vious resolution "that at its rising it will adjourn to a particular day," and then the House is adjourned to that day. 2 Hats., 82.

Where it is convenient that the business of the House be suspended for a short time, as for a conference presently to be held, etc., it adjourns during pleasure; 2 Hats., 305; or for a quarter of an hour. 5 Grey., 331.

If a question be put for adjournment, it is no adjournment till the Speaker pronounces it. 5 Grey., 137. And from courtesy and respect, no member leaves his place till the Speaker has passed on.

SEC. LI. A SESSION.

Parliament have three modes of separation, to wit, by adjournment, by prorogation or dissolution by the King, or by the efflux of the term for which they were elected. Prorogation or dissolution constitutes there what is called a session, provided some act was passed. In this case all matters depending before them are discontinued, and at their next meeting are to be taken up de novo, if taken up at all. 1 Blackst., 186. Adjournment, which is by themselves, is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another, or for a fortnight, a month, etc., ad libitum. All matters depending remain in statu quo, and when they meet again, be the term ever so distant, are resumed, without any fresh commencement, at the point at which they were left. 1 Lev., 165; L. Parl., c. 2; 1 Ro. Rep., 29; 4 Inst., 7, 27, 28; Hutt., 61; 1 Mod., 252; Ruffh. Jac., L. Dict. Parliament; 1 Blackst., 186. Their whole session is considered in law but as one day, and has relation to the first day thereof. Abr. Parliament, 86.

NOTE.-See Senate Rule XXXII.

Bro.

Committees may be appointed to sit during a recess by adjournment, but not by prorogation. 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; I Chand., 50. Neither House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it

is by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose.

Con

Congress separate in two ways only, to wit, by adjournment, or dissolution by the efflux of their time. What, then, constitutes a session with them? A dissolution certainly closes one session, and the meeting of the new Congress begins another. The Constitution authorizes the President "on extraordinary occasions, to convene both Houses, or either of them." stitution, I, 3. If convened by the President's proclamation, this must begin a new session, and of course determine the preceding one to have been a session. So if it meets under the clause of the Constitution, which says, "the Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day" Constitution (I, 4), this must begin a new session; for even if the last adjournment was to this day, the act of adjournment is merged in the higher authority of the Constitution, and the meeting will be under that, and not under their adjournment. So far we have fixed landmarks for determining sessions. In other cases it is declared by the joint vote authorizing the President of the Senate and the Speaker to close the session on a fixed day, which is usually in the following form: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, That the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives be authorized to close the present session by adjourning their respective Houses on day of ——."

the

When it was said above that all matters depending before Parliament were discontinued by the determination of the session, it was not meant for judiciary cases depending before the House of Lords, such as impeachments, appeals, and writs of These stand continued, of course, to the next session. Raym., 120, 381; Ruffh. Jac., L. D. Parliament.

error.

Impeachments stand, in like manner, continued before the Senate of the United States.

SEC. LII. TREATIES.

The President of the United States has power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. Constitution, II, 2.

NOTE.-See Senate Rule XXXVI, clause 3; Rule XXXVII, clause 3.

Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the law of the land. It differs from other laws only as it must have the consent of a foreign nation, being but a contract with respect to that nation. In all countries, I believe, except England, treaties are made by the legislative power; and there, also, if they touch the laws of the land, they must be approved by Parliament. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas's Rep., 223. It is acknowledged, for instance, that the King of Great Britain can not by a treaty make a citizen of an alien. Vattel, b. 1, c. 19, sec. 214. An act of Parliament was necessary to validate the American treaty of 1783. And abundant examples of such acts can be cited. In the case of the treaty of Utrecht, in 1712, the commercial articles required the concurrence of Parliament; but a bill brought in for that purpose was rejected. France, the other contracting party, suffered these articles, in practice, to be not insisted on, and adhered to the rest of the treaty. 4 Russel's Hist. Mod. Europe, `457; 2 Smollet, 242, 246.

By the Constitution of the United States this department of legislation is confined to two branches only of the ordinary legislature—the President originating and the Senate having a negative. To what subjects this power extends has not been defined in detail by the Constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. 1. It is admitted that it must concern the foreign-nation party to the contract, or it would be a mere nulity, res inter alias acta. 2. By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those subjects which are usually regulated by treaty, and can not be otherwise regulated. 3. It must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the States, for surely

the President and Senate can not do by treaty what the whole Government is interdicted from doing in any way.

4. And also to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by some on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say others. The Constitution thought it wise to restrain the Executive and Senate from entangling and embroiling our affairs with those of Europe. Besides, as the negotiations are carried on by the Executive alone, the subjecting to the ratification of the Representatives such articles as are within their participation is no more inconvenient than to the Senate. But the ground of this exception is denied as unfounded. For examine, e. g., the treaty of commerce with France, and it will be found that, out of thirty-one articles, there are not more than small portions of two or three of them which would not still remain as subjects of treaties, untouched by these exceptions.

Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the

case of France in 1798.

It has been the usage for the Executive, when it communicates a treaty to the Senate for their ratification, to communicate also the correspondence of the negotiators. This having been omitted in the case of the Prussian treaty, was asked by a vote of the House of February 12, 1800, and was obtained. And in December, 1800, the convention of that year between the United States and France, with the report of the negotiations by the envoys, but not their instructions, being laid before the Senate, the instructions were asked for and communicated by the President.

The mode of voting on questions of ratification is by nominal call.

NOTE-See Senate Rule XXXVII.

SEC. LIII. IMPEACHMENT.

The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. Constitution, I, 3.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. Constitution, I, 3.

The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Constitution, II, 4.

The trial of crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. Constitution, III, 2.

These are the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on the subject of impeachments. The following is a sketch of some of the principles and practices of England on the same subject:

Jurisdiction. The Lords can not impeach any to themselves, nor join in the accusation, because they are the judges. Seld. Judic. in Parl., 12, 63. Nor can they proceed against a commoner but on complaint of the Commons. Ib., 84. The Lords may not, by the law, try a commoner for a capital offense, on the information of the King or a private person, because the accused is entitled to a trial by his peers generally; but on accusation by the House of Commons, they may proceed against the delinquent, of whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the offense; for there they do not assume to themselves trial at common law. The Commons are then instead of a jury, and