Hindu panch, five, which is the usual number of the ingredients.

PUNCH. See METAL-WORKING MACHINERY. PUNCH AND JUDY, in Great Britain and some European countries, a well-known puppetshow frequently exhibited in the streets. The show of Punch and Judy derives its origin from the Neapolitan Punchinello, but many of its features are purely English. The earliest account of the adventures of Punch and his wife, Judy, is found in a ballad, the date of which does not appear to be anterior to 1795. This account corresponds pretty closely with the representations given in our streets. The show embodies a domestic tragedy, followed by a supernatural retribution, the whole of which is treated in a broadly farcical manner. Punch himself is represented as short and thick-set, with an immense hump upon his back, a wide mouth, long chin and hooked nose, and wearing a three-pointed cap. His wife, Judy, who is in some respects his counterpart, and his dog, Toby, are important characters in the performance See also PUPPET-SHOWS.

PUNCHEON, a liquid measure of capacity containing from 84 to 120 gallons. See WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

PUNCHINELLO, pŭn-chi-něl'ō (from pulcinello), an Italian mask or marionette. The Abbate Galiani derives the name from a misshapen but humorous peasant from Sorento, who had received it (about the middle of the 17th century) from his bringing chickens (pulcinelle) to market in Naples, and who, after his death, was personated in the puppet-shows of the San Carlino Theatre, for the amusement of the people, to whom he was well known. See also PUPPET-SHOWS.

PUNCTUATION, from the Latin punctus, "a point," is the term used to designate the use of points, or marks, for the purpose of separating words from each other in sentences and parts of sentences. The convenience of such separation is obvious, yet for many centuries after writing had first been used there was nothing to indicate the pauses, or divide a book into sentences. No attempt to punctuate is apparent in the earlier manuscripts and inscriptions of the Greeks. It was in Alexandria that punctuation originated, when that city was the centre of ancient learning. The open space to the left of a line which indicates the beginning of a paragraph made its appearance on papyri at Alexandria. The early signs intended for punctuation were at first used in poetry only, to enable readers to comprehend the meaning hidden in obsolete words and involved and difficult verses. Ages passed, however, before any form of punctuation became general, and it was not until the 9th century after Christ that the division of sentences by period, colon and semicolon marks took place. The comma was the same as to-day, a large dot or double dot indicated the full stop, and a high dot stood for a colon or semicolon.

The following rules for the use of the points are condensed from De Vinne's 'Practice of Typography.

The chief purpose of the comma is to define the particles and minor clauses of a sentence. Reversed, and often in pairs, commas mark the beginning of a quotation. A reversed comma

marks the abbreviation of Mac in Scotch names, as M'Carthy. Reversed commas in tables are a sign for ditto. The comma frequently supplies the place of omitted words, as in addresses.

The semicolon keeps apart the more important members of the sentence, and is most used in long sentences.

The colon is used after the particles or introductory words to another statement, as in to wit: viz: for example: Dear Sir: It is often used to separate hours from minutes, as 2:14, for 14 minutes past two.

The period marks the end of a completed sentence. It is also employed in abbreviations, as J. Smith, i.e., q.v., etc. It separates whole numbers from decimal fractions.

The dash has been substituted for almost all the points, being once much used to indicate suppressed words. It is employed to connect a side heading with the text that follows. It should be selected where there is an abrupt change in statement, as "Thus the plot thickens - but I weary you." It serves to give additional force to an anti-climax: "They will steal anything, and call it-purchase." The insertion of a comma before the dash is now regarded as unnecessary.

The parenthesis, usually shown in pairs, encloses the words added to a sentence, which would be complete without it. The bracket has similar uses, but is preferred when the words introduced are not by the author, but added as explanatory by an editor.

The interrogation marks the end of a question that requires answer. It is not needed when the question does not call for an answer, as "The Cyprians asked me why I wept."

The exclamation marks a word or phrase intended to express great surprise or emotion; and is used also at the end of an exclamatory clause. "Look, my Lord! it comes!"

The apostrophe, most used to mark the possessive case, as in John's, is used also to show the contraction of words, or omitted letters, as h'd'k' for handkerchief, I'll for I will, and the clipping of words in dialect, as nuthin' for nothing. It is also used to mark the close of a quotation, single or double. For all nouns in the plural number that end in s, the apostrophe must follow to make the possessive, as boys' games; singular nouns ending in s call for 's, as James's book.

The first function of a hyphen is to mark the division of a word that carries into the next line, but it serves also to connect compounded words, as round-shouldered.

Consult Wilson, Treatise on Grammatical Punctuation' (1850); Teall, 'Punctuation' (1899); Cochrane, 'Punctuation and Capitalization (1908); Hart, 'Rules for Compositors' (Oxford 1912).

PUNDIT, or PANDIT, an Indian title for men who devote themselves to the pursuit of learning, especially on religious subjects. It corresponds with the modern title of "Doctor." It is especially applied to certain men who in the 19th century after being instructed by the English in the science of geodesy have explored and surveyed Tibet, and other areas of Asia generally inaccessible to Europeans. The most notable of them were Mohammed i Hamid, who went (1863-64) over the Karakoram Pass

to the Yarkand River; the famous Naing Singh, who, between 1865 and 1875, brought back valuable results from his travels in Tibet, and discovered the northern springs of the Indus; Mirza Sudja, who (1868-69) crossed the Little Pamir to Kashgar and Ley; Haider Schah, who in 1870 made an expedition to Faizabad in the valley of the Oxus, and later explored the mountain ranges between Cabul, Bokhara and East Turkestan. Consult Garbe, 'Indische Reiseskizzen (1889).

PUNIC (pü'ník) WARS, in ancient history, the general name applied to three great wars between the Romans and the Carthaginians. The first (264-241 B.C.) was for the possession of Sicily, and ended by the Carthaginians having to withdraw from the island. The second (218-202 B.C.), the war in which Hannibal gained his great victories in Italy, was a death struggle between the two rival powers; it ended with decisive victory to the Romans. The third (149-146 B.C.) was a wanton one for the destruction of Carthage, which was effected in the last-named year. See CARTHAGE.

PUNICA. See POMEGRANATE.

PUNISHMENT, in the strict sense of the term, is a definite expression of public indignation, at least conventional, if not genuinely moral. It always aims, at least, at expressing the indignation of the social group, and in this resides the fact that it is only externally similar to the earlier custom of revenge which, theoretically, is private. Public indignation, like non-moral resentment, or revenge, is a reactionary state of the group consciousness directed toward the cause of inflicted pain or other injury. And even punishment is, as in the cases of blood-revenge, frequently indiscriminate. In these cases punishment not infrequently falls on the relatives of the culprit. The nature of punishment necessarily involves suffering in the form of pain or loss of honor, place, power, liberty, property or even life. It implies forfeiture of what would otherwise have been admitted to be a right inhering in the sufferer, who suffers because he has perpetrated a wrong. The common will is not, as Rousseau informs us, "the sum of the individual wills. The common will is the product of social life, and it is the will of establishing the solid foundations of peaceable interrelations among the members of a community. There being a stern necessity of social bonds under penalty of extinction to the whole community, the common will develops a most powerful tribal conscience demanding universal obedience to certain general rules called laws. All the citizens of a community may well be said to agree in this, that everybody regards himself as exempt; wherever there are laws all know there are some who will disobey them. The primary object of punishment is in every instance to maintain or restore the common will or social order. Our legal system in all its parts is a virtual confession of man's incapacity for individual self-government. "It is when a man can do as he pleases," says Huxley, "that his troubles begin." Statutory law is the will of a nation published in written and enduring form for the information of those subject to it. And yet after everything is done that can be done to instruct people as to what the public good requires, we always find two classes:

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those who abide by the demands of the public will, and those who do not. How shall the state treat those who wilfully violate its statutes? What shall be done with those who are both mentally capable of understanding its demands and who are physically able to conform to them, but still act directly counter to their requirements?

Such questions have been asked since man became a member of society: and the answer given was, punish them, or "cure" them. Such was the origin of punishment. The advocates of this treatment of public offenders saw its justification in many principles. Some saw in punishment a vindication of the law; others protection (which too often is inspired, however, by mere revenge and forgetful of the fact that two wrongs do not make a right); "example" was the purpose of still others (but these not seldom revealed an inclination to ignore all sense of proportion, and the degree of guilt); a recent development is the idea of reformation. Of all the foregoing, the notion of making an example is perhaps the least worthy, being an (unconscious, it may be) expression of mere vindictiveness. It is alleged to be a deterrent theory. Could the infliction have any deterrent effect at all upon just people unless it was supposed that the person punished was receiving his actual deserts? Reflection will, we feel certain, teach anyone that punishment out of all proportion to the degree of guilt would have just the opposite effect upon the just if they thought otherwise.

In every society the traditional notions as to what is right and wrong, obligatory or morally indifferent, are all too commonly accepted by the great majority without any further reflection. At their source not a few of these notions have their origin (sociology shows this) in sentimental likings and antipathies. The moral estimate all too frequently survives the cause from which it sprung; and no enlightened judge could fail to see that while this is so, the operation of "example" as a punitive principle would lead to flagrant injustice, for many times the moral estimates that come down to us from our fathers have no foundation in existing conditions.

Considered etymologically the word punishment would, it was hoped, throw some light upon what was uppermost in the minds of its advocates through the ages. That etymology is as follows: Punishment derives from Old French punir, which in turn comes from Latin punire, to punish, from poena, punishment, expiation, pain; and this is from the Greek Toh (poine), meaning quit-money or fine for blood spilled. The Greek word finds its cognate in the Sanskrit Ki, to repay, which is related to the Zendish kitha, penance, and kana, vengeance; these Aryan words are related to the Slavonic cena, a price. But valuable as these suggestions are one cannot expect, as Professor Wundt observes, to find much help from etymology; for "the phenomena of language do not admit of direct translation back again into ethical processes. The ideas themselves are different from their vehicles of expression and here as everywhere the external mark (or word) is later than the internal act for which it stands" (Wundt).

Remembering all this, it may not be far out of the way to admit that punishments should

be graduated according to the degree of harm of an offense to society and according to the attractiveness of the offense to the offender; and not out of a desire to set an example. Its intrinsic object is to remove the "sin" not the "sinner," but the cause of danger and of pain.

Punishment, in Western countries and nowadays, is seldom applicable to civil actions though these also are followed by compulsory payments of moneys, or failing this, by deprivation of property, liberty, etc. As the legal consequence of crimes, however, punishment consists chiefly of infliction of pain on the body; and this ranges from capital punishment, or death, down to imprisonment. In some instances whipping is added; and formerly in military and naval offenses, flogging. In crimes of lesser degree, imprisonment or penal servitude for a term of years is the punishment.

Since very early times a constant change in the treatment of punishment has been going on in civilized states. Its treatment may be divided into two parts; in the first place there is detection, arrest, trial and acquittal or conviction; in the second, treatment of the criminal after conviction. The acquisition by the state of the power to dispense justice and to make and enforce law is one of the greatest events in the whole of human history. It is the treatment of criminals after conviction that concerns us chiefly here; but as this penology can scarcely be understood in its development without taking into consideration the other division of the treatment of crime, called criminal procedure, we will approach it from this point of view.

The original motive in the treatment of offenders was that crude vengeance, the usefulness of which in maintaining the instinctive idea of order in primitive societies has been often studied by sociologists. The danger of free vengeance is not alone that the injured may wreak out atonement upon the innocent, but also that the infuriated avenger will limit the punishment he inflicts only by the degree of bitterness and hate he personally feels. In this way the original culprit feels that the vengeance he has felt (and his friends join him in his feeling), that the excessiveness of his suffering, now invites him to retaliate. Thus matters tend to grow worse and worse; and soon family and clan are embroiled in a permanent and destructive feud. Then a want clamors for relief. It grows into a demand and the demand finds a spokesman for reform in the person of a chieftain or other leader. For the hopeless tendency to engender feuds leads to reforms by which the chieftain seeks to suppress private revenge. Then "Vengeance is mine, I will repay is the claim of the savage ruler. It is at this point that we find the emergence of a primitive criminal and civil procedure in all peoples that have risen out of savagery to barbarism, and the earlier stages of civilization, for it is here that the offended party goes before a judge to demand vengeance against his adversary. The purpose of this primitive court is to inflict such penalties that the injured party and bystanders will feel that justice has been done, so that these persons will be content to abstain from private revenge. Retributive justice means just such severity as group consciousness at this low stage of progress can witness with satisfaction. Next cupidity is

pitted against hate, for the influence of authority is in favor of substituting redemption for penalties that kill or maim the fighting men of the tribe; and thus is instituted the compositio, the wergild and other fines; that is where the complainant is willing and content to sell his right of vengeance.

Thus the realization of "right" is from the beginning a social function. The idea of right being incorporated in the chieftain played an important part in bringing about the acquisition by the state of power to dispense justice; and moreover the religious tendencies worked to the same end. Wickedness was held to be an injury to the deity, whose anger would be visited upon the entire land; a conception that lasted far down into the Middle Ages, and according to which the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah was held to be typical of the effect of the curse from God. Already in primitive times religion led to a strange idea of justice; secret societies consecrated by the deity (Dukduk, Egbo) took upon themselves the function of enforcing "right," instituting reigns of terror in their districts, maintaining order in society and claiming authorization from the god with whose spirit they were permeated. Later influenced by all these tendencies, the social aggregate took over the control of justice. It was already considered to be the upholder of right, the servant of the gods, the maintainer of public peace, the dispenser of sacrifices; and so the various elements conceived of as justice, which had previously been distributed among the single families, tribes, associations, societies, were at last combined and placed under state control.

Forms for the dispensation of justice judging of crimes, determining of punishments developed into judicial procedure, which for a long time bore a religious character. The Deity was called upon to decide as to "right" and "wrong." Hence those terrible judgments of God through trial by water, fire, poison, serpents, scales, combat or decision by divining eye, so closely allied to the so-called trial by hazard. The cruel mal-treatment of elderly people suspected of witchcraft in early New England is familiar to all. A peculiar variety of ordeal is that of the bier, according to which the body of a murdered man is called into requisition, the soul of the victim assisting in the discovery of the murderer. An advance in progress is the curse, which takes the place of the ordeal. Thus arise those ordeals by invocation and by oath with compurgators. Witnesses succeeded to conjurors; divining looks were replaced by circumstantial evidence; and instead of a magical, a rational method of obtaining testimony was adopted. This development was not attained without certain attendant abuses; and the abolition of ordeal by God was among many peoples, notably among the inhabitants of eastern Asia, some tribes of American Indians and the Europeans of the early Middle Ages, succeded by the introduction of torture! Years ago August Comte maintained that the institution of slavery was the greatest single step up to his day in the progress of human culture, since it superseded a great amount of slaughter, with or without cannibalism. The practice of eating the criminals, which is quite a common form of cannibalism, seems to be largely due to revenge or indignation. In Lepers' Island,

in the New Hebrides, the victims of it were not generally enemies who had been killed in fighting, but it was a murderer or a particularly detested enemy who was eaten in anger and to treat him ill. In many lands torture stood in close connection with the judgment of God. That this is so is no more remarkable than the fact that religious intolerance which accompanied the rise of monotheism was the result of the nature attributed to its God. Torture in other cases originated either directly or indirectly from slavery. To obtain evidence by torture the accused person was forced through physical suffering to make disclosures concerning himself and his companions; and in case he himself was considered guilty, to a confession.

The development of Hebrew teaching on the subject will reveal the stages through which the notion of "justice" passed. First there is the injunction to moderate vengeance and lextalionis appears with its demand for an "eye for an eye. Second, we must leave vengeance to rulers. And lastly, "love your enemies, do good to those who despitefully use you, forgive as you hope to be forgiven."

Retaliation is finally seen to be a continuation of a moral disease; not a cure. The idea of loving one's enemies is found in the books of Saint Matthew, Saint Luke and Saint Mark; Lao-Tsze and Mang-Tsze voiced these sentiments in ancient China; we find them expressed in the Brahman Laws of Manu; Buddha taught that the hatred and revenge is not appeased by hatred (it ceases by nonhatred only); we find the same notion in Leviticus, Plato, Pliny and Epictetus, taught it to the classical world; and in the same spirit Jesus taught in His Sermon on the Mount;

An

"Ye have heard that it hath been said: eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil." We only point out the truth of the sentiment which prompted these sayings and which should be expressed in the sentence: "resist not evil with evil." Evil must be resisted; but we must not retaliate. The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness are not so radically opposed to each other as they appear to be. What the latter condemns is in reality not every kind of resentment, not impartial indignation; but personal hatred. Jesus himself certainly was not free from righteous indignation. Moreover the belief in a transcendental retributive justice, in an ultimate punishment of badness which we meet with in Taoism, Brahmanism, Buddhism and Christianity, side by side with the doctrine of forgiveness is founded on the demand that wrong should be resented. What is taught by all the great teachers who have been mentioned is good will to the good and to the bad alike. This is based on the consideration that all creatures, both good and bad alike, are ultimately products of circumstances; and, therefore, that the bad deserve compassion, not hatred. A novelist (George Eliot) has told us that it was the "illusion" of one of her characters that he trusted "in his own skill to shape the success of his own morrows, ignorant of what many yesterdays had determined for him beforehand." The modern Italian school of criminology strikes this note again and again; it is a diapason whose slow and solemn vibrations, communicated to their

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own meditations, all readers of the literature of the new criminological determinism of Italy, will recall.

The laws of ancient Rome still command respect and in cases obedience in many civilized communities. We note the following punishments meted out to the offender in ancient Rome: There was the mulcta, or fine; vincula, imprisonment or fetters; verbera, or stripes; talio, or infliction of punishment similar to injury, limb for limb; infamia, public disgrace, by which the delinquent, besides being scandalized, was rendered incapable of holding public office and deprived of other privileges of Roman citizenship; exilium, banishment (aquae et ignis interdictio accomplished this); servitus, or slavery; mors, death either civil or natural (banishment and slavery are civil death). Natural death was brought about by beheading, scourging, strangling or throwing the criminal headlong from the Tarpeian rock, or from the place in a prison, from the Robur. Many have been the changes. Capital punishment has ceased to be a retaliation and has become more and more a mere protection against the repetition of a crime. As it would be wrong to leave a tiger abroad so a man who by his very nature is a murderer should not be allowed to remain at liberty. Since imprisonment is on the one hand not a sufficient guarantee for the safety of society and on the other hand is perhaps a more cruel treatment than death, capital punishment remains, under our present civilization, still a necessity of our penal code. Yet in all this the attempt is no longer made, to retaliate on the murderer the cruelties which he has committed; it is a maxim that the death punishment should be inflicted with as little pain as possible. The infliction of pain is not an act which men now regard with indifference, even in the case of the criminal, and to many enlightened minds it has appeared both unreasonable and unjust and cruel that the state should wilfully torment a criminal to no purpose. But while retributive punishment has been condemned, punishment in a new sense has been defended and looked upon in a different light, not as an end in itself, but as a means. It is to be inflicted not because wrong has been done but in order that wrong may not be done. Its object is held to be either to deter from crime or to reform the criminal and by means of elimination or seclusion to make it impossible for a criminal to commit fresh crimes. In the case of capital punishment the criminal is simply no longer allowed to live and it has ceased to be a revenge or retaliation. It has become a cure founded on the experience that a man who committed one murder is likely to commit a second murder. Hence a man who has killed another not on account of his innate or inbred murderous inclination, but through the unhappy complication of circumstances (under an unwritten law), will not be treated as an habitual murderer; and according to the laws of all civilized countries is not punishable by death.

Behind bars no criminal ought to be pampered, but should receive prison fare and prison treatment in accord with the regulation of the place where his deeds have brought him. For all this is curative. An execution for murder is merely the removal of a dangerous member from society and this for the same reason that a limb of the body infected by in

curable disease must be amputated. Some recent tendencies by some well-meaning people are so naïve that one is tempted to call them childish; the conventions of society cannot be abandoned to alleviate the sufferings of criminals. To do so would be to act about as logically as it would be to abandon all medicine that leaves a bad taste in a patient's mouth. At the same time most lawyers might well remember that life is preferable to rules of health and that not a few of our laws are capable of becoming outgrown. Our penal laws are not as yet fully adapted to the new view. All our minor punishments are still retaliatory, which fact makes our prisons all too frequently breeding places of crime and vice, instead of what they ought to be, namely, moral hospitals. Perhaps a just test of any penal system is to be found in the quality of discharged convicts, and according to Mr. Eugene Smith, president of the Prison Association of New York it is a notorious fact that the most desperate class of criminals consists of discharged convicts.

PUNJAB, pŭn-jäb', or PANJAB (Persian, "Five Waters"), an extensive territory in the northwest of Hindustan, formerly under the dominion of the Sikhs, but in 1849 annexed to British India. It is so called from its position, being intersected by the five great rivers which unite to pour their waters into the Indus. In 1901 the northwestern part of the Punjab was separated to form a chief commissionership under the government of India (see NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE). The lieutenantgovernorship as thus limited is bounded on the east by Kashmir, Tibet, and the river Jamna; on the south by Sind and Rajputana, the river Sutlej being in part a boundary river; on the west by Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province; on the north by the Northwest Frontier Province. For administrative purposes it is divided into divisions (Jalandhar, Lahore and Rawal Pindee). Lahore is the capital, while Amritsar, the sacred city of the Sikhs, is the next largest city, since Delhi has been detached. Simla, the mountain capital, is within the province, and is the residence of the viceroy during the hot season. Murree is the summer headquarters of the military command. The total area of the province is about 95,000 square miles, with a population of about 19,974,956. The area of the Native States is 38,299, with a population of about 4,250,000.

General Description. The province of the Punjab is a triangular tract of land between the Sutlej and the Indus, and, with the exception of the hill country on the slopes of the Himalayas, it is a great alluvial plain. On the northeast side is the margin of the Himalayas, on which there are beautiful sanitaria, or hill stations-Simla (the mountain capital of India), Dagshai, Sabathu, Kassauli, Dharmsala, Dalhousie and Murree, the military headquarters of the province. The country between Jhelam and the Indus is known as the salt range, as it contains inexhaustible mines of rock salt which have been worked for many centuries. It is abundantly irrigated by six rivers. These rivers (proceeding from west to east) are the Indus, the Jhelam (ancient Hydaspes), Chenab (ancient Acesines), the Ravi (ancient Hydraotes), the Beas (ancient Hyphasis) and the Sutlej (ancient Hesudrus).

The Jhelam and Chenab unite their waters, and then are joined by the Ravi; the united stream is then augmented by the Sutlej, which has previously received the Beas. The combined waters of these rivers form the Panjnad, which joins the Indus near Mithankot. The rivers of the Punjb divide it into five districts, or doabs (countries between two rivers): namely, the Sind-Sagar Doab, between the Indus and Jhelam; the Jech Doab, between the Jhelam and Chenab; the Rechna Doab, between the Chenab and Ravi; the Bari or Manja Doab, between the Ravi and Beas; and the Jallandar Doab, between the Beas and Sutlej. Of these the first is by far the largest, but also the most sterile and least inhabited, abounding with bare eminences and rugged declivities, interspersed here and there with rich and fertile valleys. The second is mostly level, and has been described as "a sterile waste of underwood," the abode of shepherds, and scantily irrigated; the Rechna Doab is bare and neglected, though susceptible of high cultivation; the Bari Doab, though bare, has a large surface under cultivation, and is the most populous and important of all, containing the large towns of Amritsar, Multan and Lahore; while the Jallandar Doab is highly cultivated, well peopled and excelled in climate and productions by no province in India. Speaking generally, the plains east of Lahore are the most fertile, wealthy and populous of the province, and the granary of the Punjab; while those on the west present a striking contrast. The soil of the level country varies remarkably from stiff clay and loam to sand, mixed with each other in variable proportions, and with vegetable matter; besides which, carbonate and sulphate of soda are sometimes mixed with it in such quantities as to render the land almost worthless. The mineral wealth of the Punjab is almost confined to its rich deposits of rock salt. The climate is hot and dry, and little rain falls, except in the higher country and under the influence of the southwest monsoon. The part of the province to the east of Lahore can be cultivated in most seasons without irrigation, but owing to this its crops are much more likely to fail from a deficiency of rainfall than those of the western irrigated tracts. The summer heat is very great, and in the early part of January sharp frosts are common.

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Vegetation, Agriculture.— Wood is scarce, except upon the hills. In the west considerable areas are occupied by date-trees; and palms of other species, banyans and other trees are found here and there. The area under forests is over 4,250,000 acres. About 28,000,000 acres of the remainder are under cultivation, and over 20,000,000 acres more are available for cultivation. The principal grain crops wheat, barley, rice, buckwheat and millet, pease, vetches and mustard; sesamum and other oil seeds, turnips, carrots, onions, cucumbers and melons. Indigo and sugar are exported. The tobacco plant grows luxuriantly, especially about Multan, and opium has been grown somewhat extensively. About 8,750,000 acres are under wheat, and over 750,000 under rice. The total irrigated area exceeds 9,000,000 acres, of which more than half is irrigated by canals. Among the fruits are the date, orange, fig, vine, apple, mulberry, banana and mango.