I go to the Supreme Court with the utmost respect for its history and traditions. Great men sat upon that Court in Spanish days. Great men are there now. Willard

and Moreland, Trent, Carson, and Johnson balanced by Arellano and Torres, Mapa and Araullo, not specially mentioned to make invidious distinction, but merely to give honor where honor is due, are names which would shine in the legal history of any country. I know the tittle-tattle of legal criticism. I have heard lawyers criticize this or that opinion or this or that judge. I have done the same. The lawyer was not to blame; in fact it was merely the exhibition of the prime quality of a good lawyer, belief in the rectitude of his cause. Yet judge for judge, and opinion for opinion, let him who is impartial compare the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands with the courts of last resort of the States of the American Union or with the courts of other countries, and the good name of the Supreme Court of these Islands will lose nothing by the comparison.

Yet, however able our judiciary, one must frankly admit that there is widespread and popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Fortunately, it is much more evident in other countries than here. Meeting this situation squarely is the duty of all, especially of the Judiciary itself.

The first criticism which is presented is disapproval of the law's delay. How can justice be expedited? The Legislature can help by the enactment of short practice acts, and by limiting appeal. Lawyers and judges can help by avoiding or prohibiting technical delay. How can the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands assist?

The Supreme Court is called upon to decide about one thousand cases annually. This, with the incidental motions, if every case is to be discussed, authorities are to be exhausted, and polished opinions are to be turned out, places an intolerable burden on the Court.

If I may be permitted, there is one section of the Judiciary Organization Act which might well be borne in mind. Section 15 reads: "In the determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court shall be given in writing, signed by the judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the decision shall be stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness." As decided in Ocampo v. Cabangis, this language is, of course, merely directory. A Court can follow it or not as it pleases. But to my mind it is a wise injunction. "Briefly as may be consistent with clearness" means not a transcript of the record, not a long list of quotations from digests, encyclopedias, or cases, not a statement and re-statement of arguments, but merely a short narrative of essential facts, consideration of the vital issue or issues, presentation of propositions, and judgment.

But even this construction I would use only for important cases deemed valuable as precedents. Many times, even against the complaint of attorneys, a case which involves no new principle can be resolved as affirmed, modified, or revised without opinion. Or it may be that the decision of the trial court is worthy to be copied

without comment, or that there is another opinion on all fours. In any of these instances, I find nothing to be gained in re-stating facts or principles or in endeavoring to demonstrate axioms of the law. Only the vanity of the writer of the judicial masterpiece is flattered, and the pocket of the paper manufacturer is benefited. The Supreme Court under American innovation is not permitted to hand down oral opinions. But it is not certain but what under the English system which permits of a case to be argued in the morning, and decision to be delivered in the afternoon, justice is accomplished just as nearly as under our system wherein attorneys make long oral arguments and submit extended briefs, the Court discusses the case thoroughly, and then, perhaps months or years afterwards, an exhaustive opinion and judgment is handed down. Lord Coke says in a quotation from his reports followed by our Supreme Court, "If judges should set down the reasons and causes of their judgments within every record, that immense labor should withdraw them from the necessary service of the commonwealth, and their records should grow to be like elephantini libri, of infinite length and, in mine opinion, lose some of their present authority and reverence; and this is worthy for learned and grave men to imitate." And in England the Judiciary enjoys a greater prestige than in the United States or the Philippines.

Again I see nothing to be gained in long dissenting opinions. Such opinions merely serve to make the law uncertain. Ordinarily they are only an outlet to relieve the feelings of the judge who has failed to convince his colleagues, and who by this means can let the public know in ironic but always perfectly courteous judicial language, exactly what his opinion of the mental caliber of his associates is. The idea of the dissenter is about that which Franklin once expressed of Adams, that he "was an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes wholly out of his senses."

Nor do I see the wisdom in consuming valuable time in chasing the illusive word through books of synonyms. Let us hope that pure English or pure Spanish goes onto the paper in spontaneous dictation, for good language intensifies good law. But if the dictator has not the mental alertness to use plain straight-from-the-shoulder red-blooded language, then, I say, leave distinctions in phraseology to the rhetoricians and pass on to legal principles.

The cluttering of opinions with citations and authorities does not appeal to me. The reports are now so numerous that he is indeed a pocr lawyer who cannot cite a case to substantiate his theory. An all too common practice is for briefs to include a quotation from an encyclopedia with a long list of citations appended, most of which are found on investigation to be not in point. Now, I have the greatest admiration for the Common Law. I believe ordinarily in the doctrine of "stare decisis," for it means legal stability. But there is the danger of lazy and mechanical imitation. I always want to be assured that the reasoning of the precedent is sound and that it is applicable to existing conditions. The law is progressing like all sciences. It has a social concept which not long ago was lacking. It must meet

the new and complex conditions of a changing civilization. It is a forward-looking law, while precedents look backward. Throughout it there runs a legal philosophy which aims at a humane law leading to the goal of justice. Usually law and justice coincide, but if they disagree, then I would forget the law and do justice. "The cardinal principles of justice," the United States Supreme Court said in Holden v. Hardy, "are immutable." Because of human imperfections, justice is difficult enough to attain. It should not be made more so by an inflexible and blind law.

There is an example under our Penal Law which arrives at the same conclusion. Now, I also admire the precision and clearness of the Civil Law. But sometimes it makes judges merely expert mathematicians. Take a case under the Penal Code. A Judge of First Instance, after hearing the evidence, and remember that he is in a better position to do justice than the appellate court since he has seen and heard the witnesses testify, gives judgment for a certain penalty, a penalty not in accord with the rules of the Penal Code. Justice is done. Some bright lawyer appeals. And the Supreme Court by adding circumstances is forced to increase the sentence. The law is followed. Mayhap justice is scorned. The result attains even in such a grave matter as the imposition of the death penalty, which results in the concurrence of certain prescribed and unalterable circumstances. In my judgment the Philippine Legislature will win the applause of all patriotic citizens if at the next session it pass a new Correctional Code based on the modern conceptions of penology and criminology and intended to prevent crime and to reform, not to punish offenders. Let the Legislature also repose confidence in the impartiality of the Judiciary and prison officials by giving to them discretion in the imposition of penalties. I look for our Legislature in the continuance of the same wisdom it has heretofore shown in the enactment of progressive laws, to place a modern humane Correctional Code on the statute books.

If the Judiciary do what the people want, it will look through the form of procedure to the substance of a just result. I believe with Justice Moreland that procedure is the means to an end, and not the end itself. If from the pleadings it is humanely possible to decide the case, let it be done, or let the Supreme Court go out of its way as it often does to point the course for the lower court in order to avoid further appeal. So, also, with our artificial rules of evidence. I would strictly adhere to the rule to set aside no judgment unless it is made to appear that the error affects the substantial rights of the parties. Technicality, a sign of an undeveloped legal system, pours money into the pockets of the lawyer but takes it unjustly out of the pockets of the client.

In this connection, there is one part of the oath which next Monday I shall take which appeals to me-"that I will do equal right to the poor and to the rich." The rich can hire the finest legal minds. The poor must often rely entirely on the impartiality of the Courts. The lot of the laboring man especially merits considera

tion. Industrious, honest, patriotic-laws which will give him more comforts and more protection are to be commended.

The Judiciary cannot shut its eyes to what is going on in the world about. It cannot go into monastic seclusion and accomplish practical justice. The study of men is as complicated and is as important as the study of books. I have acquired more good hard sense from a Chinese tienda-keeper in Binondo than I have in the reading of some books.

The ideal type of a judge is for me Oliver Wendell Holmes of the United States Supreme Court. Justice Holmes has found time to produce a legal masterpiece which will be remembered when his work on the Court is forgotten. He has found time to take a sincere interest in labor and humanity. And in the Court he has followed original methods which bring results. Often you can see him reading authorities or making notes from records while attorneys are arguing cases orally. The attorney is not flattered but after all many cases could just as well be left to depend on serious presentation in the brief and not on oratory. The Justice is also said to take up a case, read it carefully, make up his mind immediately, write a short opinion, and pass on to the next case. These short opinions may be termed superficial and are often unsatisfactory to counsel. On the contrary they are really a criterion of depth of mind, dealing mainly in essentials and legal propositions and leaving it to the attorney's intelligence to fill up the gaps of evolutionary argu

ment.

The Judiciary must think of itself as a part of the government. This being so, the Judiciary will conceive a strong paternal government. It will properly follow the English-American rule, and not the Continental rule, and will regard all men as equal before the law, by holding public officials to strict accountability. It will, however, not attempt to encroach upon the powers of the Chief Executive and to embarrass him in the performance of acts of state. For a similar reason the Courts will not attempt to embarrass the Legislature by holding many laws invalid. The formulation of policy is for the Legislature, the elect of the people, and not for the judges. In this respect the Continental meaning of "unconstitutional" which restricts the power of the Courts is to be preferred to the American doctrine which means that the act is beyond the power of the Legislature and, therefore, void. Judicial vetos, or a revising Judiciary, are not essential to good government. I like a system similar to that of Massachusetts, which permits the Legislature to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court before a bill is enacted into a law. Plainly, therefore, while it is well for executive and legislative branches to be closely associated, it is best for the judiciary to keep strictly aloof from these fields. The Judiciary should only assume its truc role of construing the law, of protecting the people, and of imposing self-restraint on the people. Thus circumscribed, the Judiciary will not encumber the other powers of government and will gain more time for the accomplishment of its own peculiar functions.

The most valuable agency to keep officials, including the Judiciary, within the law, is the force of public opinion. We must necessarily draw a line between mere licentiousness and freedom of speech. One must be curtailed. The other must be encouraged. But even if a petition of a newspaper article contain a mis-statement, I, for one, believe in leniency. I would even go so far as to permit criticism of the Courts so long as the criticism does not impede the course of justice. We want a government of law, and not of men. And we can only attain it through a liberal and equitable construction of our drastic libel law. A good name is to be desired, but so also are the loving favor and the great riches of an informed and courageous public opinion.

My friends, the Philippines need a legal education with high standards. They need a legal literature produced by eminent scholars. They need a strong and harmonious Bar Association. They need a judicial system accomplishing justice speedily, keeping to its own sphere, and enforced by public opinion. The field is wide. There is work for all. Let us do our duty as befits good lawyers and good citizens.