states retained in their elections upon other principles than an expression of popular will? By his amendment, this inequality is preserved; and the candidate actually chosen may be far from being the choice of a majority of the people of the United States. The He thonght that the amendment was incompatible with our system of government; and he did not see that it was so desirable as the mover described, that a uniformity in the exercise of the elective right, should be thus established. uniformity was only one in form, and might produce great inequalities in practice. While the present diversity exists in the systems of New York and Virginia, it may well happen that the vote of the former may be neutralized; while Virginia gives an undivided vote for the candidate of her choice. But the obvious remedy for this, is to restore to New York her general ticket. To correct this inequality by districting Virginia, might virtually annihilate the entire power of both these large states. Distraction of public opinion is indeed an evil in any of the states; but the remedy is not to be found in the diffusion of a principle among them all, which tends to spread the evil still wider. It is said that the operation of a general ticket destroys the vote of the minority in a state, and that it virtually transfers their votes to a candidate whom they dislike. This argument contains within itself a fatal error. It indirectly assumes that minorities are entitled to representation as well as majorities. But we must recollect that the same result must happen, more or less, in the district system also. It can never be admitted, that minorities have rights like these. If the elective power be a state power, the general ticket system is the only sound one. If it be desirable to obtain the sense of the majority of the people throughout the United States, it should be done by a general vote throughout the Union. The more you divide the mass into divisions and subdivisions, the farther we remove the final result from that which we profess to attain-the will of the majority. Under the general ticket system no person can be elected unless he obtains a majority of the electoral votes conferred by the people, voting on the basis of their true constitutional power-by states. But by districts you place it within the power of the minority, to defeat the majority. To the argument in favor of the amendment, that it is adapted to remedy the evils growing out of the caucus system; Mr. Storrs replied, that the true remedy for those evils was to be found in the virtue and integrity of the people. That the system must necessarily derive its power from public opinion; and as long as it was confined at one point, its evils were more fully exposed. It then presented a single power, against which the energies of the state might be directed. Diffused, it still operated silently and unseen, and carried its contaminating influence throughout the body politic, tainting the whole system, and corrupting the vitality of our social institutions. On the other branch of the amendment he observed, that the principal argument in favor of taking the election from the house, was founded on the danger of the abuse of that power. This argument directed itself against the existence of all political power and government. It proves (if it prove any thing) that it is better to go at once back to a state of nature, and adopt the social institutions of the aborigines in our vicinity. He did not fear any danger to the government, from the corruption of the house. If the government was to be demolished, (he said) it would not find the weapons of destruction in that house. The Pretorian bands would be led up to that fatal work, from other quarters. The great masses of feeling in different parts of the union, and the common interests affecting great sectional portions of the country, must be first inflamed and put in motion by those who seek for power-the spirit of anarchy will say to the north, "Your commerce is to be annihilated;" to the south, "Your internal security is in danger;" and to the west, "Your inheritances are to be taken from you, and your political power is to be trampled upon." We may then look among the people for those, who, flattering their prejudices fomenting their passions-stirring up the deadly elements of party hatred, and exasperating the bitterest feelings of human infirmity, persuade them to consider their public men and statesmen as traitors to their interests, and to treat them as public enemies. If we are really so unfit to be trusted; the mover of this amendment might have spared all his labor to convince us of its propriety. But, in my opinion, the experience of this country has taught a different lesson; and it is yet to be proved that the integrity of this house has ever been made subservient to executive influence. The tests which the gentleman adopts, are such as no man can stand the trial. If the executive appoints his friends to office, 'tis corruption; if he appoints his enemies, 'tis corruption still. If he appoints his friends-ho pays; if his enemies he buys. Are these the unsparing judgments, which a generous people will pass upon their public men? Are we to cherish doctrines like these, which lead to such denunciations of all that our national pride and the character of our institutions lead us to respect. Believe me, sir, the people of this country will not respond to these sentiments. They are too jealous of their own honor, and the reputation of their government, and too generous, to cherish such injustice to their own institutions, and their own statesmen. They will not consider it as dishonorable to be called from this house, to the service or councils of the country. Public men must be educated for public stations. Soldiers may be made by nature; but statesmen must be educated. They must devote themselves to the study of the laws and institutions of their country; her history; domestic and foreign relations; the principles of her public policy; the temper of the people, and the spirit of the government. In this house, too, they must pass the ordeal of public opinion, and manifest those profound talents, sound political principles, and great moral qualifications, which alone can adorn the public councils, and perpetuate the civil liberties of the country. The examples drawn from the ancient republics are not applicable here. They were republics of single cities, uneducated, of condensed population and corrupt morals; and ། fell by the lawless violence of their own citizens. Nor can any parallel be found between the election of a president, and the absurd mockery and violence of a Polish diet. This union is not to be dissolved by violences like these. Its dissolution is rather to be expected from the operation of other causes. It can only be accomplished by first impairing the confidence of the people in the integrity of their representatives and public councils-in raising up against it the states, by violating their rights; and in combining against the government the moral power of the country. Then you will find how weak this political system is, without this support from the nation; and it will expire without a struggle." He thought, that the best plan was, to go back to the original constitution. That plan contained within itself an effectual remedy to the evils of the caucus system. It was always in the power of a few electors to defeat a party candidate for the presidency; and it insured, in the two highest stations in the country, public men of the first grade of character. At present, the vice-presidency is the mere reward of personal influence. By the amendment of 1802, the small states lost much of their power in the election; and the amendment proposed to take from them the only remnant of their power. The plan of sending back to the people the two highest candidates, by no means secures the election of the second choice of the nation. This might well be the lowest of the three highest, who by this amendment, would be excluded from the election. He concluded by asking, if this was an auspicious moment for an amendment of the original compact. When that was formed, the states had been recently chastened by adversity, and they deeply felt the greatness of their mutual obligations. Now, circumstances are changed. We are in the days of our prosperity. Great sectional interests have sprung up in the states; and a whole nation has been brought into existence beyond the mountains. Public feeling has been lately deeply agitated, and the country is not yet quiet. And he submitted to the committee whether it were discreet now to move in this matter? Mr. Archer, of Virginia, and Mr. Kellogg, of New York, advocated the first branch of the amendment, which took the election from the house, and opposed the residue. Mr. Saunders, of North Carolina, advocated them both, as did Mr. Cambreling, of New York; Drayton, of South Carolina; Isaacs, Polk, and Mitchell, of Tennessee; Bryan, of North Carolina; Le Compte, of Kentucky. They were opposed by Messrs. Stevenson, of Virginia; Ingersoll, of Connecticut; Bartlett, of New Hampshire; Everett, of Massachusetts; Pearce, of Rhode Island; Wood, of New York; Mitchell, of South Carolina; Miner, of Pennsylvania; Trimble, of Kentucky; and Vance, of Ohio. After the very elaborate speeches of Mr. M'Duffie, and Mr. Storrs, there could be little room for material novelty. Mr. Everett, in a very eloquent and ingenious speech, in one point went farther than Mr. Storrs. He contended, that the proposition before the house was a violation, and not an amendment, of the constitution, That it subverted the fundamental principles of the constitution, in relation to the choice of an executive; and was inconsistent with the terms of the original compact. He also repelled, in the most forcible terms, the insinuation against the integrity of congress, and the character of the existing administration. As the debate proceeded, it assumed the aspect of a debate in answer to an executive message; or a resolution to consider the state of the nation. Most of those who advocated the amendments, declared themselves opposed to the present administration; and made many significant allusions to the elec tion, and what they denominated, a coalition between the friends of the president, and the secretary of state. To the charge of coalition, it was replied, that no derelection of principle was involved, in the support given by their friends to an administration of which they were both members; and it was asked, if there was any impropriety in the administration's seeking a union of councils, where there was no difference of principles; when it was considered even virtuous to seek a union of councils against it. If on one side there was a union of the supporters of the president and the secretary of state; on the other there was a coalition of the friends of the late secretary of the treasury and the vice president; of those who contended for a rigid interpretation of the constitution, and those who resorted to the utmost latitude of construction. These direct allusions to the existing state of things, became more frequent towards the close of the debate; and finally produced a scene of crimination and recrimination, very derogatory to the dignity and character of the house. When the mover of the resolutions, (Mr. M'Duffie,) came to reply to the various objections made to his amendments, he went into a history of the late election, and imputed the support which the late speaker gave to the president, to corrupt motives; and asserted that his friends were induced, by his influence, to vote contrary to their obligations to their constituents. This charge, which was conveyed in the most unequivocal terms, was immediately and promptly repelled by the western members who voted with Mr. Clay, on that occasion. The sentiments of the speaker's own constituents were stated by Mr. Trimble, of Kentucky, to be in favor of the course adopted by him; and the election, by an overwhelming majority, of his successor, Mr. Clark, whose friendly feelings towards the present administration, were well known, was triumphantly appealed to as an irrefragable proof of the approbation of his constituents. In consequence of this charge against the secretary of state, by the mover of the resolutions, and the direct and personal retorts of those, who were aimed at as his friends; a state of feeling. was produced in the house, very unfavorable to the dispassionate decision of the proposed amendments. The discussion on them had been protracted nearly seven weeks, through the indulgence of the house; and as the debate finally seemed to become a vehicle for political harrangues, Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts, moved to discharge the committee from any farther consideration of the subject. This |