault if the conditions should be favorable, he discovered that the Confederate army had crossed the Potomac in the night. 2 Ibid., II, 132. 1 General Meade, II, 125. 246 LINCOLN MEADE [1863 "The escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, telegraphed Halleck [July 14]. Meade asked to be relieved of the command of the army: his application was refused. During July 12 and 13, Lincoln was anxious and impatient and when, about noon of the 14th, he got word that Lee and his army were safely across the Potomac he was "deeply grieved." "And that, my God, is the last of this Army of the Potomac !" he said. "Meade has been pressed and urged, but only one of his generals was for an immediate attack, was ready to pounce on Lee; the rest held back. What does it mean, Mr. Welles? Great God! what does it mean?" 1 "We had them within our grasp,' he said. "We had only to stretch forth our hands and they were ours. And nothing I could say or do could make the army move." In a later private letter he developed this opinion. "I was deeply mortified," he said, "by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war and because I believed such destruction was perfectly Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed-making my belief a hobby possibly that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. easy. No one should accept this judgment of Lincoln's without considering Meade's defence. "Had I attacked Lee the day I proposed to do so," the General wrote, "and in the ignorance that then existed of his position, I have every 1 Welles's Diary, July 14, I, 370. 2 July 14, J. Hay, I, 85; N. & H., VII, 278. CH. VI] LINCOLN MEADE - GRANT 247 I reason to believe the attack would have been unsuccessful and would have resulted disastrously. This opinion is founded on the judgment of numerous distinguished officers after inspecting Lee's vacated works and position. had great responsibility thrown on me. On one side were the known and important fruits of victory, and, on the other, the equally important and terrible consequences of a defeat." 1 In the end it was Lincoln himself who suggested the sanest possible view of the episode. In a letter of July 21 he wrote, "I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done [at Gettysburg]. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skilful officer and a true man." The change in Northern sentiment between July 1 and 4 reveals unmistakably the sense of a great deliverance.2 Although indeed a great deliverance, the victory at Gettysburg had been gained by an army acting on the defensive, whilst the nature of the conflict required that the North should wage an aggressive war. And fortunately the aggressive leader had at last been found. 1863, Grant had assumed "the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg.' On January 20, Before and during the war the Mississippi river possessed, as a channel of communication and commerce, a great importance, which has steadily diminished with the develop 1 July 31, O. R., XXVII, Pt. I, 109. 2 Authorities: O. R., XXVII, Pt. I, II, III; General Meade; Frank Haskell; C. W., 1865, I; Pickett's Letters; W. R. Livermore; T. L. Livermore, Milt. Hist. Soc., XIII; IV; B. & L., III; Longstreet; Alexander; Welles's Diary; Schurz, Reminiscences; Pickett and his Men, L. S. Pickett; Pickett's Men, Harrison; Francis A. Walker; Pennypacker; Fitzhugh Lee; Fremantle; Hosmer's Appeal; Swinton, Army of the Potomac. 248 THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER [1863 ment of the railroad system of the West. The importance of gaining control of it was appreciated at the North from the first; such control being regarded in the East as a military advantage, whilst by the people of the Western States it was deemed indispensable to their existence, as providing an outlet for their products and an artery for their supply. "The free navigation of the Mississippi" were words to conjure with, not only in the Southwest, but everywhere west of the Alleghanies, except in the region directly tributary to the Great Lakes.1 Lincoln, owing to the geographical situation of his home, had been brought up with this sentiment; in manhood his mind was thoroughly impregnated with it; and throughout the great crisis he never lost sight of its military and commercial significance. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the resulting operations had freed the Mississippi north of Vicksburg; the capture of New Orleans had given the Union its mouth. But the Confederates were still in virtual possession of the two hundred miles of river between their two strong fortresses of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thereby maintaining communication between Louisiana and Texas on the one side and the rest of the Confederacy on the other. Louisiana supplied them with sugar, while the great State of Texas furnished quantities of grain and beef, besides affording, through its contiguity to Mexico, an avenue for munitions of war received from Europe at the Mexican port of Matamoras a consideration of much weight, since the ports of the Southern States were now pretty effectually sealed by the Federal blockade. Of the two fastnesses, Vicksburg was by far the more important and the desire in the Confederacy to keep it was keen. 1 California and Oregon are manifestly excepted from this general statement. |
