estate descendible in a different course, and to different persons as special heirs, from what the first would carry the estate to: viz., to males instead of females, or vice versa; for where the first words give an estate tail general, and the words ingrafted thereon are words serving to limit the fee, it seems by the general and better opinion, that the annexed words of limitation are not to be attended to, as in the cases of Goodright vs. Pullyn, 2 Ld. Raym., 1437.; Wright vs. Pearson, Fearn. Cont. Rem., 187, Ambl., 358; and King vs. Burchall (Ambl., 378), where the ingrafted words limited the whole fee. Fearn. Cont. Rem., 286. So the rule is not applied to devises, where the remainder is given to the heir of the first devisee, for life only; in which case the first devisee will take no more than an estate for life. White vs. Collins, Com. Rep., 289. And where the word 'issue' is used with words of limitation superadded, it will be construed to be a word of purchase. Loddington vs. Kyme, 1 Ld. Raym., 203; Backhouse vs. Wells, 10 Mod., 181; and see Doe vs. Collis, 4 T. R., 294, adj. acc., in which case Lord Kenyon observed, that, in a will, issue was either a word of purchase or of limitation, as would best answer the intention of the devisor; though, in the case of a deed, 'issue' was universally taken as a word of purchase. Et vid. Doe vs. Burnsall, 6 T. R., 30. But the word 'issue,' in a will, will not be construed to be a word of purchase, where the general intent requires a different construction. See King vs. Melling, 1 Vent., 225, 232; 2 Lev., 58; 2 P. Wms., 472; King vs. Burchall, 4 T. R., 296, n.; Roe, d. Dobson vs. Grew, Wilm., 272; 2 Wils., 322. In cases where the testator has directed a settlement to be made, and the court of chancery has been called upon to give directions respect

ing such settlement, the court has deviated from the rule in Shelley's case, and has so far departed from that which would be the legal operation of the words limiting the trust, if reduced to a common law conveyance as to construe the words 'heirs of the body,' although preceded by a limitation for life, as words of purchase, and not of limitation. But this has been done only in cases where it appeared from some clause or circumstance essentially repugnant to the nature of an estate tail, that the devisor could only intend to give the first devisee an estate for life; and that he used the words 'heirs of the body,' for the purpose of describing the persons, to whom he meant to give the estate, after the death of the first devisee. Leonard vs. Earl of Sussex, 2 Vern., 526; Stamford, (Earl of) vs. Hobart, 3 Bro. P. C., 31.; Papillon vs. Voice, 2 P. Wms., 471; Ashton vs. Ashton, 1 Collect. Jur., 402; Glenarchy vs. Bosvill, Forrest, 3; 1 Collect. Jur., 405. Meure vs. Meure, 2 Atk., 265. And see the case of White vs. Carter, Ambl., 670, adj. acc., in which Lord Camden took a distinction between the case, where a testator has given complete directions for settling his estate, with perfect limitations, and where his directions are incomplete, and are rather minutes or instructions, and cannot be performed in the words of the will. In the former case, said his Lordship, the legal expression shall have the legal effect, though perhaps contrary to his intention; as in Garth vs. Baldwin, 2 Ves., 646. In the latter case, the court will consider the intention, and direct the conveyance according to it. And where there is a settlement without articles, the words will be left to their legal operation, unless from some recital in the deed, or some other circumstance, it clearly appears that the language of the limitation was owing to mistake.

Butl. Feran. Cont. Rem., 114. Ch. Ca., 27. Doran vs. Ross, 1 Ves. jun., 57. Lastly, where the estate devised to the ancestor, is merely an equitable or trust estate, and that to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, carries the legal estate, they will not incorporate into an estate of inheritance in the ancestor; as would have been the case, if both had been of one quality, that is, both legal, cr both equitable. Fearn. Cont. Rem., 68. For where the limitations are both legal, the estate-tail arises by legal construction or a rule of law; and when the limitations are both equitable (without other ingredients in the case to control the construction), a similar rule is adopted by equity, to preserve an uniformity in construction. But when both the estates are not legal, the application of a legal construction or operation of a rule of law, which must equally affect both, seems to be excluded, by one of the objects of that construction not being a subject of legal cognizance. So when both are not equitable estates, their combination seems to be out of the reach of an equitable construction, to which one of the estates is not adapted. Idem, 78; Et vid., Lord Say and Sele vs. Jones, 3 Bro. P. C., 113; 8 Vin. Abr., 262; Shapland vs. Smith, 1 Bro. C. C., 75; Silvester vs. Wilson, 2 T. R., 444; Venables vs. Morris, 7 T. R. 342, 438.

"Thus stood the law with respect to the rule in Shelley's case, when the famous case of Perrin vs. Blake arose, before the court of king's bench, in the year 1769; a case which, how much soever it has been regretted as having for a time unsettled the law with regard to this celebrated rule, yet has, in the end, been productive of the most important benefits to the profession, by having given rise to the admired essay, from which the preceding observations have been

chiefly extracted. The case was this:-One W. Williams seised in fee of a plantation in Jamaica, devised in the following words:-'Should my wife be enseint with child, at any time hereafter, and it be a female, I give and bequeath unto her the sum of 20001. &c.; and, if it be a male, I give and bequeath my estate real and personal equally to be divided between the said infant and my son John Williams, when the said infant shall attain the age of twenty-one. Item, It is my intent and meaning, that none of my children should sell or dispose of my estate for longer time than his life; and to that intent I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate to my son John Williams and the said infant, for and during the term of their natural lives, the remainder to my brother-in-law, J. G. and his heirs, for and during the lives of my son John Williams and the said infant, the remainder to the heirs of the body of my said sons John Williams and the said infant lawfully begotton, or to be begotten, the remainder to my daughters, &c.' Perrin vs. Blake, 4 Burr., 2579; 1 Bl. Rep., 672; Dougl., 329; 1 Hargr. Law Tracts, 490. No other son was born; and the question was, what estate John Williams took under this will? Had this been the case of an executory trust, says Mr. Fearne, the court of chancery might possibly have construed it an estate for life in J. W., upon the clause expressing the testator's will, that his sons should not convey a greater interest than for their lives. But as it was the limitation of a legal and not a trust estate, the court of chancery itself (in conformity to its own established distinctions explained in the above mentioned cases of Leonard vs. Earl of Sussex, 2 Vern., 526; Glenorchy vs. Bosville, Cas. Temp. Talb., 19; Bagshaw vs. Spencer, 2 Atk., 581; 1 Ves., 149), we may suppose,

would have decreed it an estate-tail in J. W. The court of king's bench, however, in the case of Perrin vs. Blake, treated those distinctions as too refined; and adjudged, that J. W. took only an estate for life, under the devise in question. A writ of error was brought upon this judgment in the exchequer chamber; in which the judgment was reversed by the opinion of seven judges against one; so that, upon the whole, eight judges were of opinion that John Williams took an estate-tail; and four, that he took only an estate for life. An appeal was brought to the house of lords from the judgment of reversal in the exchequer chamber; but the parties at length compromised the dispute.

"The subsequent cases of Hayes vs. Foorde, 2 Bl. Rep., 698; Hodgson & Ux. vs. Ambrose, Dougl., 337; 3 Bro. P. C., 416; Jones vs. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. 218, 219; Thong vs. Bedford, 1 Bro. C. C., 313, and the recent decisions above cited under their respective heads, have again restored the doctrine respecting this celebrated rule to its former authority. And it is now finally settled, that 'neither an intent manifested by the testator to give only an estate for life, nor the interposition of trustees to preserve contingent remainders, nor mere words of condition, describing the order of succession in which the devisees are to take place, nor the introduction of powers of jointuring, or of liberty to commit waste, are of themselves sufficient to vary the technical sense of the words used. It must plainly appear that the testator did not mean to give such an estate as would pass under the words used, unless controlled by such apparent intent.' Per Lord Alvanley, C. J. Poole vs. Poole, 3 Bos. & P., 620, 627. In order to ascertain the testator's presumable inten