and then with his crew mounted the locomotive and left the train upon the siding. Plaintiff's husband then began to inspect the cars, and while so engaged under a car the Central Railroad Company's employees, finding that the train had not entirely cleared the siding, returned with their locomotive and pushed it forward. Plaintiff's husband was unable to crawl out and was killed. Held, that this act did not apply to plaintiff's husband in this case. (Supreme Court, 1893, Vaunatta v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 154 Pa. State Reports, 262.)

A person employed by the individual owner of cars run on a railroad under a contract with the railroad company is, when in charge of the cars, an employee of the railroad company within the meaning of this act. (Supreme Court, 1893, Miller v. Cornwall Railroad, 154 Pa. State Reports, 473.)

An employee of an iron company, whose business it is to unload cars in the company's yard after they have been placed there by the railroad company, is not a fellow-servant of the trainmen of the railroad company engaged in placing the cars in the yard within the meaning of this act. (Supreme Court, 1894, Noll v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 163 Pa. State Reports, 504.)

BRIGHTLY'S PURDON'S DIGEST, TWELFTH EDITION, 1895, PAGE 2073, SECTIONS 3 TO 8.-Suits for wages. (a)

Watching timber at a salary of $50 per annum is not the kind of "manual labor," nor the salary such "wages of labor," as are contemplated by the act of April 20, 1876 [sections 4 and 5], requiring an affidavit and bail absolute for appeals. (Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, 1882, Zeigler v. Everhart, 2 Kulp, 360.)

To require affidavit and security on an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace under this act [sections 4 and 5] it must appear, either in the claim filed or in the transcript, that the judgment was rendered for the wages of manual labor. Claims for certain amounts "for labor done and performed at certain furnaces," and, "as labor, a certain number of days, as services performed for the defendant for a certain amount per day," do not come within the terms of this act. (Court of Common Pleas, Montour County, 1887, McElrath v. Foust, and Walleze v. Excelsior Electric Company, 4 Pa. County Court Reports, 653.)

An affidavit that the appeal is not intended for the purpose of delay is mandatory under this act [sections 4 and 5] before the defendant is entitled to an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for wages of manual labor. (Court of Common Pleas, Adams County, 1892, Flegel v. Datterer, 11 Pa. County Court Reports, 156.)

BRIGHTLY'S PURDON'S DIGEST, TWELFTH EDITION, 1895, PAGE 2077, SECTIONS 27 TO 29.-Payment of wages, etc. (b)

This act applies to those only engaged in mining or manufacturing. Contractors engaged in the construction of the roadbed of a railroad are not within the contemplation of the statutes. (Court of Quarter Sessions, Berks County, 1893, Commonwealth v. Marsh, 14 Pa. County Court Reports, 369.)

This act is highly penal and must be strictly construed, hence does not apply to any business except mining and manufacturing. The act is unconstitutional at least as far as it amounts to making a contract between parties against their will. (Court of Common Pleas, Warren County, 1894, Bauer v. Reynolds, 14 Pa. County Court Reports, 497.)

ACTS OF 1881, ACT PASSED JUNE 29, 1881.-Payment of wages, etc. (b)

The fair and reasonable construction of this act is that the employee may decline to receive anything but cash or an order redeemable in cash in payment of his wages, but if he does receive goods in payment he waives his right to demand cash. (Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, 1885, Row v. Haddock, 3 Kulp, 501.)

These sections are utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what in this country can not be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts. They are an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employee;

a See Law, page 978.

b See Law, page 981.

more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void. (Supreme Court, 1886, Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. State Reports, 431.)

[The nine following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

The relators were brought up before the court on habeas corpus. They were in custody under a commitment on charge of conspiracy. They were master ladies' shoemakers and had agreed with each other not to employ any journeyman who would not consent to work at reduced wages; but it also appeared that the object went no further than to establish certain rates which had prevailed a few months before, from which there was reason to believe the employers had been compeiled to depart by a combination among the journeymen. A motion to discharge on the ground that a combination to regulate wages is no offense by the common law of Pennsylvania was argued. In his opinion the court held in part as follows: Unless it clearly appears that a prisoner brought up on habeas corpus is entirely innocent, a judge is bound to bail or remand. A combination is criminal wherever the act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the confederates and giving effect to the purposes of the latter, whether of extortion or mischief. According to this view of the law, a combination of employers to depress the wages of journeymen below what they would be, if there were no recurrence to artificial means by either side, is criminal. But the motive may be as important to avoid, as to induce an inference of criminality. The mere act of combining to change the price of labor is, perhaps, evidence of impropriety of intention, but not conclusive; for if the accused can show that the object was not to give an undue value to labor, but to foil their antagonists in an attempt to assign to it, by surreptitious means a value which it would not otherwise have, they will make out a good defense. It must therefore be obvious that the point in this case is whether the relators have been actuated by an improper motive, and that, being a question of fact, I am bound to refer its decision to a jury, the constitutional triers of it. (Court of Nisi Prius, Philadelphia, 1821, The Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly's Reports, 36.)

The arming of men to the number of three or more with guns, maintaining them in organized force, carrying and discharging their arms in a peaceful neighborhood, to the terror of the citizens, is riot. Armed patrols posted in companies of three or more, discharging their arms, and taking into custody citizens in a peaceful neighborhood, to the alarm and terror of the peaceful people thereabout resident, constitutes a riot. But a man may defend by all reasonable means his person and property, and to this end may arm himself and members of his family, and patrol his immediate premises to meet and anticipate an apprehended attack, not forgetting the rights of his peaceful neighbors. When the property endangered embraces a large field of operations, as a colliery, the posting of an armed patrol may be a necessary precaution. (Court of Quarter Sessions, Westmoreland County, 1875, Commonwealth v. Armstrong and Guescetti, 11 Phil. Reports, 656.) Four employees of defendants asked for an increase of wages, and, on its being refused, left work. Defendants were members of a manufacturers' association, the by-laws of which provided that when any hands employed by the members should be on a strike either for wages or disagreement no member should employ them after receiving due notice thereof, and addressed a circular letter to the other members. giving the names of such employees, and requesting that they should not be employed until the trouble was settled. Plaintiff, one of said employees, failed to get work for a month, and brought an action against defendants for damages. It appeared that plaintiff and the other employees were members of a union, and that the union paid thein while they were out of employment. Held, that a nonsuit was properly granted. (Bradley v. Pierson, 24 Atlantic Reporter, 65.)

A mere mob, collected upon the impulse of the moment, without any definite object beyond the gratification of its sudden passions, does not commit treason, although it destroys property and takes human life. When a large number of men arm and organize themselves by divisions and companies, appoint officers, and engage in a common purpose to defy the law, to resist its officers, and to deprive any portion of their fellow-citizens of the rights to which they are entitled under the

constitution and the laws, it is a levying of war against the State, and the offense is treason. Much more so when the functions of the State government are usurped in a particular locality, the process of the Commonwealth and the lawful acts of its officers resisted, and unlawful arrests made at the dictation of a body of men who have assumed the functions of government in that locality. It is a state of war when a business plant has to be surrounded by the army of the State for weeks to protect it from unlawful violence at the hands of men formerly employed in it. Where a body of men have organized for a treasonable purpose, every step taken is an overt act of treason in levying war. Every member of a usurping government who has participated in such usurpation has committed treason. The design of overthrowing the government of the State need not extend to every portion of its territory. It is sufficient if it be to overturn it in a particular locality, and such intent may be inferred from the acts committed. Aliens domiciled within the State and who enjoy its protection owe temporary allegiance to it, and are amenable for treason. There are no accessories in treason; all are principals. The relation of employer and employed is one of contract merely; neither party has the right to coerce the other into the making of a contract to which his mind does not assent. The aggregate rights of a large number rise no higher than the rights of individuals. Labor associations are legal so long only as they act peaceably and respect the rights of others. They may refuse to work and persuade others to join them in such refusal, but no more. They can not lawfully control the works in which their members have been employed or prevent by violence, or threats of violence, others from going to work. A citizen has the undoubted right to protect his property, and for this purpose may lawfully employ as many men as he sees proper, and may arm them, if necessary. (Court of Ôyer and Terminer, Allegheny County, 1892, The Homestead Case, Charge to the Grand Jury, 12 Pa. County Court Reports, 97.)

Where the constitution and by-laws of a relief association provide that a member shall receive no benefits until he executes a release to his employer, a railroad company, of all damages, the execution of such a release is a bar to an action against the railroad company. (Graff v. Railroad Company, 8 Atlantic Reporter, 206.)

Where a railroad company is a member of a relief association and has agreed to guarantee the obligations of the association, and to make appropriations to supply any deficiencies, an employee of the company who joins the association under an agreement that the acceptance of benefits from the relief fund for an injury caused by the operation of the railroad shall release all claims for damages against the company, and that he will execute such further instrument as may be necessary to evidence the acquittance of the company, is by the acceptance of benefits after an injury precluded from recovering damages from the railroad company, though he has never executed a formal release of damages. (Supreme Court, 1894, Ringle v. Pennsylvania Railway Company, 30 Atlantic Reporter, 492.) Where a railroad company has contributed to the funds of a relief association composed of its employees, an agreement by a member of the association that the acceptance of benefits from the relief fund "for injury or death shall operate as a release of all claims for damages against the said company" is not contrary to public policy and does not violate the rule that a common carrier cannot make a valid contract against his own negligence. In such a case there is no waiver of any right of action that the person injured may thereafter be entitled to. It is not the signing of the contract but the acceptance of benefits after the accident that constitutes the release. The injured party is therefore not stipulating for the future, but settling for the past; he is not agreeing to exempt the company from liability for negligence, but accepting compensation for an injury already caused thereby. (Supreme Court, 1894, Johnson v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 163 Pa. State Reports, 127.)

Where employees enter into a lawful combination to control by artificial means the supply of labor, preparatory to a demand for an advance of wages, a combination of employers to resist such artificial advance is lawful, since it is not made to lower the price of labor, as regulated by supply and demand. A combination of employers prevented dealers in the supplies used by such employers from selling to an employer who was not a member of their combination, and who had conceded a demand of the employees, by informing such dealers that no member of the combination would buy from them if they sold to such employer. Held, that this was not unlawful coercion. (Supreme Court, 1894, Cote v. Murphy et al., 159 Pa. State Reports, 420; Buchanan v. Barnes, 28 Atlantic Reporter, 195; Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. State Reports, 433.)

2352-84

The railroad company, in 1887, adopted a rule that no one would be employed by it who was a member of a labor organization, unless he would agree to withdraw therefrom; and, from that time required every applicant for employment to sign an application, representing that he was not a member of any such organization, or that, if he was, he would withdraw therefrom. Some years later, receivers of the railway company were appointed, and continued the same rule and practice. Certain employees of the receivers petitioned the court to restrain the receivers from acting upon a notice, issued by them, stating their intention to discharge any employees who were members of labor organizations, unless they severed their connection therewith before a certain date. It appeared that all the petitioners had either obtained employment by canceling their membership in such organizations, or had had notice of the rule, and been employed in violation of it, by subordinate agents, without the knowledge or consent of the receivers; and no others, differently situated, asked to be made parties. Held, that the petitioners, who had thus violated a known rule, had no standing to seek to restrain its enforcement; and that, in any event, the court would not direct the receivers to abrogate a rule, established by the owners of the property, and believed by them, and by the receivers, to be advantageous in its management and which involved nothing unlawful. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1894, Platt v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 65 Federal Reporter, 660.)

SOUTH CAROLINA.

REVISED STATUTES OF 1893, CIVIL STATUTE LAWS, SECTIONS 2215 TO 2218.-Contracts with, employment and payment of wages of, laborers. (a)

A laborer employed to make a crop under a verbal contract to allow him a certain share of the crop as compensation for his services is not entitled to a lien on the crop, the law providing that the contract shall be reduced to writing. (Supreme Court, 1876, Hair v. Blease, 8 S. C., 63.)

Section 2215 does not abolish the common-law right of agricultural laborers to contract with an employer, and the relation of master and servant as to such laborers may exist without regard to this statute. (Supreme Court, 1882, Huff v. Watkins, 18 S. C., 510.)

The lien given to an agricultural laborer by section 2217 does not give him such an interest in the crop as would permit him to bind his share therein by a lien for advances. (Supreme Court, 1883, Carpenter v. Strickland, 20 S. C., 1.)

An agricultural employee who is to receive a part of the crop as compensation for his services is a laborer for hire, and, as such, is not entitled to give an agricultural lien upon any part of the crop before settlement with his employer. (Supreme Court, 1883, Richey & Miller v. Du Pre, 20 S. C., 6.)

REVISED STATUTES OF 1893, CRIMINAL STATUTE LAWS, SECTIONS 288 TO 290.— Contracts with, employment and payment of wages of, laborers. (b) Section 288 of this chapter, which subjects a party to a civil contract to indictment and imprisonment for its breach, does not violate the constitutional provision prohibiting involuntary servitude, nor any other constitutional provision. A contract under this statute must clearly set forth the time when the amount stipulated is to be paid to the laborer. If the contract fails so to state, the laborer is not liable to an indictment for its breach. (Supreme Court, 1889, State v. Williams, 32 S. C., 123.)

SOUTH DAKOTA.

COMPILED LAWS OF 1887, TERRITORIAL, CIVIL CODE, SECTIONS 3752 TO 3754.Obligations of the employer. (c)

An employer is not liable to those in his employ for injuries resulting from the negligence, carelessness or misconduct of a fellow-servant engaged in the same general business, and performing services for the same general purposes; but to this rule there are well-defined exceptions. One, and perhaps the most important, of these exceptions arises from the obligation of the master, whether a natural

a See Law, page 1016. b See Law, page 1023. c See Law, page 1031.

person or a corporate body, not to expose the servant, when conducting the master's business, to perils or hazards against which he may be guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master. It is implied in the contract between the parties that the servant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensation. But it is equally implied in the same contract that the master shall supply the physical means and agencies for the conduct of his business; and in selecting such means, machinery, and appliances, and in preserving and maintaining them in a suitable condition, he shall not be wanting in proper care. His negligence in that regard renders him liable to an employee who sustains damage in consequence of such neglect. Sections 1130 [3753] and 1131 [3754] of the Civil Code is an enactment of the common law on that subject and does not change the rule. (Supreme Court, 1882, Herbert v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 3 Dakota, 38.)

On an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the decision in the above case was affirmed and it was held that an employer is not liable for injuries to his servant caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant in a common employment; but this exemption does not extend to injuries caused by the carelessness or neglect of another person in the master's service in an employment not common to that in which the person injured is engaged, and upon a subject in regard to which the person injured has a right to look for care and diligence on the part of the other person as the representative of the common master. If no one is appointed by a railroad company to look after the condition of its cars, and see that the machinery and appliances used to move and stop then are kept in repair and in good working order, it is liable for the injuries caused thereby. If one is appointed by it charged with that duty, and the injuries result from his negligence in its performance, the company is liable. He is, so far as that duty is concerned, the representative of the company. Section_1130 [3753] does not apply to losses suffered by an employee in consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in another and not in the same general business. Section 1131 expresses the general law that an employer is responsible for injuries to his employees caused by his own want of ordinary care. His selection of defective machinery, which is to be moved by steam power, is of itself evidence of a want of ordinary care, and allowing it to remain out of repair, when its condition is brought to his notice, or by proper inspection might be known, is culpable negligence. (United States Supreme Court, 1886, Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Herbert, 116 U. S., 642.)

A section foreman and the conductor of a train are coemployees within the meaning of the rule of the common law, and also section 1130 [3753]. (Supreme Court, 1889, Elliot v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 5 Dakota, 523.)

Where two servants of the same master are engaged together in the accomplishment of a common object, the one having no control or authority over the other, they are coemployees within the meaning of section 1130 [3753]. (Supreme Court, 1889, Schmidt v. Leistekow, 6 Dakota, 386.)

TENNESSEE.

CODE OF 1884, PART I, TITLE 9, SECTION 1858.-Mining, quarrying, boring, and manufacturing companies-Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (a)

An employee is not estopped to proceed against stockholders of an insolvent corporation for his wages by taking note and obtaining judgment against the corporation for such wages and by receiving pro rata on his claim out of the corporate assets. The individual liability of stockholders was designed merely to supply any deficiency of the corporate assets. Stockholders are not relieved, by transfer of their stock, from their individual liability to employees of the corporation for wages previously earned. (Supreme Court, 1888, Jackson v. Meek, 87 Tenn., 69.)

Statutes are strictly construed, which, in derogation of the common law, make stockholders liable for wages earned by employees in the service of the corporation. A traveling salesman or drummer falls within the description of persons provided for by this section. He is not a "laborer, servant, or operative" but a

a See Law, page 1050.