Speaking concisely, the Code covers the law of persons, and the law of property, and of the acquisition of property, and includes succession, gifts, obligations in general, special contracts, registration, prescription, and the outlines of the law of merchant shipping and of insurance.

Broadly speaking, as Mr. Walton tells us, the Code, excepting Book 4 which deals with commercial law, is a recension of the Code Napoléon, while preserving some peculiarities of the old law of the province, and correcting many obscurities and inaccuracies which the discussions of more than half a century had discovered in the French code. But the situation created in Quebec by the Code was a peculiar one, for whereas the Code Napoléon purported to make a tabula rasa of all pre-existing laws of France, abolishing the Customs of the North such as the Custom of Normandy and the Custom of Paris, and overriding the modified Roman law which prevailed in the South, the Quebec Code does not purport to abolish the old law of the province except where its express provisions are contrary to it.

Now the old law of Quebec prior to the Code consisted of the Custom of Paris, the lois et ordonnances of France which prior to 1663, the date of the edict which created a Superior Council for Quebec, had modified or supplemented the Custom, and, according to the view of Mr. Walton, those ordinances later than 1663 which had been registered by the Superior Council of Quebec; also the decrees and regulations of the Superior Council of Quebec itself and the ordinances of the governors and intendants of Canada. To this must be added the works of the old French commentators beginning with Dumoulin, and of whom the one of highest authority is Pothier.

Even to-day in Quebec, on a question on which the Code is silent the opinions of the commentators are conclusive when unanimous, as having force of law in the same manner as the text of the Coutume de Paris itself. And where, as not unfrequently happens, differences of opinions exist, the courts have adopted the opinion which seems best founded, giving special weight to the views of Pothier.

The Civil Code was prepared by a commission under instructions from the Legislature directing them to follow as far as possible the French codes, and one of Mr. Walton's rules of interpretation tells that if by collating the articles of the Code the interpretation of the article under discussion is still uncertain, the most reliable guide will be the reports of the commissioners. As has been already stated the commissioners largely followed the Code Napoléon, utilizing, however, the many commentaries on that Code of French jurists, and these latter commentaries have great weight before the courts of the province where the texts are identical. So too the decisions of the French courts, especially of the Cour de Cassation, are very frequently quoted as authority and gain great consideration.

The position, however, is complicated by the fact that the commissioners who prepared the Quebec Code drew also many provisions from the English law, and we read in one of Mr. Walton's rules that when a provision is derived from the French law it is to be interpreted by reference to French authority, and when it is derived from the English law by reference to English authority.' Again, in that most important department of private law which comes under the category of commercial law, and which includes the law of corporations and the mercantile law or law merchant, the codifiers availed themselves freely of English and Scottish as well as of French authorities. "In this branch of the law,' says our author, ‘since the Code as before it our practice has been to refer both to French and English

authorities. In this field our courts have perhaps more experience than those of any other country, in the application of comparative jurisprudence.'

But in Quebec not only is it permitted to refer to the reports of the commissioners who prepared the Code as authority, in a way in which it is not permitted with us to refer to debates in Parliament, and not only have commentaries and textbooks an authority which textbooks with us do not possess, but the matter is further complicated by the different position in which decided cases stand. Rule 9 in Professor Walton's book states that ' when the question is not concluded by reference to other articles of the Code, or to the explanation of the codifiers, the next best guide will be the decided cases upon the point.' In a great many Canadian matters it is noticeable in a striking degree that the condition of things is a sort of compromise between the English and the American equivalents, but in Quebec law the position occupied by decided cases may be described as a sort of middle term between the French system on the one hand, and the English on the other. In France it is a fundamental principle that the courts are not bound by previous decisions. The maxim is non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est. The weight given to decided cases in France depends in a great measure on whether the court considering them thinks they proceed upon right principles or not. The appellate courts in France do not consider the judgment of the court below and proceed to render the judgment which the lower court should have rendered, but they consider whether the judgment of the court below has involved a wrong application of principles, and, if it has, they quash the judgment of the court below, and the matter goes back to it to be again dealt with. The decision of the highest court in France, the Court of Cassation, is not theoretically binding upon the lower courts, although of course, practically, if the latter do not conform to the views of the Court of Cassation their judgments will be continually set aside and the business remitted to them to be reconsidered. However, so far as the determination of a particular case is concerned, the lower court after the second successful appeal is bound to conform to the decision of the Court of Cassation. The position in Quebec in respect to the matter is thus expressed by Professor Walton: Under our system as matter of theory previous decisions are not absolutely binding. But in practice they enjoy greater authority than they do in France, though less than they do in England, and the tendency is toward giving them greater weight than was formerly the case. This is inevitable seeing that the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada, the two highest courts of appeal, act upon the principle that previous decisions are binding. . . This being the position taken up by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada, it is clear that courts of inferior jurisdiction (in Quebec) will, for the sake of their own dignity, and to secure uniformity of jurisprudence, be inclined to submit to the views held in the courts above. But the position here is still widely different from that in England. It is not possible to formulate precise rules on the subject because there is no settled opinion and the views of individual judges differ a good deal.'

The whole matter has been carefully considered by P. B. Mignault of Montreal, in an article in La Revue Légale (vol. 6, p. 145). Mr. Mignault, however, seems to concede a higher position to judgments of the Privy Council, and a translation of a few sentences from his article may be useful, it being remembered that in France a succession of concordant decisions is spoken of as establishing a 'jurisprudence.' Mr. Mignault thus summarizes the position in Quebec: An isolated decision does not con

stitute and could not constitute a jurisprudence. Errare humanum est. Therefore, in spite of the fact that an appellate tribunal-I ought perhaps to make an exception so far as concerns the Privy Council-may have rendered a decision, it is permissible for a tribunal of an inferior degree, it is even its duty when the cited case upsets our jurisprudence, especially when this decided case has only been so decided by a majority of judges, to insist on what it believes the true doctrine, leaving the appellate tribunal to apply itself again to the study of the question, in order to determine, this time in a final way, if it is proper to make the jurisprudence enter upon a new path. But when everybody is wrong, everybody is right. If a judge finds himself confronted by several concordant judgments, forming a long succession of decisions, so as to have the force of a custom, his duty is to bow to it, and to accept a doctrine which has received the assent of the greater part of the authorized interpreters of our law. To resist this jurisprudence would be useless, since his judgment could not fail to be invalid and injurious, for he would expose the parties to the expense of an appeal.' I am absolutely agreed with Judge Langelier, who said in a recent case, 'I have great respect for the decisions of the tribunals, but I have still more respect for the law... Argument ought to be reasoned argument, and reasoning does not consist in a list of judicial decisions nor even in a list of authors' names. Let me say once more with Justinian, non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est. But with these reservations let me add that if the superior tribunals insist in their interpretation of the law, if there is no hope of their changing their opinion, the unity and fixity of the jurisprudence demands that individual opinions should efface themselves.'

In such a condition of things as this Professor Walton deserves the praise due to a pioneer in the task of bringing order out of something like chaos. From the first there was great uncertainty of interpretation in respect to the Quebec Code; those who were imbued with the modern French law and the modern French writers were inclined to treat the Code as if it had made a clean sweep of the previous law, whilst the older practitioners, whose habits of thought had been formed by interpreting the Custom of Paris with the help of the commentators, were disposed to treat it as if it were simply a literary effort intended to express the existing law. Again, the tendency of those educated in English legal ways of thinking was to interpret the Code like any other statute, and to apply decided cases in the same way as in England. The clouds of doubt which have thus gathered round the question of the proper interpretation of the Code may readily be imagined, and Mr. Walton deserves credit for having grouped together these questions and endeavoured to explain them and to apply the answer which he thinks to be correct. He has covered matter which it is believed has never been put together before, and matter that it is certainly necessary for a young lawyer in Quebec to have a clear conception of. One peculiarity of style we may hope will be corrected in a future edition. We refer to a most peculiar way of splitting up the book into paragraphs of three or four lines, thus giving a disjointed effect to matter which is very closely connected and should be included in one and the same paragraph.

A. H. F. L.

Domaines Respectifs de l'Association et de la Société. Par HENRI HAYEM. Paris: Arthur Rousseau. 1907. 8vo. iii and 448 pp. (8 fr.)

THIS excellent work gives an interesting account of the development and of the present state of the French Law concerning the numerous forms in which joint undertakings for common objects can be carried out. The only form specially defined by the Code Civil, as adapted for enterprises of any sort intended to be carried out for the common benefit of several persons or of a large number of persons, is the form of the 'société.' A'société' may be 'civil' or 'commercial': if commercial, it may either be an ordinary partnership, or a commandite partnership, or a company (see Code de Commerce, Arts. 18 and 19); but in all cases it must conform to the following definition contained in Arts. 1832 and 1833 of the Code Civil, that is to say: there must be: (a) a partnership capital; (b) contributions consisting of money, or other property or of active services; (c) a mutual agreement as to the application of the partnership capital and of the partners' services for the pecuniary advantage of the partnership and as to the division of the profits among the partners. It will be seen that this leaves out all combinations formed by several persons for any purpose other than pecuniary advantage and even excludes combinations which, though not intending to divide any profits among the members, are formed with the object of gain. All such combinations of a permanent character existing between a number of persons and not coming under the definition of a 'société' were formerly described as 'associations' and, under that name, were to a large extent made subject to government authorization and supervision by Art. 292 of the Penal Code and a number of supplementary enactments referred to in detail by Mr. Hayem, who also describes the inconvenience caused by the uncertainty of the legal character of such associations from the point of view of private law. The statute of 1901, the elucidation of which is one of Mr. Hayem's main objects, was passed with the intention of removing this inconvenience. That statute defines an association as 'an agreement by which two or more persons join together in a permanent manner their intellectual acquirements, or their energies, with an object other than the sharing of profits,' and allows all associations included within that definition to acquire corporate rights, subject to compliance with certain prescribed conditions. A number of associations of a special nature had previously been regulated by separate laws.

Mr. Hayem explains the relation of the general statute to the separate laws, and surveys the numerous controversies which have arisen with reference to the interpretation of the definition quoted above, which does not, if construed literally, include associations in which the members contribute property of any kind for philanthropic, scientific, political, or religious purposes, and which, according to some writers, also seeks to exclude societies formed for any purposes from which the members derive any personal advantage (e. g. co-operative consumers' associations). giving conclusive reasons for a more liberal and comprehensive construction of the definition, Mr. Hayem shows that, even if such a liberal construction were universally admitted, there would still be a number of permanent joint undertakings which could neither be classed as 'sociétés' nor as associations,' and he makes certain proposals intended to meet the difficulties created by this state of things.

The interest of the book is largely increased by a comparison of the French law on the subjects in question with the law of other countries,

which both as regards its arrangements and the matter which it contains deserves the highest commendation. The following passage comparing English and French law shows the author's power to seize characteristic points: Nous aimons les textes généraux divisant les matières en larges catégories, et n'émiettant pas, en de multiples dispositions de détail, l'effort du législateur. Nos législateurs cherchent à bâtir des constructions juridiques, où puissent vivre en bonne intelligence, comme en quelque phalanstère idéal, les institutions sociales. Les Anglo-Saxons donnent à chaque type juridique sa petite loi spéciale. C'est une "maison par famille" qui constitue le trait caractéristique de ce système, et cette phrase caractérise aussi les habitudes de vie intime en Angleterre.'

Much interesting information is given on the legal nature of M. Briand's 'associations cultuelles,' on the French law of trade unions and trade combinations generally (including the combinations which are commonly described as 'trusts'), co-operative societies, mutual societies, and other similar associations. Quite apart from the instruction which it conveys, the book will be perused with pleasure by any reader who can appreciate dialectical skill and lucid and elegant forms of expression.

The absence of an alphabetical index is the only fault which we have been able to discover. E. S.

Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy: with special reference to the Hague Conferences and Conventions and other general international agreements. By SIR THOMAS BARCLAY. London Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. Boston, Mass.: Boston Book Co. 1907. 4to. xix and 383 pp. (218. net.) WE can say with confidence that this is a most valuable repertory of documents and comments, and that only a small part of it is superseded or made subject to material qualification by anything that has been settled at the Hague Conference of 1907. More cannot be usefully said here and now, for an adequate review of Sir Thomas Barclay's work, which is a series of memoranda on a score of distinct subjects prepared some time before the Conference, would involve detailed comparison with the results or want of results which, at the time of writing, are not yet fully accessible in an authentic record. The learned author's point of view is already well known to those of our readers who follow the development of modern international law and practice. He is an optimist, but a reasonable optimist, being conversant with men and affairs as well as with books. Compared with the enthusiasts of universal arbitration and disarmament, he is like a Fabian compared with a militant Social Democrat. Sir Thomas Barclay's labours will certainly do good service for some years to come to many publicists and diplomatists who will acknowledge their obligations to him, and perhaps to more who will not.

Bibliographie du droit international. Par le MARQUIS DE OLIVART. Paris: A. Pedone. 1905, 1907. 4to. 2 parts, 711 and (analytical table) xiii pp. (25 fr. each part.) THIS is an enlarged recension of a classified catalogue semi-privately issued in 1899 (L. Q. R. xv. 428), and still regarded by the learned author as in progress, for, as a true bibliographer, he knows that finality is impossible. The second fasciculus is a supplement to the first, arranged according to the same analytical scheme, and proceeding in a descending order