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they might do legally as individuals, feared by the employer at the time of the passage of the act, and regarded by the workmen as placing a powerful weapon in their hands, has in practice not been either so dangerous or so beneficial as was expected. That men may strike, either as individuals or in combination, and do other things in combination which would have been illegal under previous laws, does not apparently cause the employers much concern. So long as men go on a strike, and do not by intimidation or violence prevent other men from taking their places, employers feel able to cope with the situation. It is in dealing with this question that British employers believe that they have been distinct gainers by the passage of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875. To enact a bill in part similar to the British act in accordance with suggestions made to us would result in too great an interference with American ideas of the freedom of action of the individual. The law in its entirety is more drastic than we care to endorse. Some discussion of leading cases may be found in Appendix No. 15.

If the conduct of trade disputes could be disassociated absolutely from intimidation and threats, we believe it would be public policy to abandon the common law principle of conspiracy as applied to such disputes. A strike may injure the employer, but this ought not necessarily and in itself to make the acts of the workmen unlawful if otherwise innocent, provided the main object of a strike is to improve the condition of the workmen concerned.

We recognize, however, that the ordinary processes of law frequently do not meet all of the real evils in case of a strike; and that intimidation and threats, while now punishable under the law, cannot always be satisfactorily proved before the courts. We are not, therefore, prepared to recommend the passage of so radical a measure as House, No. 870. There is an element in the law of conspiracy, as applied by courts of equity in industrial disputes, which needs to be preserved; and, while it may be admitted that judicial interpretation of the law is uncertain and even inconsistent, we believe that it is for the interest of society to proceed slowly, along more conservative lines.

If it were possible to frame an act declaratory of the rights of contestants in industrial disputes which would not on the one hand be regarded as a justification of industrial disorder, and on the other hand as giving legal sanction to combination of capital in the form of trusts, we should favor the passage of a measure attempting to define more precisely what it is lawful for citizens to do. We have endeavored to frame a measure which will embody such rights; but, in view of the far-reaching consequences above alluded to, we have been unable to agree.

It is understood that Messrs. Sterling and Osgood sign this report subject to the qualifications, relating to the single topic of injunctions, stated by each separately over his own

name.

CARROLL D. WRIGHT.

HENRY STERLING.

ROYAL ROBBINS.

WILLIAM N. OSGOOD.
DAVIS R. DEWEY.

Believing, as I do, that the interposition of courts in equity by injunctions in labor disputes between employer and employee is a wrongful exercise of that power, and that no restraining order should issue in relation to such disputes, and that every person accused of a crime should have his constitutional right to a trial by jury respected, I desire to say that, while I assent to the report as a whole, the treatment of the subject of injunctions seems to me to be inadequate, and I disagree with the reasoning in the two closing paragraphs and in the paragraph relating to exemption from orders of courts of equity.

HENRY STERLING.

I have requested the permission of my fellow members of the committee to insert an explanation of my attitude upon the single subject of injunctions, which relates to matters in addition to those unanimously endorsed by the committee.

A sense of duty, coupled with a deference to convictions. firm if erroneous, impels me to attempt to embody my ideas upon the same in a proposed bill for legislative action.

Many lawyers of eminence believe that our courts have not gone too far in issuing injunctions in industrial disputes, and that no legislation is demanded; that any apparent ambiguity or inconsistency in the application of the principles of equity in the preservation of property rights when compared with the preservation of personal rights will ultimately be corrected by the courts themselves, independently of legislation.

Other lawyers of equal eminence, as well as some judges, believe that the Legislature should declare what personal rights of the citizens should not be enjoined, and that the powers of the courts of equity in regard to issuing injunctions in industrial disputes should be defined.

In a recent case, Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, Justice Holmes plainly intimated that the remedy for industrial disputes should be left with the Legislature, if that body should see fit to interfere; and in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, he used the following language: "But there is a notion, which latterly has been insisted on a good deal, that a combination of persons to do what any one of them lawfully might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful conduct unlawful."

The late Chief Justice Field in the case last referred to said: "In England the rights of employers and employed, with reference to strikes, boycotts and other similar movements, have not in general been left to be worked out by the courts from common law principles, but statutes from time to time have been passed defining what may and what may not be permitted. The administration of those statutes largely has been through the criminal courts." "If acts complained of do not amount to intimidation or force, it is not in all respects clear what are lawful and what are not lawful at common law.”

It may be urged that these words just quoted are from dissenting opinions, and do not state the law. It should not be forgotten indeed that from criticism spring all progress, all reform.

Without intimating that the power of our courts in issuing injunctions in industrial disputes has been abused or is in danger of being abused, it may nevertheless be of the

utmost importance that certain personal rights of our citizens, including both employers and employees, should be defined, and that the possibility of their future infringement should be guarded against.

Property rights are undoubtedly and properly protected by the courts of equity, as stated in this report. But should not the personal rights of both employer and employed be also protected? I do not refer to personal rights to do wrong, because there can be no such rights, but to personal rights to do lawful and peaceful acts.

Therefore, I respectfully suggest the following bill: —

AN ACT RELATING TO CERTAIN PERSONAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

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SECTION 1. It shall be lawful in this Commonwealth for cit2 izens to assemble in places not forbidden by law or municipal 3 ordinances, for the peaceable discussion of grievances which 4 they may have against other citizens; peaceably to persuade 5 and attempt to persuade other citizens to do any lawful act; 6 peaceably in lawful places and at lawful times to apprise others 7 of any dispute or difference which has arisen between them and 8 others concerning the price of their services; or commodities 9 and while seeking to accomplish said results to do any and 10 all acts which are not directly connected with a breach of the 11 peace, and which are neither criminal nor actionable at law, or 12 which do not directly cause irreparable injury to the property 13 or persons of others.

1 SECTION 2. Any act which it is lawful for an individual 2 citizen to do acting alone in seeking to secure a fair and reason3 able compensation for personal services shall not be unlawful 4 if done by two or more individuals acting together for said 5 purpose: provided, that the provisions of this act shall not be 6 construed to apply to the acts of two or more individuals or 7 corporations in respect to regulating the price of commodities; 8 or to regulating the rates of transportation within this Com9 monwealth of commodities or persons by common carriers; or 10 the rates of transmission of intelligence, heat, light and power, 11 as distinguished from personal services.

WILLIAM N. OSGOOD.

APPENDIX No. 1.

INDUSTRIAL EQUALITY PARTNERSHIP LAW.

AN ACT TO ENCOURAGE THE FORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS, AND TO PROMOTE EQUALITY BETWEEN LABOR'S PAY AND CAPITAL'S PAY FOR EQUAL SERVICES.

Definitions.

SECTION 1. In this act unless the context otherwise requires :

“Ordinary wages" means the sum agreed upon by the employer and employee as minimum pay for handwork and headwork, and includes the pay or compensation for work performed by a personal employer and by managers, superintendents and the like.

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Ordinary dividends means dividends on the capital used in the business at a minimum rate agreed upon by the parties.

"Extra earnings" means that part of the joint earnings which remains after the payment of ordinary wages, ordinary dividends and all expenses, and after deducting the reserve funds allowed by the act for repairs, depreciation and ordinary dividends.

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Employee" includes an officer of a corporation, a manager, a superintendent, and any other person in the employ of a person, firm or corporation.

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Employer" includes a person, firm or corporation, domestic or foreign.

Acceptance of the Act Voluntary.

SECTION 2. An employer doing business within the Commonwealth and ten or more employees may become entitled to the benefits of this act by a voluntary acceptance of the act, approved by the industrial court. The acceptance of the act shall be in writing, signed by the parties, and shall be for a term of not less than one year nor more than three years at a time, but may be renewed from time to time. The acceptance of the act shall be filed in the office of the industrial court, and shall state the following:

(1) The rate of ordinary wages to be paid each employee and each personal employer who accepts the act;

(2) The rate of ordinary dividends to be paid to the owner of the capital;

(3) The value of the capital to be used in the business;

(4) The term of the acceptance of the act, with the date of beginning

and of ending;

(5) The full name and post-office address of each employer and each employee who accepts the act.

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