of the United States, as might, in the opinion of the president, be communicated without injury to the public. This amendment was carried; and a motion made, by Mr. Ingham, to leave out this discretionary power, on the part of the executive, was negatived, by a vote of 98 to 71. The resolution was then passed, by 125 to 40. This call for information, was not answered by the executive; until after the proposed mission had been sanctioned by the senate: thus completely refuting the insinuations, which had been freely made in the house, by the opponents of the measure; that the information was called for, in order to act upon the senate, through the medium of public sentiment.

On the 17th of March, he transmitted a message to the house on the subject of the mission; together with the information required by the resolution of Mr. Webster. This message (which will be found among the public papers, in the latter part of this work,) contained a full account of the situation of the American continent, which gave rise to the contemplated congress; a development of the system of the policy of the United States, and of their views, with regard to that congress. It was referred to the committee on foreign relations; which reported in favor of the expediency of the measure.

This report gave a very able exposition of the advantages of the mission; and an answer to the principal objections, which had been urged against it.

The committee regarded the congress at Panama as a body in which would be considered various subjects, embracing in general terms the political and commercial relations of the United States, with the new American republics,-that it was merely a meeting of diplomatic agents, clothed only with power to discuss and negotiate concerning these topics, and not to commit the governments appointing them to any definite coursethat the established principle of our diplomatic intercourse, was to maintain diplomatic relations with those powers, with whom we had political and commercial relations; and that that principle applied with peculiar force to the present instance,and required our representation at Panama.

To the objection that the attendance of the United States at the congress of Panama, would be unconstitutional; the committee replied, that there was no restriction in the constitution, on the appointment of foreign ministers by the proper authority. This objection proceeds on an assumption, that the congress at Panama is either a government, a branch of a government, or a confederacy of govern

true.

ments; and that the United States, by attending there, unite themselves to that government or confederacy. Neither part of this assumption is The congress is a meeting of diplomatic agents from independent governments; and if the congress were a government, or confederacy, our attendance there by diplomatic agents would be no entrance into the confederacy, or union to the government.

The assertion, that all the proposed objects could be as well attained by separate negotiations with the several states, was met by a direct denial; and the difficulty of carrying on separate and disconnected negotiations for the attainment of a common object, with courts so far apart as to prevent the interchange of intelligence more than twice a year, was strongly contrasted with the advantages of a free and prompt interchange of sentiments, in an assembly of diplomatic agents.

The objection, that the subjects of discussion, the powers of the ministers and the mode of organizing the congress, and of deciding questions, were not settled, was not well founded. The mode of proceeding must necessarily be that of diplomatic discussion and conference, and was expressly stated to be so, and the omission to fix the other details, was considered rather

favorable than disadvantageous to the United States.

It

The objections founded upon the danger of compromising our neutrality, and of forming entangling alliances, were refuted by a reference, to the express conditions upon which, the invitation to the congress was accepted; to the character in which this country appeared there, viz: as a mediator between Spain and her former colonies; and to the constitutional checks upon any such measures, which existed in the executive and senate. was further urged, that the danger of forming an alliance was incident to all missions, and that the consequences of an alliance with one of these new republics, would be as entangling as those of an alliance with all; and yet no objection had been made to the diplomatic intercourse with them, and no disadvantages had grown out of such an intercourse. That this measure was without an exact precedent was admitted; but the circumstances out of which it grew were also unprecedented-and so were most of the important measures adopted by the government of the United States, since the adoption of the constitution. It was not, however, in principle novel or unprecedented. The ministers to the Panama congress carry with them the same powers that have ever been vested in the

foreign ministers of the United States. The characteristic policy of this country, has been to ask no questions, about the quality or constitution of the power to which our ministers were sent. It has rested for security not on a timid calculation of the powers of the government, or body with which our ministers were to treat; but on our constitutional safe-guards at home. The policy has been to be represented, wherever we have important political and commercial relations. In like manner, our ministers to Panama will go to do the business of the country. Their appearance there cannot have the effect of breaking down the senate and house of representatives, and by a dictatorial power unknown to the constitution, of binding the country in a foreign alliance.

Upon the objection which had been much relied on, that there was something in a congress of assembled powers essentially pernicious, which this country ought to shun; it was remarked, that the pernicious character of the late European congresses, to which the opponents of these measures had particularly referred, consisted in the nature of the governments assembled, and in the objects-aimed

violently interfering in the internal affairs of other states; but the committee did not perceive, the applicability of this objection to an assembly of the representatives of popular governments for different objects.

Besides, this objection went too far. If the pernicious character of the power,to which the mission is to be sent forms a reason for not sending it; it would be impossible for the United States to maintain a single mission in Europe. In every case our ministers there are accredited to governments, constructed, as we think,upon principles which could not be introduced here, without immediate national ruin.

The committee then proceeded, to consider the subjects of discussion at the proposed congress, in the following manner :

66

By the terms of the invitation, as well as the nature of the case, the discussions at Panama are to extend to all subjects of importance.

"To the new states, as among each other:

"Or, as between them and Spain. "Or of importance directly to us, in our connection with them.

"Each power is at liberty to propose what subject for discussion or negotiation, it may please; the only limitation being that which the United States impose on themselves, with the understanding of the other powers, that we are to

engage in no discussions inconsistent with an entire neutrality.

The

"Although, in different degrees, the three classes of subjects, above enumerated, are interesting to the people of the United States. relations of the new states to each other, are very important to us. They are our near neighbors. One of them has an immense landed frontier on our territory, and, together with the two next in geographical succession, lies on those waters into which the great internal communications of the United States are discharged. With the others, we have no direct geog aphical, but we have highly important commercial connections. At present there are eight or nine independent states, formed out of the late Spanish and Portuguese colonies; seven of these, viz: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, the provinces of La Plata, Chile, Peru, and Upper Peru, have adopted republican governments. Now, it is to us a matter of very great interest, how these states shall stand towards each other. Should they fall into dissensions and wars, those great advantages which we have reasonably promised ourselves, from their growth and prosperity, could not be realized. The great drawbacks on the progress of these states, and on the extension of advantageous, commercial relations with them, arising from the war with Spain,

would be perpetuated, by the growth of feuds and conflicts with each other. It would have been as well for us and for themselves, that the mother country had continued to rule them, as that their energies should be wasted in civil

wars.

The committee do not intend to augur unfavorably for the peace and harmony of these states, but it is obvious that the simultaneous rise of so many neighboring independent republics must be attended with its hazards. Rival claims to portions of territory may form á subject of contention among the new states, as they did in our own confederacy after the war of the revolution. A controversy of this kind, has actually arisen between Mexico and Guatemala, which the committee trust will be settled by friendly compromise, for few events could be more to be deprecated by us, than a war between two states lying on and near the gulf of Mexico. Unfortunately, a controversy of the same kind has broken out into a war, between Brazil and the United provinces of La Plata, for the disputed possession of the Banda Oriental. The effect of this war on us has been instantaneous. It has already become necessary to ask for an additional appropriation for the naval service of the year, of near one hundred thousand dollars, to protect the property and lives of our citizens from the dangers to

which, in the progress of this war, they will be exposed. Now, it has been expressly provided, in the treaties which led to the formation of the congress of Panama, that the ministers there assembled should exercise the office of mediators when such differences shall arise. Brazil and La Plata have both been invited to the congress and had it been in active operation, it certainly is within the reach of political probability, that this unfortunate controversy might, by friendly meditation, have been prevented from ripening into the fatal issue of war. To the work of mediation, in all such cases, the United States would come as the most disinterested party and as we ourselves have experienced the benefits of the mediation of a foreign friendly power, it may happen that we may render the like good office to our sister states. Could we but, in a single instance, avert or terminate a war, it would itself form a sufficient motive for accepting the invitation. We claim no right of interference; we do not obtrude ourselves as umpires. We are invited to a congress, where we are told

these national differences, if they

arise, will be discussed; we are told that our presence, counsel and experience, are desired. No maxim of the most cautious political prudence bids us stand aloof. Next to peace on our own part, their

peace and prosperity are our leading interest; and the policy of maintaining peace, through the instrumentality of friendly mediation, is entirely congenial with the principles and feeling of the people of the United States of America, and sanctioned by their practice.

"The next general class of subjects to be discussed at the congress of Panama, are the relations of the new states with Spain. This subject, it is expressly stipulated, is only to be approached by our ministers under the reservation of strict neutrality. More than this, our great efforts will be directed to pacification. The policy of the United States, in this respect, is sufficiently unfolded in the letter of the secretary of state to Mr. Middleton, dated May 10, 1825; and the letter of the secretary of state to Mr. Salazar, dated December 20, 1825. Pacification between the belligerents is an object which it is our most decided interest to pursue. No single political event, perhaps, could be named more desirable to the United States, in reference to their industrious interests, than the termination of the present contest. We suffer every way by its continuance; our commerce with Spain languishes; and it is impossible that it should assume a profitable expansion with the new states.

"Connected with the belligerent