V. THE CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE. ARTICLE I. SECTION I. All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. SECTION II.-1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. SECTION III.-1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. 4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided. THESE clauses of the Constitution strongly indicate its real character. When, in the Virginian Convention, Patrick Henry laboured to show that the proposed Constitution implied a consolidated Government, Madison thus replied: "I myself conceive, that it is of a mixed nature; it is, in a manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one express prototype in the experience of the world it stands by itself. In some respects it is a Government of a Federal nature; in others it is of a consolidated nature." 1 And De Tocqueville thus describes it: "In this case the central Power acts directly upon those whom it governs, whom it rules, and whom it judges, in the same manner as, but in a more limited circle than, a National Government. Here the term Federal Government is clearly no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete National Government; a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly National nor Federal; but no further progress has been made, and the new word which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist."2 Both these descriptions are perfectly accurate. In the Senate, the Constitution is Federal; for the representation is by States, and directly springs from the State Legislatures— 1 Eloquence of United States, i. 137. * Democracy in America, i. 138. American edition, 1838. each State sending two senators, irrespective of its size or population. And yet in action it is not wholly Federal; for, every senator having one vote, one may be absent upon a division, and the two are frequently found recording their votes on opposite sides of the same question. In the House of Representatives it is completely National, for there the power is derived directly from the People, and the members count in proportion to population. In the Executive department, it is chiefly National, but in some degree Federal: the latter, because to the Legislature of each State is left the "manner" of appointing the electors, with the proviso, however, that they shall equal in number its senators and representatives together in Congress. Now, as these representatives are in proportion to population, the choice of the Executive becomes mainly National, because it is decided by a majority of the electors so appointed. It may, however, be in a further degree Federal, under a contingency which we shall hereafter have occasion to explain. The appointment of Vice-President lies also with the People, and, in case of need, follows a similar course; with this exception, that the ultimate choice is with the Senate, who vote by senators and not by States. The Vice-President is, ex-officio, President of the Senate, and in case of equal division, has a casting vote. Thus a man who is the choice of the People at large presides over the House, which is elected by the States in their corporate capacity. ARTICLE I. SECTION V.-1. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each House may provide. 2. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. These clauses are entirely National in their character, and are in accordance with the practice of our own House of Commons. They both form a negative on State sovereignty. The first is, of course, in constant operation. The second can point to a precedent so early as 1797, when the Senator from Tennessee was expelled for "a high misdemeanour entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator;" his offence being an attempt to seduce an Indian agent from his duty, and to alienate the affections of the Indians from the authorities of the United States. He was afterwards impeached.1 ARTICLE I. SECTION VI.-1. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. Compensation to members of Congress for their services is here provided for. It is “ascertained by law." They are not paid by the session, but by the day; and, in addition, a mileage allowance for distance between home and the seat of government is enacted. are not paid by the separate States, but from the "Treasury of the United States." The receipt of it is not optional: the words are"They shall receive." Before doing so they take a solemn oath "to support the Constitu 1 STORY'S Comm., 299. They |