The Philosophy of Sir William HamiltonLevin & Munksgaard, 1925 - 176 strani |
Pogosti izrazi in povedi
absolute absolutely infinite Alexander Campbell Fraser analysis appears assertion association attempt Ausg belief causal proposition cause character common sense conceive conception conditioned connexion consciousness considered contradiction contradictory critical desire determined Disc dogmatic element endeavoured epistemological examination existence experience explanation expression external F. H. Bradley fact forms fundamental Hamilton's thought Harald Høffding Høffding Hume Hume's ideas ilton immediate cognition inasmuch infinite intelligence intuition John Veitch judgment Kant Kant's Kritik der reinen latter law of totality Lect Léon Brunschvicg logical mathematics mental metaphysical Mill mind nature necessity notion object opinion phenomena point of view possible presupposes presupposition principle of causation problem psychological qualities question reality reflections regard Reid reinen Vernunft relation says Hamilton scepticism scientific Sir William Hamilton theory thing thinker Thomas Brown Thomas Reid tion train of reasoning train of thought truth unconditioned unity universe valid Veitch W. H. S. Monck
Priljubljeni odlomki
Stran 62 - If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypolhesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Stran 96 - That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be, MieceiL This I have indeed anxiously evinced, both by reasoning and authority.
Stran 150 - We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar.
Stran 89 - ... the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at so great a distance...
Stran 161 - Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas.
Stran 173 - Agnostic.' It is my trade-mark and I am entitled to say that I can state authentically what was originally meant by Agnosticism. Agnosticism is the essence of science, whether ancient or modern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe.
Stran 96 - What I have said as to the infinite being (subjectively) inconceivable, does not at all derogate from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, the main scope of my speculation is to show articulately that we must believe, as actual, much that we are unable (positively) to conceive, as even possible.
Stran 72 - In this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the term absolute; and therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolute, — nothing existing absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties.
Stran 52 - But this something, absolutely and in itself, — ie considered apart from its phenomena, — is to us as zero. It is only in its qualities, only in its effects, in its relative or phenomenal existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable ; and it is only by a law of thought, which compels us to think something, absolute and unknown, as the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of incomprehensible reality to us.
Stran 29 - ... with their correlatives freedom of choice and responsibility — man being all this, it is at once obvious that the principal part of his being is his mental power. In Nature there is nothing great but Man, In Man there is nothing great but Mind.