the contract of employment, most strikes lasting fewer than fourteen days do not constitute a dissolution of a labor contract, and hence do not result in dismissal of the strikers. Dismissals of part of the employees occurred in 190 cases and dismissals of all the workers in 137 cases. Arrests and deportations of strikers to their homes (the legal residence of factory workers being usually some village) took place in 269 cases, destruction of property took place in 71 cases, and the military forces were called out in 340 cases. Both destruction of property and use of the military forces occurred frequently during the strikes of 1903. The conflicts were most numerous in the metal industry and in the oil industry of the Caucasus.

The following table shows the number of strikes that were accompanied by extraordinary measures and occurrences:

STRIKES, ACCOMPANIED BY EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES AND OCCURRENCES, BY YEARS, 1895 TO 1904.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[Except in cases of special interest, the decisions here presented are restricted to those rendered by the Federal courts and the higher courts of the States and Territories. Only material portions of such decisions are reproduced, introductory and explanatory matter being given in the words of the editor. Decisions under statute law are indexed under the proper headings in the cumulative index, page 1037 et seq.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTE LAW.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SUPERINTENDENT ACTING AS LABORERCONTINUING DUTY-PARENTS' RIGHT TO SUE FOR LOSS OF MINOR'S SERVICES-Jordan v. New England Structural Company, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 83 Northeastern Reporter, page 332.-There were two cases under this title before the court on appeal from the superior court of Suffolk County. A minor, T. F. Jordan, was suing by his next friend to recover damages for injuries received while in the employment of the company, and his father was suing for loss of services. Judgment was for the plaintiffs in both cases in the court below. On appeal, however, it was held that the "Fellow-servant law," under which alone the action could be brought, did not give the father a right to sue. The judgment in behalf of the son was affirmed.

The facts appear in the opinion, which was delivered by Judge Knowlton and is in the main as follows:

In the defendant's shop there was a large crane, estimated to weigh about 20 tons, which passed in and out upon an iron track nearly 20 feet above the ground, which track was supported by girders. The track and girders were taken down and replaced by new ones. While the work was going on and before the old track was entirely removed, the crane ran in and out over that part which was in position, and as soon as the new track was in place and safely supported it began to run in and out occasionally over that. The minor plaintiff was an iron worker. He was sent with another man to put in a bracket underneath the girder, between the pillars that supported it, and in doing the work he stood upon a narrow piece of iron and steadied himself by taking hold of the track above the girder with one hand. His companion went away temporarily, and John Flynn, a foreman who directed the work, came up to take his place, standing in a similar way, with one of his hands holding the rail of the track. The crane came along over the track and cut off the ends of two of the plaintiff's fingers.

There was ample evidence to warrant a finding that Flynn was a superintendent within the meaning of the statute. The jury might well find that it was a part of his duty to warn workmen, who were in exposed positions of the coming of the crane, if they were where they would not be likely to see it. There was testimony that he had given such warnings repeatedly during the progress of the work. It appeared that the place was very noisy, and that the plaintiff could not hear nor see the approach of the crane while he was working below the girder. His back was towards the crane as it approached, while the superintendent was facing it. There was testimony that the superintendent could have seen the crane as it was coming, although this was disputed. The superintendent was not relieved from the obligation to use due care for the safety of the employees by his taking the place of the plaintiff's companion, temporarily, to assist in the work of putting in the bracket. It was a question for the jury whether the superintendent was negligent in failing to discover the approach of the crane and to warn the plaintiff of his danger. It was also a question for the jury whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care. In this case the defendant's exceptions must be overruled.

The claim of the father presents a different question. This, like the other, is brought under the employer's liability act, and no negligence is charged except that of the superintendent. At common law neither of the plaintiffs could recover, as the only negligence complained of was that of a fellow-servant. The employer's liability act cannot be availed of by the father to recover for loss of service or for expenses, inasmuch as this statute gives a right of action only to the employee or his legal representatives, or, if he is instantly killed or dies without conscious suffering, to his widow or next of kin. (Rev. Laws, c. 106, secs. 71-73.) The employee or his legal representatives shall have the same rights to compensation and of action against the employer as if he had not been an employee," etc. If he is a minor, this enlargement of his rights at common law does not extend to his father, suing in his own right.

* *

*

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SUPERINTENDENT ACTING AS LABORER— QUESTION FOR JURY-Gallagher v. Newman, Court of Appeals of New York, 83 Northeastern Reporter, page 480.—Annie Gallagher sued to recover damages for the death of her husband, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of one Brady, who was Newman's foreman. Judgment was for the plaintiff in the trial court and the appellate division of the supreme court, but was reversed on further appeal and a new trial ordered.

It appears that the foreman called on the deceased and a fellowworkman to assist in replacing a belt that had slipped from its place, and that while they were so employed, Brady, with the apparent purpose of furthering the undertaking, threw on the power at such time as to inflict the injuries that caused Gallagher's death. The instructions by the trial judge were held not to have properly submitted to

the jury the question of the nature of the act of Brady, whether he was at the time a superintendent, so that the employer was bound by his action, or whether the act was one of mere coservice and so not within the provisions of the employers' liability law of 1902, under which the suit was brought.

The construction of the law adopted by the court of appeals is set forth in the following excerpt from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Hiscock :

* * *

The employer's liability act provides for a recovery by the administrator of a deceased employee the same as though the intestate had not been an employee where the injury was caused "by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer intrusted with and exercising superintendence, whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence." As was said by this court in Harris v. Baltimore Machine & Elevator Works, 188 N. Y. 144, 80 N. E. 1028, this statute "gave an additional cause of action; because it prescribed that a master shall be liable for the negligence of the superintendent, or the person acting as such. At common law such a liability was not recognized, unless the superintending servant was the alter ego of the master with respect to the work." This court may be regarded as having formulated under this act the principles that an employer is not liable for the negligent act of an employee simply because the latter ordinarily is engaged in discharging duties of superintendence, nor, on the contrary, is the employer exempted from liability for such act simply because it is one which may be described in some sense as "a detail of the work; " but the employer is liable or not accordingly as the negligent act is one of or pertaining to superintendence, or is one which is the subject of performance by ordinary, subordinate employees, and including no element of superior duty, supervision, or command.

These principles were last discussed and approved by this court in the case of Guilmartin v. Solvay Process Company, 189 N. Y. 490, 82 N. E. 725. In that case some of the defendant's employees were engaged in readjusting a belt on a pulley. One Mullin was the foreman of the shift or gang to which the plaintiff belonged, and had power to stop the machinery in case of accident or emergency. On being informed of the accident, he caused the movement of the engine to be slowed down, and then directed the plaintiff with other workmen to cut the lacing of the belt, he personally joining in the work. After the belt was cut he directed one of the workmen to throw the loose end on the floor. The shaft pulley being relieved from the strain of the taut belt again revolved with the shaft and caused the loose end of the belt to strike and injure the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the trial court, which was reversed by the appellate division, on the ground that the negligence of Mullin in failing to stop the engine, if negligence it was, was the negligence of a fellow-servant in a detail of the work for which the master was not liable. Judge Cullen, writing in behalf of this court, for a reversal of the decision of the appellate division, said: "To render the master liable, the negligence must not only be on the part of the person who is acting as superintendent, but also in an act of superintendence. But if the act be of that character the fact that in a sense

it is a detail of the work will not relieve the master from liability. In the prosecution of many, if not most, works, superintendence is a detail of the work, in the accurate use of that term. It is often so denominated in the older cases, and properly so, because, before the statute, it was unnecessary to distinguish between negligence of a superintendent and that of a colaborer of the same grade as that of the person injured so far as any liability of the master was involved. The statute has changed this. In the McHugh case, 179 N. Y. 378, 72 N. E. 312, the defendant was held liable for the negligence of a train dispatcher in starting a train. The dispatcher performed that act, doubtless, scores of times a day, and its performance was a mere detail of his ordinary day's work. Therefore the question in any case brought under the statute is not whether the negligent act is a detail of the work, but whether it is a detail of the superintendent's part of the work, or of the subordinate employees and servants. In the present case had the foreman Mullin attempted to stop the engine himself, and so carelessly done the work as to cause injury to the other employees, that might very well be deemed the negligence of a coservant for which the master would not be liable, but the determination of the question whether the machinery should be stopped before the men were put to work on it was of a very different character. None of the other workmen could direct the engine to be stopped. He alone had that power. His direction in reference thereto or failure to direct was an act of superintendence. At least the jury was authorized to so find."

In the present case the act of Brady which resulted in the intestate's death is doubtless near the border line which separates superintendence from mere employment and manual labor. If, without taking any part in the actual adjustment of the belt on the pulleys, he had superintended the operation, and had directed the shifting of the lever which put the shaft in motion and injured intestate, there could be little doubt as to the character of his act as being one of superintendence. That, however, is not the case. He took actual part with the others in the manual labor directed toward the readjustment of the belt, the others working at one end of it and he at the other, and, as we have already said, it seems permissible to infer that his act in putting the shaft in motion was a mere continuance of his labor for the purpose of permitting the belt to be still further rolled onto the pulley. It fairly may be contended, in the language of Judge Braley, in Meagher v. Crawford Laundry Co., 187 Mass. 586, 73 N. E. 853, that he was "engaged with the men in a common task of manual labor," and we think that the appellant was entitled to have the jury say whether his act in moving the lever was comprehended within the lines of his duty as superintendent or was the act of an ordinary employee engaged with others in a common joint attempt to readjust the belt.

EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN-HOURS OF LABOR-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Burcher v. People, Supreme Court of Colorado, 93 Pacific Reporter, page 14.Frank Burcher and others were convicted of employing a woman in

46129-Bull, 76-08-22