suam alicui viro et muliere procreatis. If lands be given to B. et haeredibus quos idem B. de prima uxore sua legitime precrearet, this is a good estate in special tail, (albeit he hath no wife at that time), without these words (de corpore). So it is if lands be given to a man, and to his heirs which he shall beget of his wife, or to a man et haeredibus de carne sua, or to a man et haeredibus de se. In all these cases these be good estates in tail, and yet these words (de corpore) are omitted."

"Two things seem essential to an intail within the statute De donis. One requisite is, that the subject be land or some other thing of a real nature. The other requisite is, that the estate in it be an inheritance. Therefore, neither estates pur auter vie in lands, though limited to the grantee and his heirs during the life of cestui que vie, nor terms of years, are inalienable any more than personal chattels; because as the latter, not being either interests in things real or of inheritance, want both requisites; so the two former, though interests in things real, yet not being also of inheritance, are deficient in one requisite. However, estates pur auter vie, terms for years, and personal chattels, may be so settled, as to answer the purposes of an intail, and be rendered unalienable almost for as long a time, as if they were intailable in the strict sense of the word. Thus estates pur auter vie may be devised or limited in strict settlement by way of remainder like estates of inheritance; and such as have interests in the nature of estates intail may bar their issue and all remainders over by alienation of the estate pur auter vie, as those, who are, strictly speaking, tenants intail, may do by fine and recovery; but then the having of issue is not an

essential preliminary to the power of alienation in the case of an estate pur auter vie limited to one and the heirs of his body, as it is in the case of a conditional fee, from which the mode of barring by alienation was evidently borrowed. The manner of settling terms for years and personal chattels is different; for in them no remainders can be limited; but they may be intailed by executory devise or by deed of trust; as effectually as estates of inheritance, if it is not attempted to render them unalienable beyond the duration of lives in being and twenty-one years after, and perhaps in the case of a posthumous child a few months more; a limitation of time, not arbitrarily prescribed by our courts of justice, but wisely and reasonably adopted in analogy to the case of freeholds of inheritance, which cannot be so limited by way of remainder as to postpone a complete bar of the intail by fine or recovery for a longer space. It is also proper to observe, that, in the case of terms of years and personal chattels, the vesting of an interest which in reality would be an estate tail, bars the issue and all the subsequent limitations, as effectually as fine and recovery in the case of estates intailable within the statute De donis, or a simple alienation in the case of conditional fees and estates pur auter vie; and further, that if the executory limitations of personalty are on contingencies too remote, the whole property is in the first taker. Upon the whole, by a series of decisions within the last two centuries, and after many struggles in respect to personalty, it is at length settled, that every species of property is in substance equally capable of being settled in the way of intail; and though the modes vary according to the nature of the subject, yet they tend to the same point, and the dura

tion of the intails is circumscribed almost as nearly within the same limits, as the difference in property will allow. As to the intail of estates pur auter vie, see 2 Vern., 184, 225; 3 P., Wms., 262; 1 Atk., 324; 2 Atk., 259, 376; 3 Atk., 464, and 2 Ves., 681. As to the intail of terms for years and personal chattels, see Manning's Case, 8 Co., 94. Lampett's Case, 10 Co., 46b; Child and Bailey, W. Jo., 15. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Chan. Case 1, a case in Carth., 267, and one in 1 P. Wms., 1. See,' also, Fearne's Essay on Conting. Rem. and Exec. Dev., 2d ed., p. 122, to the end. Mr. Fearne's work is so very instructive on the dry and obscure subject of remainders and executory devises, that it cannot be too much recommended to the attention of the diligent student. Note, it was resolved in the 40 Eliz., that the statute De donis doth extend to the Isle of Man; because the statute is general, and the Isle of Man is not specially named. See 4 Inst., 284; 2 And., 115, and 2 Ves., 350. See, also, ante, 9a, where the following note by Lord Hale in respect to the case of the Isle of Man, there mentioned by Lord Coke to have been adjudged in 40 Eliz., should have been introduced; though as it partly relates to the statute De donis, it may come in here without any impropriety. Note, William, Earl of Salisbury, got Man from the Scots, and granted it to William Scroop. Hen. 4, claimed it by conquest from him, granted it to comiti Northumbrae, and on his attainder granted it to Sir John Stanley and his heirs; and in this case ruled. 1. That Man is not a parcel of England. 2. That it is bound by statutes of England where specially named, otherwise not. Therefore, the statutes De donis, of uses, of wills, not in force there; and it descends to the co-heirs of Ferdin

ando, and not of his brother, William, Earl of Derby. Hall MSS."

"In the same manner it is of the tenant in special tail, &c. For in every gift in tail without more saying, the reversion of the fee simple is in the donor.

"This is wrought by the construction of the statute of W. 2, cap. 1, which hath turned the feesimple of the donee into a particular estate of inheritance, and the possibility of the donor, to a reversion in him expectant upon the estate tail, so as there be two inheritances of one land; yet this was doubted in our books, and there resolved according to Littleton. But I see no cause wherefore that point should be drawn in question, for at the same session of Parliament (in which the statute De donis conditionalibus was made), viz., cs. 3, it is expressly said, vel per donum in quo reservatur reversio, so as by the judgment of the same Parliament a reversion was settled in the donor."

"Tenant intail special is, where lands or tenements are given to a man and to his wife, and to the heirs of their two bodies begotten. In this case none shall inherit by force of this gift, but those that be engendered between them two. And it is called tail, because if the wife die, and he taketh another wife and have issue, the issue of the second wife shall not inherit by force of this gift, nor also the issue of the second husband, if the first husband die."

"Tenant in fee-tail after possibility of issue extinct is, where tenements are given to a man and to his wife in special tail, if one of them die without issue, the survivor is tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct. And if they have issue, and the one die, albeit, that during the life of the issue the survivor

shall not be said tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; yet if the issue die without issue, so as there be not any issue alive which may inherit by force of the tail, then the surviving party of the donees is tenant in tail after possibility of issue is extinct.

And note, that none can be tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, but one of the donees, or the donee in special tail. For the donee in general tail cannot be said to be a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; because always during his life, he may by possibility have issue, which may inherit by force of the same intail. And so in the same manner the issue, which is heir to the donees in special tail, cannot be tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct for the reason above said."

SECTION 20. LIFE ESTATES.

Freeholds less than inheritance are life estates. Life estates are subdivided into legal and conventional life estates. Conventional life estates are those created by the acts of the parties and include estates for the life of the holder and estates for the life of another person. Legal life estates are those created by operation of law and include the estates of coverture, curtesy, dower and homestead.

SECTION 21. CONVENTIONAL LIFE ESTATES.

A conventional life estate is one created by the act of the parties. If may be for the life of the tenant, for the life or lives of others, or for the lives of the tenant and another jointly.10

10 Tenant for term of life is, where a man letteth lands or tenements to another for the terms of the life of the lessee, or for term of the life of another man. In this case the lessee is tenant for term of life. But by common

The life estate was the

speech he, which holdeth for term of his own life, is called tenant for term of his life; and he, which holdeth for term of another's life, is called tenant for term of another man's life. Coke's Institutes.