the mother opposes on the ground that the child could exercise the profession of a lawyer and also on the ground that the necessity for support was caused by the bad conduct of the child and that she was not obliged to give it until after claim had been made against his wife and descendants, in accordance with the provisions of law. The lower court granted the petition and ordered the payment of the support by the mother, which judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal. In the latter court it was held:

That the procedural law having been complied with, and it having been.proved that the child had a legal title to support, as the parentage had been proved, and the necessity for support and the amount of the property of the obligor having been shown also, there was no reason for denying the petition.

That the judgment ordering the appellant to furnish the support did not violate the provisions of articles 143 and 144 of the Civil Code, which provide that the wife and children of the recipient are the first, ones obliged to give support, inasmuch as the court had made a finding of the fact that wife and young children of the applicant, at the time that the necessity for support arose, did not possess any property, and that therefore the essential element necessary in order that the legal obligation may exist, which is property, or rents, or fortune, was wanting. It became unnecessary therefore to show that demand had previously been made of the wife and children, because decisions of the court had time and again pronounced that it is not needed so to do once the lack of means on the part of those who are to give support in the first instance has been shown.

That neither was there a violation of the provisions of sections 3 and 5 of article 152 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it was not clearly shown that the recipient, who was a lawyer, could exercise his profession or otherwise utilize the same for getting means for subsistence, or that the failure to obtain means resulted from bad conduct on his (recipient's) part.

That the amount of support depends upon the sound discretion of the court and it would not be reversed unless there has been a clear and manifest error in its estimation.

The support begins from the day of the demand made in court, even though the procedings have been delayed on account of the delay of the mother in answering the complaint for support. (Sentence of June 6, 1917, Number 396).

2. PROPERTY; "REIVINDICACION"; IDENTITY OF PROPERTY.— The "acción reivindicatoria" requires not only the proof of the ownership of the thing sought to be recovered but also its perfect identity. (Sentence of May 18, 1917, Number 358.)

ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION THROUGH MERE POSSESSION.-The inscription in the Registry of Property of "informacion posesoria" does not bar an action for the recovery of the property whose possession it thus inscribed until after thirty years after such inscription. The extraordinary prescription of thirty years

is necessary in order to convert such possession into ownership. (Sentence of May 25, 1917, Number 372.) (NOTE: Compare with sec. 41 of Code of Civil Procedure. Perhaps it is safe to say that this decision may yet be applicable in the Philippines in those cases in which possession took place during the Spanish regime, and the claim of right depends upon such possession. ED.)

ID.; EXTINCTION OF “FOROS” BY CONFUSION AND PRESCRIPTION. -It is very well recognized in law that one of the ways in which "foros" are extinguished is by the consolidation in one persons of the ownership and the right to enjoy (dominio util), and the censo can not be recreated once the full ownership has been realized in one person, except by express will manifested in a public instrument. The mere fact of the death of the former persons in whom the dominio util and the dominio director has been consolidated does not produce the revival of the right of censo in favor of one of the heirs over the same property, over which a censo had previously existed, that property having been assigned to another as his portion. (Sentence of May 21, 1917, Number 360.)

ID.; EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION FOR PARTITION.-An action for partition was instituted and the possessor of the land sought to be partitioned opposed the demand on the ground that he had acquired ownership of the property (real estate) by possession for more than thirty years. The Supreme Court, in denying the petition for prescription held:

That article 1965 of the Civil Code, just as well as Law 2, Title 8, Book 11 of the Novisima Recopilación, presuppose as an essential requisite and condition for the application of the principle of imprescriptibility which they provide, proof of the fact that the thing or property is possessed in common and proindiviso, for in truth and in fact, imprescriptibility depend upon these requisites. But once there is absence of common enjoyment, the coheir, with respect to the property inherited from a common ancestor, ceases to be a co-owner, and there can not be any more imprescriptibility. (Sentence of June 6, 1917, Number 398.)

3. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS WITHOUT SPECIAL PRIVILEGE.-A creditor intervened in an action for the enforcement of a judgment by execution over the property of the debtor. The credit of the intervener was evidenced by a public instrument of a date anterior to that of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Held: That in accordance with article 1924 of the Civil Code, the credits not having special privilege, the credit appearing on the public instrument bearing the earller date, it should have preference over the judgment credit. (Sentence of May 30, 1917, Number 381 and Number 382.)

ID.; INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT.-When it is not shown that the judicial interpretation of a contract is evidently and manifestly erroneous, it should be confirmed by the appellate court. (Sentence of May 26, 1917, Number 376.)

José Guingona has opened a law office at the Cosmopolitan Building and is having a good practice.

1917

Jesus de la Rama and Arsenio Roldan, both of the Class of 1917, have associated themslves in a law firm under the name of "De la Rama and Roldan". They have their main offices at the De la Rama Building near the foot of Santa Cruz Bridge. The firm is in charge of the business of the "Hijos de I. de la Rama”.

Exequiel M. Santos, also of the class of 1917, is practicing at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, with two other attorneys of the said province under the firm name of "Gonzalez, Nava and Santos".

Servillano de la Cruz and Manuel Tabora have joined together and established law offices in Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, and in the City of Manlai.

ALUMNI SUBSCRIPTION TO THE LAW JOURNAL

The percentage of subscriptions for each class is the following:

Mr. Arturo Ignacio, the Representative of the Junior Class, having been elected Chancellor of the Philippine Barristers, resigned as such Representative and election to fill the vacancy was had and the nomination of Mr. Ramón Felipe to substitute him was unanimously accepted.

ANNUAL LAW DANCE

We did not err in predicting a grand annual Law Dance because the ball held at the Masonic Temple on Saturday night Nov. 24, was simply magnificent. The Committee ought to be congratulated. Justice Johnson, Dean Bocobo, Mrs. Burton and Mrs. Espiritu formed the reception. line. Professors, alumni and undergraduates seemed to have met together to share the joys of dancing under the delicious foxtrots and one-steps of the "Orchestra Oriental".

COLLEGE OF LAW ATHLETIC MEET

We clip the following from a local newspaper:

"A big crowd attended the College of Law annual athletic day held yesterday at the University Campus. The event was one of the most successful affairs ever pulled off by the law students of the University of the Philippines and spoke well of the college spitit fostered in the institution.