any naval or military force, or impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth; nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

116. The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. PROTECTION OF STATES.

119. The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion, and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.

CHAPTER VI.

NEW STATES.

[Sections 121-4. The Parliament may admit new States, and determine the conditions of admission and representation of the new States in Parliament; it may make laws for territories acquired from the States or from the Queen; it may alter the limits of a State with the approval of the majority of the State electors voting on the question, and may, with the approval of the States concerned, form new States out of a part of a State or by a union of States.]

CHAPTER VII.-MISCELLANEOUS.

THE FEDERAL SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. 125. The seat of Government shall be determined by the Parliament . . . and if New South Wales be an original State, shall be in that State, and be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney.

Such territory shall contain an area of not less than one hundred square miles. . . . The Parliament

shall sit at Melbourne until it meet at the seat of Government.

CHAPTER VIII.

ALTERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

128. This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:

The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses, the proposed law shall be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives.

But if either House passes any such proposed law by an absolute majority, and the other House rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the firstmentioned House in the same or the next session again passes the proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to by the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General may submit the proposed law as last proposed by the firstmentioned House, and either with or without any amendments, subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the electors in each State qualified to vote for the election of the House of Representatives.

And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the GovernorGeneral for the Queen's assent.

No alteration diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of

a State in the House of Representatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law.

CHAPTER X.

THE WORKING OF THE

CONSTITUTION.

It is not within the scope of the present work to give a detailed account of the history of the early years of the Commonwealth. But it may not be out of place to refer to a few developments, with a view of showing how the Con stitutional machinery has been working. On the whole, there has probably been less friction between the Commonwealth and the States than has been the fortune of the other great federations. It was certainly expected that the The Tariff. attempt to frame a Federal tariff would be fraught with considerable difficulty and even danger, because of the supposed inevitable clash between New South Wales freetrade. doctrines and Victoria's protectionist interests. The freetraders, however, clearly recognised the necessity for a tariff of some sort in order to produce a Federal revenue. They also realised that, as three-fourths of the customs returns had to be handed over to the States. the proceeds from that source would have to be substantial. Their main purpose, therefore,

Preferential Duties

was to secure a revenue-producing tariff, and act merely as a check to the extreme protectionists who naturally aimed at a protective tariff. The outcome of twenty-one months of deliberation was a moderate tariff, calculated to give a return of about £8,000,000. Neither party was satisfied with the compromise; the protectionists in particular could not content themselves until the tariff walls had been raised still higher. Consequently there was a revision of rates in 1907 and 1908 which resulted in a substantial increase of the duties The return from customs and excise in 1910-11 was £13,000,000.

At the same time the principle of preference to the United Kingdom was introduced, and goods produced or manufactured in the Mother Country and shipped direct to the Common wealth were admitted at duties ranging from two-and-a-half to ten per cent. (but generally five per cent.) below those imposed on foreign goods. In the case of goods partially manufactured in the United Kingdom, the Act required that the final processes should be undertaken therein, and the cost of British material and labour should not fall below one-fourth of the value of the completed goods. Two years previously (1906), goods from British South Africa had received somewhat similar favourable treatment, a reduction of twenty-five per cent. of the rates being allowed on certain