counterfeiters thereof. Nor is the act unconstitutional as granting special privileges to certain associations contrary to section 24, article 4, of the constitution of Illinois, since, in giving the right to register such labels and trade-marks to "any person, association or union of workingmen," it gives it to all associations whether composed of workingmen or not. A cigar label, which states that "the cigars contained in this box have been made by a first-class workman, a member of the Cigar Makers' International Union of America, an order opposed to inferior, rat-shop, cooly, prison, or filthy tenement-house workmanship," is not illegal, as being immoral, or against public policy. (Supreme Court, 1894, Cohn v. People, 149 Ill., 486.)

ACTS OF 1893, PAGE 99, ACT APPROVED JUNE 17, 1893.-Factories and workshops— Inspection, sweating system, hours of labor, etc. (a)

This act entitled "An act to regulate the manufacture of clothing, wearing apparel and other articles in this State, and to provide for the appointment of state inspectors to enforce the same, and to make an appropriation therefor." is not unconstitutional, as including more than one subject in its title, since it does not appear from the title but that the appropriation is to be used wholly in defraying the expenses of enforcing the act. The first clause of section 10 of said act, which appropriates $20,000 for the salaries of the inspectors, is unconstitutional, as not germane to the subject expressed in the title. Such provision is also void under section 16 of article 4 of the constitution of the State which provides that no bills making appropriations for the salaries of the government officers shall contain a provision on any other subject. Section 5 of this act which provides that "no female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week," is unconstitutional as depriving persons of property and liberty without due process of law, in violation of section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of the State. (Supreme Court, 1895, 40 Northeastern Reporter, 454.)

[The following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

Property held in trust by the court for the purpose of protecting it pending its foreclosure, and over which a receiver has been appointed, is in the possession of the court, and any interference with it is punishable as a contempt. Where a railroad is in the hands of a receiver, and the employees of another road who have struck, or any other persons prevent the employees of the receiver from working, they commit a contempt of court and are to be treated in as summary a manner as if the contempt were committed in the actual presence of the court. (United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois, 1877, Secor v. Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railway Company, 7 Bissel, 513.)

A railroad employee who, upon becoming a member of a voluntary relief association, composed of employees, and to whose funds the railroad company is bound to contribute in case of a deficiency, signs, without fraud or undue influence, a contract that in case of injury he shall elect either to take the benefits provided by the association or have his action against the company, can not avoid the effect thereof on the ground that he signed the agreement without reading it or understanding its purport, and that he was at a disadvantage in dealing with the company. The fact that at the time of receiving relief from the association the employee is not aware of the strength of his case against the company, is ignorant of certain important facts and of the witnesses by whom he can prove them, is to be regarded merely as his misfortune, and does not avoid the effect of his election, in barring an action against the company, (United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois, 1895, Vickers v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, 71 Federal Reporter, 139.)

INDIANA.

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 81, SECTIONS 7052 TO 7055.-Hours of labor. (b)

Section 7052 of this chapter [1606 of Elliott's Supplement] does not apply to a case where the circumstances under which employment is taken show that more than eight hours' labor will be expected for a day's work, and the employee with

a See Law, page 273.

b See Law, page 292.

out objection and without informing his employers that he intended to charge for extra time, worked more than eight hours per day. It will be implied that he covenanted and agreed to the requirements of his employer as to extra time. The act applies only to laborers employed by the day. (Appellate Court, 1892. Helphenstine v. Hartig, 5 Griffiths, 172.)

Section 7052 [1606 of Elliott's Supplement] declaring eight hours to be a legal day's work, but expressly permitting overwork for extra compensation, does not entitle one who agrees to do a certain kind of work at a specified price per day, knowing that more than eight hours each day will be required to do the work, and who, at the end of each week, receives, without objection, payment for the previous week's work at the agreed price per day, to recover of his employer for the time worked in excess of eight hours per day. (Appellate Court, 1894, Grisell v. Noel Bros. Flour-Feed Company, 36 Northeastern Reporter, 452.)

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 81, SECTIONS 7056 TO 7075.-Payment of wages and coercion of employees. (a)

These sections [7056 to 7058, inclusive] apply to railroad companies as well as to other companies. (Appellate Court, 1891, Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railway Company v. Baker, 4 Appellate Court Reports, 66.)

In an action by the plaintiff for the value of services rendered in the coal mine of the defendants, the answer admitting the employment and services rendered, averred their performance under a contract antecedent to the employment, whereby the plaintiff expressly waived his right to demand and receive his wages and pay for inining coal, every two weeks, in lawful money of the United States, as provided by section 7065 [1599 of Elliott's Supplement], and also averred a sale and delivery to the plaintiff in accordance with the waiver, of goods, wares, and merchandise in payment of his demand. Held, that the contract is void in so far as it seems to waive, by an antecedent agreement, the right to receive wages, in lawful money of the United States, being in violation of sections 7065 [1599 of Elliott's Supplement] and 7071 [1610 of Elliott's Supplement]. Also held, that sections 7065 and 7071, above, are constitutional, as the legislature has such authority over the right to contract as to prohibit contracts from being made in advance waiving the right to payment in the lawful medium of payment. This it may do in order to protect and maintain the lawful money of the nation. (Supreme Court, 1889, Hancock et al. v. Yaden, 121 Ind., 366.)

[The following decision was rendered in relation to section 1602, chapter 28, Elliott's Supplement of 1889, which was repealed by chapter 83 of the acts of 1891; as section 4 of said chapter [now section 7062 of the Annotated Statutes of 1894] is substantially the same as the repealed act, the principles involved in this decísion seem to be equally applicable thereto:]

Under section 1602 of chapter 28, Elliott's Supplement of 1889, providing a penalty of $1 for each day that wages shall be withheld from an employee after ten days from demand made, recovery can be had only of the penalty accrued at the time of the commencement of the suit. (Supreme Court, 1889, Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Baker, 122 Ind., 433.)

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 81, SECTIONS 7083 TO 7087.-Liability of railroad companies, etc., for injuries of employees. (b)

This act does not impose liability upon the employer for injuries resulting from the act or omission of the person injured. Plaintiff, who was in the employ of a telegraph company, engaged with others in stringing wires on its poles, was instructed to climb a pole belonging to another company, to get certain wires out of the way. Plaintiff climbed the pole by means of iron spikes driven into it, did his work, and, while descending, fell in consequence of one of the spikes being insufficiently secured or loosened by the rotting of the wood. The court held that the danger from which the accident resulted was one of the risks of plaintiff's employment, which was assumed by him, and for which his employer was not liable. (United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, 1895, Dixon v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 68 Federal Reporter, 630.)

a See Laws, pages 292 and 293.

b See Law, page 295.

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1894, Chapter 94, SECTIONS 7429 to 7483.-Coal mine regulations and inspection. (a)

The provision of this act [sections 7461 to 7483, inclusive] requiring mine owners to employ a competent mining boss, does not relieve the mine owner from liability for injuries to employees, due to the negligence of the mining boss in not keeping the premises in which they are required to work in a reasonably safe condition. The provisions of this act [sections 7461 to 7483, inclusive] defining the duties of mine owners in regard to what they shall do to secure a safe place for their miners to work in, and providing that a violation of these provisions shall be negligence per se, does not relieve the servant from the necessity of pleading, in an action for personal injuries, his freedom from contributory negligence. (Appellate Court, 1894, Linton Coal Mining Company v. Persons, 39 Northeastern Reporter, 214.)

This act [section 7465] requires coal mined under contracts providing for payment by specified quantity to be weighed before being screened, and the full weight credited to the miner, provided that the payment for impurities loaded with or among the coal shall not thereby be compelled; and section 7 provides the penalty. Held, that a conviction for failure to weigh before screening was improper where the evidence for the prosecution showed that the coal mined was of such a nature that it was impossible to weigh the coal before screening, and credit the miner with the weight, without giving him credit for impurities among the coal. (Supreme Court, 1896, Martin v. State, 42 Northeastern Reporter, 911.)

[The four following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

Several railroads were placed in the hands of receivers in June, 1877. During the strikes of the latter part of July, the trains of these various railroads ceased for a time to run-a mob of strikers and others combining to stop them by force. The court on information of these facts, issued orders to the marshal, in aid of the receivers, requiring him to prevent all disturbance of their possession, and to use his authority, as marshal, under the law, to enable them to operate the roads, and due notice was given of the fact that these railroads were in the custody of the court and that there must be no interference with their possession. Several persons were, on complaint duly made, attached as for contempt of the authority of the court, and disobedience of its orders and a hearing took place. The facts occurring were substantially as follows: A crowd or mob of strikers and others assembled at the depot, took possession, and during a part of a week, by force and intimidation arrested the running of trains. The defendants were punished for contempt and in its opinion the court held substantially as follows: A receiver being an officer of the court, whose duty it is to protect the property and operat› the roads under the direction and order of the court, and the property thus placed in his possession is considered as property belonging to the court, and entitled to its protection. In proceedings for a contempt, the court can proceed in a summary manner, and the accused is not, of right, entitled to a trial by jury. Where the offense is clearly proved the court will proceed summarily to punish an offender. Interference with the running of railroad trains is an offense public in its character. (United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, 1877, King et al. v. The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company, 7 Bissel, 529.)

Where the members of a labor organization combine and confederate for the purpose of enforcing their demands by the seizure of their employer's property, or to prevent other men, by force and intimidation, from entering such employ ment, they are guilty of a crime; and, where such acts violate an injunction, they will be punished for contempt of court. (United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, 1893, Lake Erie and Western Railway Company v. Bailey et al., 61 Federal Reporter, 494.)

A combination among the defendants to quit work unless the plaintiff was dis charged, by reason whereof he was thrown out of employment, or an agreement not to work with plaintiff, pursuant to which the defendants quit work upon the refusal of the employer to discharge plaintiff, by reason whereof the business was suspended, and the plaintiff thrown out of work, is not actionable, in the absence of malice, intimidation, or violence, or evidence that the defendants were bound to continue work, or that the employer was obliged to retain the plaintiff in his service. Though the defendants agreed among themselves to quit work unless the plaintiff was discharged, they are not responsible for the acts of one of their

a See Law, page 299.

number, done under the belief that he was furthering the interests of the defendants, but without their knowledge. (Appellate Court, 1895, Clemett et al. v. Watson, 42 Northeastern Reporter, 367.)

Where a railroad relief association, composed of associated companies and their employees, is in charge of the companies, who guarantee the obligations, supply the facilities for the business, pay the operating expenses, take charge of and are responsible for the funds, make up deficits in the benefit fund, and supply surgical attendance for injuries received in their service, an employee's agreement, in his voluntary application for membership, that acceptance of benefits from the association for an injury shall release the railroad company from any claim for damages therefor, is not invalid as being against public policy, or for want of consideration or mutuality. (United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, 1896, Otis v. Pennsylvania Company, 71 Federal Reporter, 136.)

IOWA.

MCCLAIN'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1880, EDITION OF 1884, SECTION 1307.Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (a)

The provisions of section 1307, rendering railway companies liable to their employees for injuries resulting from the negligence of their coemployees, apply only to accidents growing out of the use and operation of their roads. If a person is required in the course of his employment by a railroad company to go upon a train, and he does so in the discharge of his duty, he is to be regarded as being engaged in its operation, notwithstanding his employment may not be connected with the running of its trains, and the company is liable to him for injuries resulting from the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1875, Schroeder v. The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, 41 Iowa, 344; 1877, Same v. Same, 47 Iowa, 375.)

The running of special trains over a railroad, by a construction company, in constructing it, is operating the railroad within the meaning of section 1307; and one who was engaged exclusively in shoveling gravel from such a train, and was not connected with its management, is entitled to recover for injuries happening to him through the negligence of the company or its employees. (Supreme Court, 1876, McKnight v. Iowa and Minnesota Railroad Construction Company, 43 Iowa, 406.)

In an action against a railway company on account of an injury to an employee caused by the destruction of a bridge, the defendant is liable under section 1307 if, owing to the negligence of any employee whose duty it was to look after said bridge and keep it in repair, the same became out of repair, and in consequence thereof the accident resulting in the injury occurred. The negligence consists in the failure to keep the bridge in repair, and the duty devolving on the employee, which he negligently performed is directly connected with the use and operation of the railway. (Supreme Court, 1877, Locke v. The Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company, 46 Iowa, 109.)

The statute rendering railroad companies liable to their employees for accidents caused by the negligence of coemployees does not extend beyond persons engaged in the business of operating railways, and is not intended to embrace all persons who are employed by the corporation, without regard to their employment. (Supreme Court, 1877, Potter v. The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, 46 Iowa, 399.)

The plaintiff alleged that he was employed by the defendant, a railroad company, as a private detective, and that while walking upon the track of the defendant's road in the performance of his duties as such employee, and in obedience to the orders of his principal, he was injured, without negligence on his part, through the negligence of the engineer of a passing train: Held, on demurrer, that the facts alleged were sufficient to bring the plaintiff within the provisions of section 1307, and entitle him to maintain an action for injuries received through the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1880, Pyne v. The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 54 Iowa, 223.)

To entitle an employee of a railroad company to recover for personal injuries inflicted through the negligence of a coemployee, it must be shown that his employment was connected with the operation of the railway, under section 1307.

a See Law, page 312.

Where plaintiff's petition failed to aver, and the evidence failed to show, that he was anything more than a section hand, and that, when injured, he was engaged in loading a car, Held that this service did not appertain to the operation of the road, and that he could not recover for injury caused by the negligence of his coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1882, Smith v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Northern Railway Company, 59 Iowa, 73.)

An employee of a railroad company, who is foreman of a crew, with power to direct the men under him in their work, and to hire and discharge them at will, is a coemployee with the men under him, in contemplation of section 1307, and may recover of the railroad company for injuries received in the course of his employment by reason of the negligence of the men in his crew. (Supreme Court, 1882, Houser v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, 60 Iowa, 230.)

An employee of a railroad company whose duty it is to wipe engines, open and close the doors of an engine house, and remove snow from a turntable and connecting tracks, is not, by reason of such duties, in any proper sense employed in the operation of the railroad, within the meaning of section 1307; and for an injury received, while performing such duties, through the negligence of a coemployee, he can not recover against the company, under the provisions of said section, notwithstanding he may have other duties to perform which do pertain to the operation of the road. (Supreme Court, 1883, Malone v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Northern Railway Company, 61 Iowa, 326; 1884, Same v. Same, 65 Iowa, 417.)

A receiver, who is operating a railroad under the appointment and direction of a court, is included in the terms, "persons owning or operating railways", in contemplation of this section; and such receiver, or rather the property in his hands. is liable for the claim of an employee for injuries received through the negligence of coemployees. (Supreme Court, 1883, Sloan v. Central Iowa Railway Company, 62 Iowa, 728.)

A car repairer, whose duty was to repair cars on the track, but who had nothing to do with cars in motion, except to ride on passenger or freight trains to and from the places where his services were required, was not engaged in the operation of a railway within the meaning of section 1307, and can not recover of the railroad company for an injury received while in the discharge of his duty, through the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1884, Foley v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, 64 Iowa, 644.)

This law does not deprive a railroad company of its property without due process of law, does not deny to it the equal protection of the law, and is not in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in either of these respects. (Supreme Court, 1884, Bucklew v. Central Iowa Railway Company, 64 Iowa, 603; 1887, Pierce v. Central Iowa Railway Company, 73 Iowa, 140; 1888, Rayburn v. Central Iowa Railway Company, 74 Iowa, 637; United States Supreme Court, 1888, Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company r. Herrick, 127 U. S., 210.)

One employed in a railroad coal house, and injured by the negligence of a coemployee while loading coal upon a car, can not recover of the railroad company, because the injury in such case is not in any manner connected with the use and operation of the railroad. (Supreme Court, 1885, Luce v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Company, 67 Iowa, 75.)

Plaintiff was a member of a construction gang on defendant's railway, and his duties required him to go and ride upon, and work upon and about, defendant's cars and tracks; he was injured by the negligence of a coemployee in throwing a heavy stone upon his hand while engaged in placing stones under the ends of ties. Held that the injury was not in any manner connected with the use or operation of the railway, as contemplated by section 1307, and that the defendant was not liable. (Supreme Court, 1885, Matson v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, 68 Iowa, 22.)

An employee of a railroad company whose sole duty is to elevate coal to a platform, convenient for delivering it to the tenders of engines, is not employed in the use and operation of a railroad, not being in any way connected with the moving and operation of trains, and the company is not liable, under section 1307, for injuries received by him, in such employment, through the negligence of coemployees. (Supreme Court, 1886, Stroble v. Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 70 Iowa, 555.)

The working of a ditching machine on a railroad, which is operated by the movement along the track of the train of which it forms a part, is an employment