Movements in the South looking to Secession.-South Carolina takes the Lead in the Execution of her long-cherished Scheme.-Adoption of the Ordinance of Secession by that State.-Georgia and the other Cotton States follow the Lead of South Carolina.-Commendable Efforts in several of the States of the North to moderate Southern Excitement and secure the yielding of reasonable Concessions to the slaveholding Interests of the South.-Tennessee and the Border States still remain firm.-Extraordinary Message of Mr. Buchanan to Congress in the Month of December, 1860, and its unhappy Effect upon public Sentiment.-Furious Debate in both Houses of Congress upon the Questions pending at this Crisis.-All Efforts at Compromise prove abortive.-Unwise and unpatriotic Conduct on the Part of Southern Senators and Representatives in vacating their Seats in Congress.

THE long-hoped-for opportunity of trying the experiment of secession was now at last presented. Abraham Lincoln had been elevated to the presidency by a strictly sectional vote; and though the fact could not be denied that he had been elected in a perfectly constitutional manner, though he had not received any thing like a majori ty of the whole popular vote, and though he was admitted on all hands to be a man of excellent practical intellect, of many amiable qualities in domestic and social life, who had never manifested the smallest portion of that rancorous sectional malignity which so many were now displaying so deplorably on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line, yet, no sooner was it ascertained that it was almost certain that he would receive a majority of the

electoral votes of the whole Union, than steps began to be taken for carrying into effect a revolutionary project which had engrossed the thoughts and sensibilities of a small class of extreme Southern politicians, mainly confined to the State of South Carolina, for some thirty years preceding. The modus operandi of the secession policy, as has been already made sufficiently apparent, was "to precipitate the cotton states of the South" into disunion, and bring about an early collision with the Federal government, in the confident hope that whenever it should be known in the border states of the South that war had been actually commenced, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee would be compelled to unite in the movement, however they might be inclined to disapprove it, as well as the motives which had prompted it. This supposition was, indeed, not at all an unreasonable one, for the states just mentioned were to a very large extent possessed of property in slaves; and though the opinion prevailed therein very widely that no such solid guarantee for their slaveholding interests as that afforded by the Federal Constitution was at all likely to be conferred by a sectional war, yet perceiving, as they would be sure to do, that the relative strength of the slaveholding states left in the Union after the withdrawal of those of the cotton-growing region would be so far lessened as to leave them thereafter an easy prey to abolition hostility, it was regarded as next to certain that they would in the end feel constrained to join any new confederacy which might be set on foot in the South having the least prospect of strength and stability.

MR. YANCEY IN THE NORTH IN 1860.

297 It was strongly suspected by the friends of the Union in the South, and had been distinctly charged to be true, in various forms, while the presidential contest was pending, that the followers of the great secession leaders were desirous that the Republicans should be successful therein, as only in this way would they be supplied with the pretext so much desired by many for withdrawing from civil associations with the free states of the North; and it is yet well remembered that Mr. Yancey, with that extraordinary skill as a political manager which distinguished him, had performed a pilgrimage to the North early in the summer of 1860 to counteract this very charge of desiring Mr. Lincoln's election, so far as the same applied to himself, the effect of which he apprehended might be such as to incapacitate him for the ultimate consummation of his hopes on this subject, unless he could succeed in securing to himself an opportunity of showing to his confiding partisans that he had really exerted himself in the North against the Republican presidential ticket. With what remarkable adroitness he executed this device no one who was a close observer of the events of that extraordinary period could have failed to observe; and yet nothing is more certain than the fact that the extremists of the South did indirectly cooperate, to the full extent of their power, in bringing about the election of Mr. Lincoln, with the views and purposes just specified. No one need, therefore, to feel the smallest surprise at finding in the pages of Mr. Greeley's work the following very striking paragraph:

"From an early stage of the canvass, the Republicans could not help seeing that they had the potent aid in

their efforts of the good wishes for their success of at least a large proportion of the advocates of Breckenridge and Lane. The toasts drunk with most enthusiasm at the Fourth of July celebrations throughout South Carolina pointed to the probable election of Mr. Lincoln as the necessary prelude to movements whereon the hearts of all Carolinians were intent. Southern 'fire-eaters' canvassed the Northern States in behalf of Breckenridge and Lane, but very much to the satisfaction of the friends of Lincoln and Hamlin. The 'fusion' arrangements, whereby it was hoped, at all events, to defeat Lincoln, were not generally favored by the 'fire-eaters' who vis ited the North, whether intent on politics, business, or pleasure; and, in some instances, those who sought to commend themselves to the favor of their Southern patrons or customers by an exhibition of zeal in the 'fusion' cause, were quietly told: 'What you are doing looks not to the end we desire; we want Lincoln elected.' In no slave state did the supporters of Breckenridge unite in any 'fusion' movement whatever; and it was a very open secret that the friends of Breckenridge generally— at all events throughout the slave states-next to the all but impossible success of their own candidate, preferred that of the Republicans. In the Senate throughout the preceding session, at Charleston, at Baltimore, and ever since, they had acted precisely as they would have done had they pre-eminently desired Mr. Lincoln's success, and determined to do their best to secure it."

So thoroughly matured was the project of secession in the minds of Southern extremists in South Carolina, that they are known actually to have commenced movements

SOUTH CAROLINA-GOVERNOR GIST.

299

looking to this desired end before even the presidential election had taken place, and when the result which soon ensued was yet but a strong probability. Accordingly we find Governor Gist, as early as the 5th of November, 1860, addressing a message to the South Carolina Legislature, embodying the following bold and explicit declarations:

"Under ordinary circumstances, your duty could be soon discharged by the election of electors representing the choice of the people of the state; but, in view of the threatening aspect of affairs, and the strong probability of the election to the presidency of a sectional candidate by a party committed to the support of measures which, if carried out, will inevitably destroy our equality in the Union, and ultimately reduce the Southern States to mere provinces of a consolidated despotism, to be governed by a fixed majority in Congress hostile to our institutions and fatally bent upon our ruin, I would respectfully suggest that the Legislature remain in session, and take such action as will prepare the state for any emergency that may arise.

"That an exposition of the will of the people may be obtained on a question involving such momentous consequences, I would earnestly recommend that, in the event of Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency, a Convention of the people of this state be immediately called, to consider and determine for themselves the mode and measure of redress. My own opinions of what the Convention should do are of little moment; but, believing that the time has arrived when every one, however humble he may be, should express his opinions in un