Impact damage to bells and spigots, as the name implies, occurred during handling of the pipes. It cannot, of course, be doubted that there is a known corrective action for impact damage, namely careful handling of the pipes. We note Mr. Herrera's testimony (Tr. 779) that he thought Cen-Vi-Ro experienced unnecessary impact damage because he didn't think they should have had any. We also note that if the delays in pipe manufacture which forced the suspension of laying operations by the subcontractor, R. H. Fulton, are Cen-Vi-Ro's responsibility, then the resulting inventory of pipes and increased handling which would normally result in more impact damage are also Cen-Vi-Ro's responsibility. Nevertheless, and in view of the provisions of the Concrete Manual, we conclude that it would be unrealistic to expect the total elimination of such damage on a project involving the manufacture, test and installation of thousands of pipes.

There is also the matter of increased handling due to hydrostatic tests in excess of contract requirements. In a letter to Raymond International, Inc., dated July 2, 1965 (Cen-Vi-Ro Correspondence), Mr. Hubbard expressed the opinion that rejects normally expected, due to accidental damage and other factors, should not exceed one-half of one percent. This letter was, of course, written over one year after production of pipes had commenced. Relating final rejects to the months in which the pipes were

manufactured indicates that only one month (October, 1964) appears to have been free of final rejects for impact damage, Exh. 5Q). However, comparing pipe production in particular months with the number of pipes manufactured in those months which were ultimately rejected for impact damage would serve no useful purpose, since rejection did not necessarily occur as the pipes were produced and the record does not support the view that the majority of impact damage occurred during or immediately after the pipes were produced. The 170 final rejects for impact damage constitute approximately 0.56 percent of the 30,133 pipes produced under DC-6000. The evidence does not establish any relationship between impact damage and other defects. We find that the record would not support a finding that Cen-ViRo continually failed to take known corrective action to eliminate or reduce impact damage.

From our examination of the Final Inventory of Rejected Pipe (Exh. 152), we identify 88 pipes. rejected for broken or impact damaged bells, of which 13 have multiple defects (seven of which failed hydrostatic tests), two additional pipes failed hydrostatic tests, one pipe (66A75X20, No. 14D, mfg. 418-66) passed the test and five were. charged to Fulton. The pipe which passed the test is on the list of identified pipes considered acceptable to Dr. Davis. Photos indicate that the damaged areas on two pipes (66AB50X16, No. 8D, mfg. 3-7-66.

firms that the damaged area of the bell on this pipe extended less than 45° of the circumference. Since the Government refused to permit repairs to impact damaged bells in accordance with the Concrete Manual we attach little or no significance to the fact that one of the identified pipes failed two hydrostatic tests. We conclude that CenVi-Ro has established prima facie that these five pipes were properly repairable under the Concrete Manual.

Dr. Davis examined 26 pipes rejected for rocky bells. He considered that four out of 26 or approximately 15 percent should have been accepted with repair. However, none of the pipes rejected for rocky bells which he examined has been identified.

The record does not reveal any reason for unconsolidation of concrete in barrels and spigots. Since we have found that unconsolidated gyro area concrete was attributable to a dampening of vibration at the points where the gyro rings encircled the forms on the 20-foot spinner, it would seem logical to attribute unconsolidation in barrels and spigots to similar causes. However, there does not appear to be any correlation between the number of final rejects for unconsolidated concrete in barrels and spigots and final rejects for gyro areas. The Government attributes 64 of the 67 final rejects for unconsolidated concrete in barrels and spigots to the period prior to May 15, 1965 (Exh. 5Q).

Thirty of these are indicated to have been manufactured during the shakedown period. Thereafter, unconsolidated concrete other than in gyro areas does not appear to have been a significant problem. Final rejects for this reason taken as evidence of defects, averaged approximately 0.22 percent of production during the so-called crisis period of January through April 1965. The record rather than supporting a finding of a continuing failure to take known corrective action to reduce or eliminate unconsolidated concrete other than in gyro areas, in our opinion supports the contrary conclusion. We so find.

We have identified 32 of the 67 final rejects for unconsolidated areas in barrels or spigots as distinguished from gyro areas. Fifteen of these pipes have multiple defects, or are indicated to have been rejected by Cen-Vi-Ro (two of these failed hydrostatic tests). One other pipe (72AB50, No. 15N, mfg. 3-965) passed the hydrostatic test. We conclude that Cen-Vi-Ro should have been permitted to repair this pipe. Dr. Davis does not appear to have examined any pipes which were rejected for this reason. None of these pipes are included in the photographs of defective pipes.

Although the contracting officer does not appear to have specifically considered unconsolidated concrete other than gyro areas as a reason for rejection, it is clear that his intention was to deny Cen-Vi-Ro's claims in their entirety. We con

Decision

Directives and instructions in effect as of April 30, 1965, provided that pipes with imperfections or damaged areas extending over six inches in gasket area of bell would be rejected. These instructions were affirmed in the May 13 letter which also provided that pipes with imperfections or damaged areas exceeding four inches in gasket areas of the spigot would be rejected.

Rocky bells result from insufficient concrete in the bell and are otherwise referred to as unconsolidated or underfilled bells. Difficulty in properly filling the bells appears to be due primarily to the mix used in the Cen-Vi-Ro process. Although it is not altogether clear, we assume that rocky bells are normally repairable as rock pockets, exposed steel or as roughness in the gasket bearing areas of the bell in accordance with the Concrete Manual. In any event, the Bureau permitted substantial repairs to rocky bells prior to April 30, 1965, and the Government's only argument that rocky bells are not repairable appears to be based on Cen-Vi-Ro's alleged failure to take "known corrective action." During the May 15 inventory which was conducted in accordance with the May 13 letter, the Bureau rejected 233 pipes for rocky bells. Although a limited number of rocky bells is inherent in the manufacture of concrete pipe by spin

ning methods, we have concluded that there is a known corrective action for rocky bells which Cen-ViRo either knew or is chargeable with knowing, namely a proper mix and proper filling of the bell. We have also found that rocky bells consid

ered as defects were manufactured for a sufficient period of time and in sufficient quantities that Cen-Vi-Ro may be found to have continually failed to take that corrective action

prior to May 15, 1965. After May 15, 1965, rocky bells were not a significant problem and the record supports the conclusion that corrective action was taken to reduce rocky bells after that date.

In early August 1965 the Bureau relaxed the restriction in the May 13 letter and permitted the repair of rocky bells which extended less than one-quarter of the circum ference of the pipe and did not extend beyond reinforcing steel when chipped out for repair. This relaxed criteria was applied to previously rejected pipes as well as current production and resulted in the acceptance of most, if not all, of the 233 pipes which were rejected for rocky bells in the May 15 inventory. While it is clear that not all rocky bells are repairable and that the magnitude and extent of the defect must be considered, the Manual permits the repair of exposed steel on the inside of pipes 36 inches or larger in diameter. It also contemplates the repair of areas extending beyond reinforcing steel. We cannot say that limiting restrictions on repair of rocky bells to an area less than one

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quarter of the circumference of the bell was unreasonable; however, we conclude that limiting repair of rocky bells to areas which did not extend beyond reinforcing steel was not in accordance with the Manual. As pointed out ante (note 88, (note 88, supra), Cen-Vi-Ro has largely eschewed identification of particular pipes it considers were improperly rejected. A photo of one 72-inch pipe having exposed steel in the rocky area reflects that the defective area on this pipe extended less than one-quarter of the circumference. We find that this pipe was improperly rejected.

The Bureau's instructions precluding repairs to damaged bells that extend over six inches in gasket areas clearly constituted a restriction on repairs to impact damaged or broken bells which are normally repairable in accordance with the Concrete Manual. There is no evidence that these restrictions were ever relaxed or changed in any way. The evidence would not support a finding that Cen-Vi-Ro continually failed to take known corrective action to reduce or eliminate impact damage. We have identified 88 final rejects for broken or impact damage to bells of which 13 have multiple defects and five were charged to R. H. Fulton, the pipe laying subcontractor. While a photo indicates that a 72-inch pipe which was rejected for impact damage to the bell leaked when hydrostatically tested, we have accepted as accurate a statement by a Cen-Vi-Ro representative that the leakage could be cured

by minor repair. In addition, CenVi-Ro has identified and established prima facie that five pipes (one 54inch and four 66-inch of which one is 66-inch x 16-foot) examined by Dr. Davis which were rejected for broken or impact damage to bells were properly repairable in accordance with the Concrete Manual. We find that the rejection of these six pipes was improper.

Since breaks on gasketed spigots which are entirely through the shell and into or beyond the gasket bearing area and which extend for more than four inches around the circumference under the gasket are not normally repairable under the Concrete Manual, it is not clear that Bureau instructions precluding repair of imperfections or damage which extend more than four inches in the spigot gasket area restricted repairs allowable by the Manual. However, read literally, the May 13 letter precluded repairs to damaged or defective spigot gasket areas in excess of four inches irrespective of whether the break was through the shell. We have identified 72 pipes rejected for broken or impact damage to spigots. The extent of the damaged areas on the great majority of these pipes is not shown. Photos of seven of the rejected pipes are in the record. The photos support the conclusion that the rejection of five of the pipes was proper. Although two 66inch x 20-foot pipes rejected for broken spigots passed the hydrostatic test, other evidence establishes that the rejection of one of these pipes was proper. We con