laid down which shall include all instances of it; but the authorities seem to agree that the gist of the offense is the conspiracy, and that a conspiracy is a confederacy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means, whether to the prejudice of an individual or the public. But by unlawful' it is not intended to mean that the acts agreed to be done must be criminal; it is enough if they are wrongful and done with an improper or evil intent. Thus it has been held that threats, intimidation, or any forcible means, other than lawful competition, are unlawful. To threaten another in order to deter him from doing some lawful act, or to compel him to do an unlawful one, has always been considered a misdemeanor at common law. I consider it well established that any conspiracy formed and intended directly or indirectly to prevent the carrying on of any lawful business, or to injure the business of anyone, by wrongfully preventing those who would be customers from buying anything from or employing the representatives of said business, by threats, intimidation, or other forcible means, is unlawful." (Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 11 Va. Law Journal, 324.)

The essential idea of "boycotting" is a confederation, generally secret, of many persons whose intent is to injure another, by preventing any and all persons from doing business with him through fear of incurring the displeasure, persecution, and vengeance of the conspirators. At trial for conspiracy to " boycott" the evidence in this case shows that while Baughman Bros. were engaged in their lawful business as stationers and printers, the plaintiff in error and other members of the Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, conspired to compel them to make their office a "union office," and to compel them not to employ any printer who did not belong to the said union; that upon the refusal of Baughman Bros. to make their office (or business) a "union office" the plaintiff in error and others composing the said union, conspired and determined to boycott the said firm, as they had threatened to do, and sent circulars to a great many of the customers of the firm informing them, that they had, with the aid of the Knights of Labor and all the trades organizations in this city (Richmond), boycotted the establishment of Messrs. Baughman Bros.," and formally notifying the said customers that the names of all persons who should persist in trading, patronizing, or dealing with Baughman_Bros., after being notified of the boycott, would be published weekly in the Labor Herald as a black list," who, in their turn, would be boycotted until they agreed to withdraw their patronage from Baughman Bros.; and accordingly the employees of Baughman Bros. were mercilessly hounded by publication after publication, for months, in the Labor Herald (which was the boasted engine of the boycotting conspirators), whereby it was attempted to excite public feeling against them and to prevent them from obtaining even board and shelter; and the names of the customers and patrons of the said firm were published in the said sheet under the standing head of "black list." Not only Baughman Bros. and their employees and customers, but the hotels, boarding houses, public schools, railroads and steamboats conducting the business, travel and transportation of the city, were listed and published under the obloquy and denunciation of the "black list." It was proved that the conspirators declared their set purpose and persistent effort to crush" Baughman Bros.; that the minions of the boycott committee dogged the firm in all their transactions; followed their delivery wagon; secured the names of their patrons; and used every means, short of actual physical force, to compel them to cease dealing with Baughman Bros. The acts alleged and proved in this case are unlawful and incompatible with the prosperity, peace, and civilization of the country, and are sufficient to warrant the verdict of guilty. (Supreme Court of Appeals, 1888, Crump v. The Commonwealth, 84 Va., 927.)

WASHINGTON.

HILL'S ANNOTated Statutes and Codes of 1891, VOLUME I, GENERAL STATUTES,
SECTIONS 2531 TO 2534.-Payment of wages, etc. (a)

An order issued in payment of wages directing a third party to pay the wage earner $180," is by its terms payable in lawful money of the United States, though the words "in lawful money of the United States" are not set out therein, and does not violate the provisions of this chapter, forbidding the issuance in payment of wages of any order, check, etc., payable in whole or in part otherwise than in lawful money of the United States. Quære, whether such an order, if it had been payable in something other than lawful money of the United States, would come

a See Law, page 1120.

!

within the provisions of this chapter, since it was not the order, check or memorandum of the person making the payment. (Supreme Court, 1893, Quinby v. Slepper, 7 Wash., 475.)

[The following decision was not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, is here included:]

Employees of receivers of a railroad joined in a general strike, without grievance of their own, for the purpose of compelling, by obstruction of travel and hindrance to traffic, parties to one side of a pending controversy to yield actual or supposed rights; quitting the service under such circumstances as made it necessary to fill their places in order to continue the operation of the road. Held, that the court should not, by reason of their past services, direct the receivers to reinstate them, as they had not been discharged for fault, and their reinstatement would displace competent and worthy men, who had worked during the strike under abuse from crowds in sympathy with the strikers. Nor was an order for their reemployment in other positions necessary, where without it they would be called upon to fill vacancies as they should occur. (United States Circuit Court, 1894, Booth et al. v. Brown et al., 62 Federal Reporter, 794.)

WEST VIRGINIA.

CODE, EDITION OF 1891, APPENDIX, PAGE 991.—Coal mine regulations and

inspection. (a)

It is the duty of the operator of every coal mine, under this act, to provide ample means of ventilation, and to cause air to circulate through the headings and working places, so as to dilute, render harmless and carry off dangerous and noxious gases. It is also his duty to employ a competent fire boss to examine with safety lamp, immediately before each shift, working places and other places where dangerous and noxious gas is known to exist or is liable to exist. It is also his duty to employ a competent mining boss to keep careful watch over the ventilating apparatus and the airways, traveling ways, pumps and drainage, and to see that proper break-throughs are made, and that all loose coal, slate or rock overhead in the working places and along the haulways be removed or carefully secured, so as to prevent danger to persons employed in the mine, and to provide props and timbers for the mine, and perform other duties required of him by law. Omission of these duties is negligence in the operator, and renders him liable to his employee for injury resulting from such omission of duty. (Supreme Court of Appeals, 1893, Graham v. Newburg Orrel Coal and Coke Company, 38 West Va., 273.)

CODE, EDITION OF 1891, APPENDIX, PAGE 998.—Weighing coal at mines. (b) It was claimed that these acts were violative of sections 1 and 10 of the bill of rights of the State in that they deprive persons of property without due process of law, and also that they were in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that they abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States, that they deny to the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, and that they deprive the defendants of their property without due process of law. Held, that, as applied to corporations and licensees. neither of these acts is in violation of the constitution of the State nor of that of the United States, but that both acts are within the scope of legislative authority. In its opinion, the court held in part as follows:

"In the further discussion of the questions involved, another principle may be referred to, which is of almost universal application, and that is, where peculiar privileges are granted by the State, peculiar responsibilities supervene, and special regulations may be imposed. The bestowal and reception of unequal privileges beget legitimately the right to impose unequal burdens. Corporations are the recipients of extraordinary privileges from this State. In no State in the Union have they such an extensive endowment of special privileges as in our own State. It would naturally be supposed, therefore, that a State in which there is so much lavishness of bounty in conferring privileges upon corporations, should reserve to herself the power to regulate, alter, or repeal charters, and to exercise expansive and remedial police powers necessary to prevent abuse. If persons engaged in extensive industries, such as in this case-coal mining-desire to retain every privilege which pertains to ordinary private property, they should be careful not to

a See Law, page 1137.

b See Law, page 1141.

apply to the sovereign power for those extraordinary privileges which attach to a charter of incorporation in this State. It is further found that under our code, every corporation chartered under the laws in this State is required to take out a State license before doing or attempting any business in this State. The defendant is therefore not only a corporation but a licensee. Such a license is granted and required as a police regulation. While our code is liberal in conferring extraordinary powers upon corporations, it has yet reserved to the legislature the power of altering and amending all charters of incorporation. Can licensees of this State invoke the protection of sections 1 and 10 of the bill of rights and claim immunity from the payment of license fees and other appropriate police regulations? It has been held by all the better authorities that they can not, and for two reasons: First, because they are in the enjoyment of a peculiar privilege derived from the State, which makes their business essentially a monopoly; and, second, because they are engaged in a vocation peculiarly the subject of public surveillance. Upon the whole, therefore, we are not able to say that the legislature has transcended its inherent power to make reasonable police regulations, or that it has violated the constitution of this State. First, upon the ground that the defendant is a corporation in the enjoyment of unusual and extraordinary privileges, which enable it and similar associations to surround themselves with a vast retinue of laborers, who need to be protected against all fraudulent or suspicious devices in the weighing of coal or in the payment of labor; second, the defendant is a licensee, pursuing a vocation which the State has taken under its general supervision for the purpose of securing the safety of employees, by ventilation, inspection and governmental report, and the defendant, therefore, must submit to such regulations as the sovereign thinks conducive to public health, public morals or public security.

66

We do not base this decision so much upon the ground that the business is affected by the public use, but upon the still higher ground, that the public tranquillity and the good and safety of society demand, where the number of employees is such that specific contracts with each laborer would be improbable, if not impossible, that in general contracts justice shall prevail as between operator and miner; and, in the company's dealing with the multitude of laborers, with whom the State has by special legislation enabled the owners and operators to surround themselves, that all opportunities for fraud shall be removed. The State is frequently called upon to suppress strikes, to discountenance labor conspiracies, to denounce boycotting as injurious to trade and commerce; and it can not be possible that the same police power may not be invoked to protect the laborer from being made the victim of the compulsory power of that artificial combination of capital which special State legislation has originated and rendered possible. It is a fact worthy of consideration, and one of such historical notoriety that the court may recognize it judicially, that every disturbance of the peace of any magnitude in this State since the civil war has been evolved from the disturbed relations between powerful corporations and their servants or employees. It can not be possible that the State has no police power adequate to the protection of society against the recurrence of such disturbances, which threaten to shake civil order to its foundations. It has been held that it was not unconstitutional, as a police regulation, to require railroads to fence their tracks, although others may not be required to inclose their lands; and also that a law requiring such corporations to pay for live stock killed on the track is not an unwarranted exercise of police power.

"If such legislation, directed against one class of corporations only, is not objectionable as class legislation, it is difficult to see why laws directed against other corporations, and directly intended to prevent popular disturbance and discontent, by regulating the manner of weighing coal, and prohibiting what is popularly known as the 'pluck me' method of payment, should not be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. Section 3 of chapter 63 of the acts of 1887, on the payment of wages, was declared unconstitutional in the case of State v. Goodwill (33 W. Va., 179), on the ground that the invidious distinction, contained therein, separating miners and manufacturers from the rest of the community, and imposing upon them burdens not inflicted upon others, made the legislation embraced therein distinctly class legislation. In the act we are now considering (chapter 76, acts of 1891) this objection is carefully and entirely removed. It seems clear that both the acts we are now considering were passed with a view of cutting off opportunities for fraud, and therefore they were fairly within the police power of the legislature. It is maintained, however, that these acts are in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. In the celebrated Slaughterhouse Case it was held that it was only the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States which are placed

by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that those of the citizens of the State, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment. The fourteenth amendment was never intended to strike down the police power of the State, nor to control its exercise, except in cases where the act amounts plainly to usurpation, and the wresting of private property from its legitimate owners without compensation. We see nothing in the legislation now under consideration which could properly be so characterized or regarded as in conflict with the fourteenth amendment. So well am I satisfied that these laws are not only constitutional but also reasonable and just, that, so far as I am individually concerned, I do not question that they can be successfully maintained against all classes of persons embraced in their scope. But this court is neither in duty bound nor ought it to decide in advance upon the guilt or innocence of persons not now before us, but who may probably come before us on some future indictment. Should individual operators hereafter be indicted, the question as to the divisibility of the acts-whether they may be maintained as against licensees and corporations, but not as against individuals-will properly arise.” (Supreme Court of Appeals, 1892, State v. Feel Splint Coal Company, 36 W. Va., 802.)

CODE, EDITION OF 1891, APPENDIX, PAGE 1002.-Payment of wages. (a) [See case of State v. Peel Splint Coal Company, pages 1338-1340, ante.]

CODE, EDITION OF 1891, APPENDIX, PAGE 1003.-Payment of wages. (a)

It is not competent for the legislature, under the constitution, to single out owners and operators of mines and manufacturers of every kind, and provide that they shall bear burdens not imposed on other owners of property or employers of labor, and prohibit them from making contracts which it is competent for other owners of property or employers of labor to make. Such legislation can not be sustained as an exercise of the police power. The third section of this chapter, which prohibits persons engaged in mining and manufacturing from issuing for the payment of labor any order or paper, except such as is specified in the said act, is unconstitutional and void. (Supreme Court of Appeals, 1889, State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va., 179.)

The fourth section of this chapter, which prohibits persons and corporations, engaged in mining and manufacturing and interested in selling merchandise and supplies, from selling merchandise and supplies to their employees at a greater per cent of profit than they sell to others not employed by them, is unconstitutional and void, because it is class legislation and an unjust interference with private contracts and business. (Supreme Court of Appeals, 1889, State v. F. C. Coal and Coke Company, 33 W. Va., 188.)

WISCONSIN.

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 73a, SECTION 1636f.-Factories and workshops-Overcrowding, etc. (b)

The provision of this statute, that all gearing of machines so located as to be dangerous to employees when engaged in their ordinary duties shall be covered, applies to employees a part of whose duties requires them to clean the gears themselves, as well as to those not employed directly on or about them.

When an employee has received instruction sufficient to put him on his guard, and enable him to comprehend the risk of being caught in a gearing, he must be presumed to have appreciated the risk of such injury.

An employer is not bound to anticipate every probable risk which may happen in the use of a machine, but discharges his duty if he gives such general instruc tions as will enable the employee to comprehend the danger.

The fact that the gearing of a machine was of such a character as to be required by statute to be covered for the protection of employees does not deprive the employer of the defense of contributory negligence. (Supreme Court, 1895, Thomp son v. Edward P. Allis Company, 62 Northwestern Reporter, 527.)

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 85, SECTION 1769.-Liability of stock

holders for debts due employees. (c)

The mere dissolution of a corporation by its own voluntary act, or by its ceasing to act as a corporation, does not relieve the stockholders from liability, under this a See Law, page 1143. b See Law, page 1151. c See Law, page 1153.

section, for debts due to its clerks, servants and laborers. A judgment against the corporation is not a condition precedent to an action against the stockholders under this section. The legislature has, under the constitution, the undoubted right to fix the liabilities of all the stockholders of an existing corporation, as to all debts of the corporation contracted after the law fixing such liability is enacted. The liability, created by this section, is in addition to the liability of the stockholders for the amount unpaid on their stock. The superintendent or foreman of the works of a manufacturing corporation, though he does not perform any manual labor, is a servant of the corporation within the meaning of this section. If stock in a corporation is held by a person in his own name, and it appears on the books to be so held, he is liable thereon as a stockholder, under this section, whether he holds it as collateral security or as his absolute property. (Supreme Court. 1887, Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis., 577.)

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 87, SECTION 1809a.-Railroads-Blocking of frogs. (a)

This act does not take away the defense of contributory negligence. (Supreme Court, 1891, Holmes v. The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 80 Wis., 299.)

ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 181, SECTIONS 4466a To 4466d.-Boycotting, blacklisting, intimidation, etc. (b)

These sections are declaratory of the common law, and wholly condemn all conspiracies to injure or oppress, or to interfere with the rights of others. Their efficacy is in no degree impaired by any statutory recognition of the right of organization for the purpose of promoting the welfare of labor. A court of equity having charge of a railroad through its receivers has authority to restrain the formation and execution of a conspiracy among the employees to quit the service in a body with the design and intent of crippling the property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation of the road. A strike is a combination among workmen to compel the master to the concession of a certain demand by preventing the conduct of his business until compliance with the demand. The concerted cessation of work is but one of and the least effective of the means to the end; the intimidation of others from engaging in the service, the interference with and disabling and destruction of property, and resort to actual force and violence when necessary to the accomplishment of the end, being the other and more effective means employed. Such strike is unlawful, and a Federal court having charge through its receivers of an interstate railroad has jurisdiction to enjoin the executive heads of the various organizations of railroad employees from ordering a strike upon the road. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District, Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 60 Federal Reporter, 803.)

[NOTE.-The foregoing case was reviewed by the United States circuit court of appeals, seventh circuit, in the case of Arthur et al. v. Oakes et al., the syllabus of the decision in said case being as follows:]

If an employee of a railroad company quits without cause, and in violation of an express contract to serve for a stated time, then his quitting would not be of right, and he would be liable for any damages resulting from a breach of his agreement, and, perhaps, in some States, to criminal prosecution for loss of life or limb by passengers or others, directly resulting from his abandoning his post at a time when care and watchfulness were required upon his part in the discharge of a duty he had undertaken to perform.

It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him to work for, or to remain in the personal service of, another. One who is placed under such restraint is in a condition of involuntary servitude-a condition which the supreme law of the land declares shall not exist within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction.

The rule, we think, is, without exception, that equity will not compel the actual, affirmative performance by an employee of merely personal services, any more than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal service one who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that character. The right of an employee, engaged to perform personal service, to quit that service, rests upon the same basis as the right of his employer to discharge him from further personal service. If the quitting in the one case, or the discharging in the other,

a See Law, page 1153.

b See Law, page 1164.