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The second part of this proviso is peculiarly American, for in all European constitutional states the state officers, ministers of the crown included, are elective or official members of the parliaments. This renders our Congress the more independent, and therefore alone responsible for their acts. What a most enviable position for a real good national legislature!

Let us pause here a little, and indulge in the hope that our Congress will become more and more true to its exalted mission, delineated in so masterly a manner in this beautiful organic law.

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LETTER VI.

Bills of Revenue in both Houses. - British Imitation. - Veto.- All Presidents have used it. Its Advantages in Regard to Factitious Legislation.Repassing Bills. Punishment of Unconstitutional Legislation. - Twothird Vote. Parties. - How to get an Office. - Electors. - Political Brokers. Strict Morality in obtaining Offices nowhere. How they are bestowed in Monarchies and Republics. - Faction, its Danger. — Abolitionists a Faction. -Custom in England that Ministers resign when defeated in Parliament, to be imitated in the United States.

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THE following section shows how the congressional laws are made by propositions or bills:

SECTION VII.

"1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

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This is an imitation of the British parliament. In practice, it is confined to bills for levying taxes, and not to other bills which may indirectly produce a revenue, as laws concerning the mint, postoffice department, public lands, etc.

"2. Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that

house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."

This proviso, which creates the veto-power of the president, and defines the same with great accuracy, has been often denounced as one which interferes with the independence of the legislative branch of the government. But it has been exercised by all presidents from Washington to Pierce; and considered so wholesome, that it has found a place in almost all our state constitutions, even of the latest date. There is no doubt that considerate presidents and governors may, by means of this veto-power, best prevent inconsiderate legislation. It is also required for the protection of the minority. On such opportunities, and in their annual messages, they may urge and broach sound doctrines, which do not so easily make themselves heard in legislative bodies, ofttimes too numerous and noisy for legislative purposes.

The intrigues and power of parties and factions, extraneous influences (the lobby) of interested and designing persons, limited time of the sessions, and carelessness, may be the origin of laws, which, when executed, would promote more harm than good. On this point of legislation the executive must be the best judge. There could not occur an unconstitutional law in our country if this veto-power were exercised with more circumspection. In a self-governing society, a few, simple, general laws are desired for the common welfare. From this view, so often laid down in the messages of our better presidents, the veto-power has been created in the constitution. Its history proves that it always has been used justly by our presidents. In this regard our executives have an important duty to perform. They will do it rightly if they start from the point that our governments are only required for the realization of justice; that they have to protect and conserve the rights of self-government and liberty; that they have not to meddle with non-political, social affairs; that they must move strictly within the limits of the constitution, and neither allow partisan legislation nor indulge in the realization of ideals and moral problems, which must be left to the exertions of those

whose proper duty and avocation it is to occupy themselves with such subjects. Bad laws create more evil than can be remedied by their repeal. Considerate and just laws are veto and repeal proof.

None of our constitutions or statute-books contains a proviso on the punishment of those who propose or approve of unconstitutional laws. A due sense for justice makes one desirable to check such legislation, which is, if not criminal, highly disgraceful under written constitutions. We can not be careful enough in selecting the members of Congress and in legislating, to save the reputation of our system of governing. There is in the English parliamentary transactions between the ministry and the houses a custom, that the first resign when they are defeated by a vote on the bills brought in by them. This can not happen in Congress, because government does not propose bills. This English custom is based upon the assumption, that the king can not err and is therefore not responsible, also not, when proposing a bill by his responsible ministers. In the untoward case, however, that such a bill should not pass, it would be against good aristocratic taste, to carry on the government with a ministry exposing the king to a defeat in the parliament. Something like such a custom should prevail in Congress and states, in cases, when a law has been declared unconstitutional by the judiciary. The executive, who has signed such a law, should then resign at once, to save the people the humiliation to be governed by a constitution-breaking executive, whose main duty is to see, that the constitution is preserved and together with the laws faithfully executed.

"3. Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the senate and house of representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the president of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the senate and the house of representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill."

This, as you will see, is a mere extension of the preceding clause. Rules and resolves concerning the internal affairs of each house come not within the scope of this provision.

Let us now take a short review of the sections we have perused They contain the rules for the organization and working of the Congress. The constitution says not a word of the parties or the

ways and means of making a candidate for Congress, and what a party-candidate has to do to get into a place or office of influence and emolument. The constitution presupposes that the people or electors, and nobody else, shall be the source from which officials spring up. But this is not the case in reality. It is obvious, that all our elections are managed by parties, which, from usage, are the agents of the people and candidates in all election affairs. We may compare them to the brokers who are stepping in between sellers and buyers to realize a bargain. Those parties, or political brokers, leave for the people nothing to do at the ballotbox, which is called the palladium of our liberty, but to approve their party-candidates, or, to throw their votes away, as the phrase is, because, as matters are, a no-party candidate will never command a majority of the votes.

History proves, that there is no state (and I fear that there never will be one), where the ways and means to office and influence or power are such as they ought to be, according to justice and morals. In monarchies birth, station, connections, armies, courts favor, and what is called loyalty to the ruling party, smoothes the path to office and preference; in democracies a hundred artifices of popularity, party, even faction, open the road to power. Bribery with its golden key unlocks many doors to offices everywhere. Talent and merit, if not patronised by royal or public favor or party, remains behind. The press, another palladium of our liberty, is also the willing helpmate of partisans or the servile instrument of princely courts. Of course, in democracies many noble principles are set forth in platforms to strengthen the parties, and to recommend them to the favor of the people ; still all this activity of parties is not legalized by law or the constitution, and, consequently, thus far, Congress depends entirely upon a power, that of party, which is irresponsible, although it assumes the management of the most important right of a free people, that of voting. I am aware that party is a part of the people, still it is not the people. When the force of party is turned against the law and constitution from selfish or even treasonable motives, party becomes faction. Of course, faction must be directly dangerous to the stability of the political fabric and constitution, while parties, which have their origin merely in a difference of opinion about the existing laws, are harmless. Genuine party

never plots, but faction does; party shuns violence, but faction seeks and craves it. The abolitionists form a faction and not a party, because they act with violence against the laws and constitution, burn this document, ignore the Union and the constitutional compromises upon which it rest, oppose with arms in hand the officers of the government, refuse constitutional appropriations on party grounds, and may finally destroy the political structure, if not checked by the common sense of the law-abiding people.

I believe that we have nothing at all to fear from our officers in regard to liberty, or, what is the same, in regard to the stability and safety of our political institutions, even admitting that they often abuse their offices for selfish purposes; but we have everything to fear from factions, which spring up in our midst, and from unprincipled party influences in our legislatures. The officers change their places, but leaders of parties and factions do not; they take a strong hold upon the mind and passions of man, and, if reckless, will not rest until a constitution which bars their plots is broken down.

The worst scenes

I write from experience, that, upon the activity of parties and factions, women have an immense influence. Read, my dear children, the history of the French Revolutions. of the first Revolution were enacted under the auspices of infuriated viragos. If they had taken the part of peace, order, and propriety, the lives of thousands, wantonly butchered, would have been saved. We all admit that the influence of women upon the character of American society is all-powerful and most beneficial. What would society be, everywhere, without it? Women form one half of society. God's plan can not be, that one half of human society shall be in public social affairs a blank. Their influence is in the direction of decorum, taste, and urbanity. If it is general, this character will be stamped upon our public affairs too. It is in want of a more universal influence of woman upon society, that the management of our public affairs seems to be so undignified and tasteless. Party helps to offices and power. "Party," so said Swift, "is the madness of the many for the benefit of the few." There is no greater slavery, no more corrupting condition, than the blind devotedness to party. If I vote for a party candidate, I do it because I believe him to be the fittest man for the place; but, this done, I watch his course with the indepen

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