answer any interrogatory in the affirmative, the fact therein brought in question shall be deemed established; and in case the jury shall answer any interrogatory in the negative, the fact therein brought in question shall be deemed not established. On the findings of the jury in answer to such interrogatories the court or judge shall proceed to pronounce judgment in accordance therewith, according to law. If the accused be adjudged guilty, judgment shall be entered accordingly, prescribing the punishment.

SECTION 5. The testimony taken on the trial of any accusation of indirect contempt may be preserved upon appeal or bill of exceptions; and any judgment of conviction therefor may be reviewed upon direct appeal to or by writ of error from the supreme judicial court, and affirmed, reversed or modified, as justice may require. Upon the claiming of an appeal, the filing of a bill of exceptions or the suing out of a writ of error, execution of the judgment shall be stayed upon the giving of such bond as may be required by the court or a judge thereof or by any justice of the supreme judicial court.

SECTION 6. This act shall not affect any proceeding for contempt pending at the time of the passage hereof.

APPENDIX No. 14.

BRITISH CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT OF 1875.

The following are its most important provisions :

3. An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do, or procure to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen, shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.*

Nothing in this section shall exempt from punishment any persons guilty of a conspiracy for which a punishment is awarded by any act of Parliament.

Nothing in this section shall affect the law relating to riot, unlawful assembly, breach of the peace or sedition, or any offence against the State or the Sovereign.

A crime for the purposes of this section means an offence punishable on indictment, or an offence which is punishable on summary conviction, and for the commission of which the offender is liable under the statute making the offence punishable to be imprisoned either absolutely or at the discretion of the court as an alternative for some other punishment.

Where a person is convicted of any such agreement or combination as aforesaid, to do or procure to be done an act which is punishable only on summary conviction, and

* The following sections of the Trade Union Act, 1871, should be read in connection with this provision of the conspiracy act: —

1. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise.

2. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be unlawful, so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust.

is sentenced to imprisonment, the imprisonment shall not exceed three months, or such longer time, if any, as may have been prescribed by the statute for the punishment of the said act when committed by one person.

4. Where a person employed by a municipal authority or by any company or contractor upon whom is imposed by act of Parliament the duty, or who have otherwise assumed the duty, of supplying any city, borough, town or place, or any part thereof, with gas or water, willfully and maliciously breaks a contract of service with that authority or company or contractor, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the probable consequences of his so doing, either alone or in combination with others, will be to deprive the inhabitants of that city, borough, town, place or part wholly or to a great extent of their supply of gas or water, he shall on conviction thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction, or on indictment as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, either with or without hard labor.

5. Where any person willfully and maliciously breaks a contract of service or of hiring, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the probable consequences of his so doing, either alone or in combination with others, will be to endanger human life or cause serious bodily injury, or to expose valuable property, whether real or personal, to destruction or serious injury, he shall, on conviction thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction or indictment, as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labor.

6. Where a master, being legally liable to provide for his servant or apprentice necessary food, clothing, medical aid or lodging, willfully and without lawful excuse refuses or neglects to provide the same, whereby the health of the servant or apprentice is or is likely to be seriously or permanently injured, he shall, on summary conviction, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months, with or without hard labor.

7. Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority,

(1) Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children, or injures his property; or

(2) Persistently follows such other person about from place to place; or

(3) Hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof; or

(4) Watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, or the approach to such a house or place; or

(5) Follows such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road,

Shall, on conviction thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction, or on indictment as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labor. Attending at or near the house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, in order merely to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the meaning of this section.

8. Where in any act relating to employers or workmen a pecuniary penalty is imposed in respect of any offence under such act, and no power is given to reduce such penalty, the justices or court having jurisdiction in respect of such offence may, if they think it just so to do, impose by way of penalty in respect of such offence any sum not less than one-fourth of the penalty imposed by such act.

The remaining clauses relate to legal proceedings, definitions, repeal of other acts, and the application of the act to Scotland and Ireland.

APPENDIX No. 15.

JUDICIAL OPINIONS ON INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES.

The leading case in England, to which much reference is made in this country, is that of Allen v. Flood, a case quoted by every employer and every representative laboring man when this subject is under discussion. It is constantly referred to by lawyers, and it has governed the subsequent decisions. The case was deemed of so much importance that when it came up on appeal before the House of Lords their lordships requested the attendance of eight of the most eminent judges to give their opinion on questions of law, and Parliament ordered these opinions to be printed as a parliamentary paper. The case is officially known as Allen v. Flood and Another. The case was originally heard in the court of Queen's Bench, appealed to the court of appeal, and thence appealed to the House of Lords, the court of last resort. The substantial facts of the case are as follows: :

Flood and Taylor were shipwrights, working for the Glengall Iron Company. They were employed by the day, but the particular job on which they were then engaged was expected to last about a fortnight, and there was every reason to suppose that they would be retained until its completion. These two men had previously served an apprenticeship with the Glengall Iron Company. They had been taught to work both in wood and iron, but at the time were employed on wood work only. They were men of excellent character, had always behaved themselves, and had done their work properly and satisfactorily. There had been no collision between these men and the other men working for the company. The Independent Society of Boiler Makers and Iron and Steel Shipbuilders, a powerful trade union, consisting of about 40,000 members, objected to the employment of the shipwrights, who were both iron and wood workers. Members of this union employed by the Glengall Iron Company demanded the discharge of Flood and Taylor on this ground. Allen, the London delegate of the union, at the request of its members, had an interview with Mr. Halkett, the managing director of the company, and demanded the discharge of the two obnoxious men, threatening that unless this demand was granted all of the boiler makers then in the employ of the company would leave work that day. Halkett protested against this interference, but Allen was firm. He frankly admitted that his union had no ill feeling against their employers or against any men in particular, but that the union had determined to prevent the employment of shipwrights who had done iron work, that wherever they were employed the boiler makers would cease work, and that the employers had no option in the matter, as the decision of the union would be enforced in every case. Referring specifically to Flood and Taylor, he said the men were known, and wherever they were employed the same action would be taken. The result of the interview

was that Halkett gave instructions to his manager to discharge the two men, and that same day they were discharged.

The meaning of the highest court of the British empire is: where an act is lawful in itself, the motive with which it is done is immaterial. To induce a master to discharge a servant, if the discharge does not involve a breach of contract, or to induce a person not to employ a servant, though done maliciously, and resulting in injury to the servant, does not give him any cause of action. This judgment not only broke down many of the restraints of the law, both civil and criminal, but it overturned the overwhelming judicial opinion of England. One of the judges who answered their lordships' question in the affirmative, but whose opinion was disregarded by the majority vote of the law lords, in the course of his opinion said:

I look upon the case of Lumley v. Gye (2 E. and B., 216) as a binding authority, that if any person, with knowledge of the existence of a contract of service between two other persons, the one to employ, the other to render service, willfully causes and induces the employed to break his contract, and an injury to the employer is the result of that breach, an action on the case will lie against him, at the suit of the employer. I see no reason to doubt that a corresponding right of action exists in law at the suit of the employed against a person who wrongfully induces the employer to break his contract, to the injury of the employed. This principle is, in my opinion, sound and in accordance with good sense. . . . Wrongfully to induce an employer to break his contract and discharge his workman is wrongfully to injure that workman by disabling him from earning his wages. Wrongfully to coerce an employer to terminate an existing contract before its appointed time brings upon the employed precisely the same character of injury.

Justice North, one of the majority judges, in delivering his opinion, quoted approvingly the decision of the court of appeals in Bowen v. Hall:

Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may not be wrongful. But if the persuasion is used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.

In closing his opinion the lord chancellor said: :

I regret that I am compelled to differ so widely with some of your lordships, but my difference is founded on the belief that in denying these plaintiffs a remedy we are departing from the principles which have hitherto guided our courts in the preservation of individual liberty to all. I am encouraged, however, by the consideration that the adverse views appear to me to overrule the views of most distinguished judges, going back now for certainly two hundred years, and that up to the period when this case reached your lordships' house there was an unanimous consensus of opinion; and that, of eight judges who have given us the benefit of their opinions, six have concurred in the judgments which your lordships are now asked to overrule.

Lord Ashbourne in his dissenting opinion said: —

I need not go in detail through the celebrated case of Lumley v. Gye, which for nearly half a century has passed into the regular current of legal authority, and which was followed by Lord Selborne and Lord Esher in Bowen v. Hall. To intimidate

an employer into breaking a contract with a particular workman, and to coerce or maliciously induce an otherwise willing employer not to give him future employment, alike does that workman serious damage in his trade and prevents him from earning his wages. The object of the wrongdoer is the same in each case.

And, again, Lord Morris in his dissenting opinion said:

In my opinion, it is actionable to disturb a man in his business by procuring the determination of a contract at will, or by even preventing the formation of a contract, when the motive is malicious and damage ensues. . . . At common law a workman had a right to work for any person who was willing to employ him. Both had a right to trade in labor as in any other commodity, and as they thought fit. This was part of the personal liberty enjoyed by every man, and, like personal liberty, was the subject of peculiar safeguards; notably, it was a right which, like that of personal liberty, could not be bartered away,- a contract restraining one's right to trade, with certain exceptions not material here, was like a contract to become a slave, null and void,the one right as well as the other was inalienable. The existence of this right to trade was established at least as far back as the reign of Queen Anne.

We have quoted this case at considerable length because of its farreaching importance. When the decision was first rendered by the House of Lords it was regarded by the workmen as a sweeping victory won by them. They considered that their position had been immensely strengthened, and that, by being legally permitted to hold over an employer the threat of a strike, unless men obnoxious to them were discharged, they had a powerful weapon in their hands, which could not fail to be effective. But the employers were not slow to perceive that the decision also put a weapon into their hands, which as used by them might become equally effective. If the law permitting officials or members of trade unions to threaten nonunionists or others with loss of employment, or to threaten employers with suspension of work unless they discharged objectionable men, so also employers could legally refuse to employ members of a trade union in case of molestation of nonunionists by their fellow workmen. In other words, both threats to strike and threats to lock out had been legalized, and the threat might be converted into an act without subjecting the doer of the act to a civil or criminal prosecution. The effect of this decision has been to make it impossible to secure a conviction for maliciously causing the dismissal of a workman by his employer, or causing persons, not to enter into contracts with him.

In this Commonwealth there are two leading cases which are very often cited, and to one of which we have already referred, that is to say, the case of Vegelahn v. Guntner et al., 167 Mass. 92 (44 N. R., p. 1077). A bill was filed in the supreme judicial court in Suffolk County, Mass., by Frederick O. Vegelahn, asking for an injunction against George M. Guntner and others to restrain them from interfering with his business, etc. The hearing was before Justice O. W. Holmes. It appears that Justice Holmes issued a preliminary injunction, which not only enjoined the defendants from committing acts of violence or intimidation, but also, in effect, from maintaining a patrol of men in front of the plaintiff's factory, for the purpose of influencing those in his employ to leave it, or those seeking employment to refrain from so doing. As a result of the hearing, the injunction was made permanent, but was so modified as to restrain the defendants only from committing acts of violence or intimidation. On a report of the case to the full bench of the supreme judicial court, the injunction was, by a divided court, so modified as to conform to the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Holmes. The decision of