SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH

ON THE SUBJECT OF

UNION,

DELIVERED IN THE

IRISH HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE 24th OF JANUARY, 1799.

AND NOW REDUCED TO THE FORM OF

AN ADDRESS

TO THE

PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

BY THE HON.

SIR WILLIAM CUSACK SMITH, BART.

THIRD BARON OF THE EXCHEQUER IN IRELAND, L.L.D. FR.S.

AND M.R.I.A.

Duo genera semper fuerunt eorum qui versari in Republicâ studuerunt ; quibus ex generibus alteri se populares, alteri optimates et haberi et esse voluerunt. Qui ea quæ faciebant, quæque dicebant, multitudini jucunda esse volebant, populares: qui autem ita se gerebant, ut sua consilia optimo cuique probarent, optimates habebantur.

CICERO PRO SEXTIO.

PRINTED FROM THE SEVENTH CORRECTED EDITION.

LONDON.

ADVERTISEMENT.

SEVERAL persons, of whose judgment I think highly, (though in the present instance they may not seem to have exercised it successfully,) having expressed a desire, that those arguments, which I lately used in Parliament, should appear in print, I am induced, by their request, to offer them to the public.

On the subject of Parliamentary Competence, I expect that I shall not be thought to have gone into an excessive length of discussion; when it is recollected, that there is scarcely a lawyer, who has opposed an Union, without also disputing the authority of Parliament to enact one: that in several publications which have appeared upon the subject, their authority has been explicitly and confidently denied; and that this question of competence is highly important, and even preliminary: since it would be a waste of time to discuss the advantages of a measure, which the legislature was not competent to conclude.

Having in the following pages enlarged upon some topics, which, when speaking in the House of Commons, I felt it my duty to treat concisely; having supplied, from my notes, or memory, arguments, which from similar motives, or from inadvertence, I there omitted; and having given admission to some new reasonings, which occurred to me as I wrote; I have thought it advisable to throw the whole into the shape of an ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE of Ireland; of which, however, what I said in Parliament will, by those who heard me, be recognized as forming the substance and foundation.

AN

ADDRESS, &c.

HAVING the honor of a seat in the Legislature of this country, and holding an opinion on the important question now under discussion, from which many respectable and virtuous persons, and no small portion of my countrymen, dissent, I feel myself to be warranted, (I will not say obliged,) to dis close the foundations of the judgment, which I have formed.

In addressing myself to the people, I appeal not to their authority. The necessity for their sanction to any act of their Legislature, I protest against, as a principle subversive of our mixed government; and introductive of absolute democracy in its room. But that popular approbation of a public measure, which is not requisite towards giving it validity, may yet be desirable towards giving it effect:-towards promoting general tranquillity; towards multiplying and maturing the benefits of the law; towards conciliating that people, whose sentiments it is the free spirit of the British system to respect; and giving to the subjects' acquiescence in the decrees of their Legislature, a more cordial and zealous character, than that of mere duty, and reluctant obedience.

My opinions on the momentous subject now before us, are shortly these: that Union on fair terms would be beneficial to this country; and that such conditions we are likely to obtain. To justify these opinions, will be the object of the following pages.

In considering this question, let me be permitted to begin by laying preliminary grounds.

The British Islands constitute one empire. Their imperial connexion is not the result of a mere coincidence of crowns on the same head; but the crowns (if I may so express it) are constitutionally blended. His Majesty's

being Monarch of Great Britain is the indispensable requisite, and of itself adequately efficient cause, of his being King of Ireland. Ipso facto of his being sovereign of our sister country, he is ours; and practically to deny this imperial union of the islands, would be treason against the principles of the Irish constitution.

Now, let us suppose the rest of our establishment to be as yet unformed; and that, applying to some modern Solon, we inquired how many Legislatures this one empire should contain. Is it likely that he would recommend more than one? Would the lawgiver distract one dominion with two wills? Might he not even suppose you blundered, in talking of two Legislatures in the same empire?-and pronounce of such a state, as Stephano did of Caliban, that it was "a most delicate monster, with two voices ?"

If such must, a priori, be the opinion of a wise man, I may infer that, so far as union allots one Legislature to a single empire, it is a rational and wholesome measure:-that in securing that empire from the possible collision of dissentient parliaments, union is the corrective of a dangerous anomaly.

The discussion might be pushed farther, between the lawgiver and the inquirer. The former might predict, that a state thus constituted, would find in the duplicity of its Legislature, the sources of present weakness, and seeds of future severance. That a difference of system between the Legislatives, must paralyse the general force of the empire; and that by the enemies of the connexion, this parliamentary distinctness might be converted into means of accomplishing a separation.

If the maxims be warranted, which I have been thus attributing to our supposed lawgiver, the inference seems to be-that the tendency of union, in consolidating the Legislatures, will be to fortify the British Empire; and eradicate those seeds of separation which it contains:-and this tendency will, on the one hand, raise an opponent to the measure, in every foe to British greatness and connexion; and, on the contrary, will recommend it to the favor of all those, who think the connexion salutary, and wish it to be maintained; all who, admitting as a maxim, that Ireland must stand and fall with England, feel interested at all times to promote the security of the empire; and especially when the situation of Europe, and the World,when the power, the success, and the hostility of France, render it necessary that the British Empire should concentrate all its strength; unless we be prepared to surrender all its honors.

If it were replied to our Sage, that British influence would be found an antidote to the mischiefs which he had suggested: and prevent Legislative dissensions from weakening the energies of the empire,-or Irish inde pendence from marring the councils or interests of Britain,—he might, in answer, decline admitting an hypothesis, which derogated from the practical supremacy of the Irish Legislature; or, admitting it, might show that this was no longer the case of two Legislatures in one empire;-but the

case of a paramount British, and subordinate Irish Parliament. That therefore, whether the islands should have each a distinct parliament, could no longer involve a question for Irish pride; inasmuch as it would not be more degrading to this country to have its Legislature one with, than subject to that of Britain. That where there existed a subjection in fact, this might be rendered but the more pernicious, by a veil of nominal independence; since authority is softened by being ascertained, and exposed to view; and the power is sure to be exorbitant, which, whispering its mandates, contrives to keep itself concealed.-That thus to constitute two Legislatures, both nominally supreme, and then obviate the mischiefs of such an organization, by rendering one of them practically subservient, would be to create a fault, in order to correct it; and to bring matters clumsily, incompletely, and corruptly round, to that point,-in which the original establishment of one parliament might have placed them. That instead of permitting imperial energy to flow directly from a simple primitive arrangement, this might be circuitously and imperfectly to accomplish the same objects,-by a system pernicious to morals, destructive of public spirit, and which must sow the seeds of popular disaffection. For he might conclude, that the nominal supremacy of one Legislature could not be converted to a practical dependence, but by the corrupt connivance of its members; and that if such profligacy existed on their parts, it would either spread a contagion, fatal to liberty and public virtue; or rob the parliament of confidence, the constitution of respect, and the kingdom of prosperity and peace. Thus he mighs affirm, that quacumque via data, a coalition of all the imperial Legislative powers would be desirable: that it would be preferable to distinct and really independent parliaments; and, still more to be preferred to Legislatures, under whose seeming independence, there lurked the practical subserviency of one.

Let us now suppose this lawgiver to have entered on his plan: to have organized the imperial Legislature, and assigned to Ireland what he conceived to be its due proportion of representation. In this stage of the arrangement, I seem to hear an Irishman object, that this country had not an adequate share in the imperial councils. Our Solon would admit the justice of such a complaint; but would require to be shewn that it was founded in fact; and if my countryman, by way of substantiating his charge, should suggest that British representation out-weighed the Irish in point of numbers, it seems likely that he would expose himself to this answer: "Your objection is absurd: you are setting in opposition to each ⚫ther, parts which are not politically opposed: the quantity of Irish representation is commensurate to Irish power, resources, and contribution: the British exceeds it in point of numbers; because in Britain there is more contribution to represent: for the same reason, the representation of England exceeds that of Scotland, Wales or Yorkshire;-and the representation of three Irish provinces out-weighs that of the fourth. If the representatives of the empire do their duty, each will prefer the welfare "the NO. XII. VOL. VI.

Pam.

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