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And so, too, the forgery or falsification of records is provided against by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, ss. 27, 28, which enact that it shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment as above mentioned, or penal servitude to the extent of seven years, to forge, or fraudulently alter or utter, any such court record or document as above specified. And that the above penalties shall also attach to any person who, as clerk of any court or otherwise, shall knowingly utter any false copy or certificate of any record, or forge the seal or process, of any court of record (e). There are also enactments on this subject (in reference to public records generally) contained in an earlier statute, viz., the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 94 (ƒ), intituled "An Act for keeping safely the Public Records." And by these it is enacted, that any person employed in the Public Record Office who shall certify any writing as a true copy of a record in the custody of the Master of the Rolls, knowing the same to be false in any material part,—shall be guilty of felony: and he is punishable with penal servitude for life, or not less than five years; or imprisonment for not more than four nor less than two years (g). Moreover, by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99 (the "Evidence Amendment Act, 1851"), if any officer authorized or required by that Act to furnish any certified copies or extracts, shall wilfully certify any document as being a true copy or extract, knowing that the same is not so, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and be liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eighteen months (h).

II. [Any striking, or other outrage, in the superior courts of justice, in Westminster Hall, or at the assizes, is highly

(e) In this case, also, the offender, after conviction, may be bound over to keep the peace. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 51.)

(f) The Public Record Office Act, 1838, has been amended in certain matters by the 40 & 41

Vict. c. 55, but not in respect of the provisions referred to in the text.

(g) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 94, s. 19; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 99; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47.

(h) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 15.

[penal. Indeed by the antient common law before the Conquest, striking in the king's courts of justice, or drawing a sword therein, was a capital felony (i); and even afterwards the law retained so much of the antient severity, as only to exchange the loss of life for the loss of the offending limb. Therefore a stroke or blow in the superior courts, or courts of assize or oyer and terminer, whether blood be drawn or not; or assaulting a judge sitting in the court, by drawing a weapon, even without any blow struck;—is punishable with the loss of the right hand (4), imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of goods and chattels, and of the profits of the offender's lands during life (1). Moreover, not such only as commit actual violence of this description, but such as use threatening or reproachful words to any judge sitting in the courts, are guilty of a high misprision; and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and other corporal punishment (m).]

(i) Wilk. Leg. Anglo-Sax., LL. Inæ, c. 6; LL. Canut. c. 56; LL. Alured. c. 7.

(k) In reference to this singular relic of our antient system of criminal law, which has not (at least in terms) been touched upon by modern enactments, it may be mentioned that the matter came under the serious consideration of the courts in our own times. For in the year 1799, Lord Thanet and others having been prosecuted for a riot, at the trial of Arthur O'Connor and others for treason under a special commission, two of the defendants were found guilty, generally. Now the three first counts charged (inter alia), that the defendants did riotously make an assault on one J. R., and did then and there beat, bruise, wound and illtreat the said J. R., in the presence of the commissioners. And when the defendants were brought up for

judgment, Lord Kenyon expressed doubts, whether the court was not bound to pronounce the judgment of amputation of the right hand, &c., as required in a prosecution expressly for striking in a court of justice. In consequence of these doubts, the attorney-general entered a nolle prosequi upon the three first counts; and the court pronounced judgment of fine and imprisonment on the others, as for a common riot.-(27 St. Tr. 821.)

(7) Staundf. P. C. 38; 3 Inst. 140, 141; Hawk. b. 1, c. 21, s. 3. So it is laid down that a rescue of a prisoner from any of the said courts, is punishable with perpetual imprisonment and forfeiture of goods, and of the profits of lands during life; but if no actual blow be given, amputation of the hand is excused. (4 Bl. Com. p. 125.) See as to rescue in other cases, post, p. 269.

(m) Harrison's case, Cro. Car.

III. [Another species of offence, somewhat allied to the last,-is that of intimidation, or other improper demeanor, practised towards the parties or witnesses in a court of justice. As if a man assaults or threatens his adversary for suing him, a counsellor or attorney for being employed against him, a juror for his verdict, cr a gaoler or other ministerial officer for keeping him in custody and properly executing his duty (n); or if a man endeavours to dissuade a witness from giving evidence, or advises a prisoner to stand mute; these are all impediments to justice, are high misprisions and contempts of the king's courts, and are punishable with fine and imprisonment. Antiently, indeed, it was held, that if one of the grand jury disclosed to any person indicted the evidence that appeared against him, he was thereby made an accessory to the offence, if felony, and in treason, became a principal; and at this day it is agreed that he is guilty of a high misprision, and liable to be fined and imprisoned (0).

So as regards jurors, an offence somewhat of the same character as the last may be committed, which is described in the books as embracery; that is, attempting to influence them corruptly to one side, by promises, persuasions, entreaties, money, entertainments and the like.] The punishment for this misdemeanor in the person embracing and the juror embraced is, by the common law,—and also under the provision contained in 6 Geo. IV. c. 50, s. 61,-fine and imprisonment (p).

c. 2.

503. The court itself, also, against he cites Stiernh. de Jure Goth. 1. 3, which the contempt is committed, has power to punish it in a summary way by fine or imprison

ment.

(n) 3 Inst. 141, 142. Blackstone remarks (vol. iv. p. 126), that these offences, when they proceeded further than bare threats, were punished in the Gothic constitutions with exile and forfeiture of goods; and

(0) See Barr. on Statutes, 212; 27 Ass. Pl. 44, s. 4, fol. 138; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 21, s. 15.

(p) The false verdict of jurors, whether occasioned by embracery or not, was antiently considered as criminal; and therefore severely punished by means of the writ of attaint. (See 3 Bl. Com. pp. 388, 402; 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 60.)

IV. A fourth offence which may be here noticed, is that of obstructing a lawful arrest, or, generally, the execution of lawful process. [This is, in all cases, an offence of a very high and presumptuous nature: but more particularly so, when it is an obstruction of an arrest upon criminal process and it hath been holden that the party opposing such arrest, becomes thereby particeps criminis; that is, an accessory in felony, and a principal in treason (9). Formerly one of the greatest obstructions to public justice, both of the civil and criminal kind, was the multitude of pretended privileged places, (especially in London and Southwark,) where indigent persons assembled together to shelter themselves from justice,-under the pretext of their having been antient palaces of the Crown, or the like ().] But all of these sanctuaries for iniquity are now demolished, and the opposing of any process therein was made highly penal by the statutes 8 & 9 Will. III. c. 27; 9 Geo. I. c. 28; 11 Geo. I. c. 22; and 1 Geo. IV. c. 116: which enacted, that persons opposing the execution of any process in such pretended privileged places within the bills of mortality, or abusing any officer in his endeavour to execute his duty therein, so that he receives bodily hurt; and all persons aiding and abetting such opposition; shall be guilty of felony. The principal provisions, however, as regards the offence now under consideration, are contained in more recent enactments: and, particularly, in the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 18 and 38. Of the first of these we had occasion to speak in a former place, as amounting in certain cases to a crime of the same malignity as an attempt to murder (s). By the section last named it is enacted that whoever shall assault, resist, or wilfully obstruct any peace officer in the due execution of his duty, or any person acting in his aid, or

(9) Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 17, s. 1. (r) Such as White Friars and its environs; the Savoy; and the Mint, in Southwark. Some further

information on the subject of the law of sanctuary will be found in a later part of this work..

(s) Vide sup. p. 79.

shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent his own lawful apprehension or detainer, or that of any one else, for any offence,-shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable to the extent of two years, with or without hard labour (†).

V. [Escape and Prison-breach. To suffer the escape of a person, lawfully arrested for crime, so that he shall gain his liberty before he is delivered by course of law, is also an offence against public justice (u). And the officer permitting such escape, either by negligence or connivance, is much more culpable than the prisoner himself,—the natural desire of liberty pleading strongly in his behalf, though he ought in strictness of law to submit himself quietly to custody, till cleared by the due course of justice. Officers, therefore, who after arrest negligently permit a felon to escape, are punishable by fine (v); but voluntary escapes, by consent and connivance of the officer, are a much more serious offence: for it is generally agreed that such escapes amount to the same kind of offence, and are punishable in the same degree, as the offence of which the prisoner is guilty, and for which he is in custody; whether treason, felony or trespass. And this, whether he were actually committed to gaol, or only under a bare arrest (x). But the officer cannot be thus punished as for felony, till the original delinquent hath actually received judgment or been outlawed in respect of the crime for which he was so committed or arrested (y); otherwise it might happen that the officer might be punished for felony, and the person arrested and escaping might turn

(t) See also 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 12, as to any assaults upon constables while in the execution of their duty.

(u) Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 17, s. 3;

c. 19, ss. 2, 3.

(v) 1 Hale, P. C. p. 600.

(x) Ib. p. 590; Hawk. ubi sup.

c. 19, s. 22.

(y) Process of outlawry in criminal cases, where the person charged cannot be apprehended, is not as yet abolished, though it may be said to be obsolete. (See Report of Criminal Code Bill Commission, p. 36.)

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