it is based' (p. 24); nor that a person who has executed a deed is estopped from denying its contents' (p. 28). In both cases mutuality is required; and in the latter, the rule only applies in actions on the deed. Relevancy is not synonymous with 'connection' (p. 33), but with logical connection; nor were there formerly only two grounds of incompetency for witnesses (p. 190). In America the law student has been provided with such masterly compilations of Cases on Evidence by Professors Thayer and Wigmore respectively, that we should have been glad to see Mr. Cockle take a more ambitious and critical view of his task in this country. S. L. P. Paterson's Licensing Acts, with Forms. By the late JAMES PATERSON. Nineteenth Edition. By WILLIAM W. MACKENZIE. London: Butterworth & Co. 1908. 8vo. lxxxii, 798 and 185 pp. (158. net.) 'PATERSON' may now almost be reckoned as a hardy annual '—a testimony alike to the success of the book and to the gathering importance of, and the growing law upon, the subject. And with each quickly succeeding new edition the bulk of the volume increases. The present issue is, for example, not far short of twice the size of the fifteenth edition, published so recently as 1903, insomuch that the book is already becoming physically a little unmanageable, and one fears to anticipate the next edition embodying the proposed legislation, unless a different size or a division into two volumes is adopted. Since the eighteenth edition was published a year ago there has been no direct new licensing legislation to digest; yet the statute book was not entirely empty, even during the 1907 session, for the Army Act of that year made a change in the billeting law, and the Public Health Acts Amendment Act invested local authorities in districts where the Act is in operation with power to order the provision of sanitary conveniences in public houses-and both of these enactments are duly noted in the new edition. But if Parliament has been content with two small changes in the licensing law, the Courts have not been idle. The House of Lords' decision in Leeds Corporation v. Ryder, and the Divisional Court's decision in Liverpool Corporation v. Walker are important interpretations of hitherto unsettled points arising under the 1904 Act; and both are copiously noted in the volume before us, as are other recent decisions, illustrating the painstaking thoroughness with which Mr. Mackenzie does his editorial work. Of course Paterson is a book for reference rather than perusal-(and the careful and exhaustive index makes it excellent for that purpose)-and it is a book for the practising lawyer rather than the layman; yet in view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding licensing law at the present time, one would like to see it in the possession of others just now. actively canvassing the subject could be forced to pass an examination in If every politician and publicist who is Paterson before speaking or writing upon the licensing question, we should be spared many half-digested ideas, and perhaps a certain amount of undiluted nonsense. We should not, for example, have a lady, conspicuous in a section of social reform, urging that justices who have a proprietary interest in the trade should not adjudicate upon licensing matters. might even be saved the speeches of Members of Parliament who declare We that the publican's business ought to be regulated by law- a statement And if only actually made at a public meeting not many months ago. statesmen could be forced to wade through the book there might be some hope for the long overdue codification of the licensing law. Mr. Mackenzie has done his best to elucidate and arrange; but what a tangle it is, even then! E. E. W. A Digest of English Civil Law. By EDWARD JENKS (editor), W. M. GELDART, W. S. HOLDSWORTH, R. W. LEE, J. C. MILES. Book II. Part II. Law of Contract (Particular Contracts) by R. W. LEE. London: Butterworth & Co. 1907. xxxi and 313 pp. (58. net per part.) MR. JENKS and his colleagues maintain the high reputation already obtained by their attempt to codify English Law. We wish here to dwell solely upon the benefits which judicious readers may obtain from the 'Digest of English Civil Law.' The book, in the first place, provides a bold and, on the whole, accurate statement of the general principles which underlie large departments of the private law of England. Our own doubt as to the prospect of Mr. Jenks and his fellow writers being completely successful in their endeavour turns on the point whether they confine themselves closely enough to laying down the general principles of the topics with which they deal. We are not, for instance, sure whether the thirty-seven articles comprised in Title v. Principal and Agent might not with advantage be reduced in number. The book, in the second place, does far more than merely supply readers with general statements as to the rules governing particular branches of the law of England; it enables them to see that the law really does consist of a body of principles. We feel, however, that something would be gained if our authors had made a greater effort to force upon the observation of students the fact that every proposition of law must either state some broad general rule, or else indicate a real or apparent exception to such a rule. To teachers of law, in the third place, the 'Digest of English Civil Law' will, we are convinced, become, as it advances to completeness, of more and more value. It gives at any rate an outline or sketch of English law of which a competent teacher can by thought and study fill up the details. The last service of the work not only to teachers, but to students, is that it reduces English law to propositions which it is possible definitely to discuss. The 334 articles of which the last volume consists are assuredly for the most part the expression of well-established legal rules. It is impossible, however, but that some of these 300 and odd propositions should be either inaccurately expressed or in some cases of doubtful soundness; for that is probably the case with some of the authorities on which they rest. But every one of them is intelligible. Each of them raises a perfectly clear issue. Each of them either commands assent or excites dissent. No student can do better than accept the challenge offered him by Mr. Jenks and his colleagues, and through the reading of reported cases enable himself to give, in his own mind at least, a clear verdict as to the correctness of the opinions propounded. From an intellectual conflict of this kind the authors of the 'Digest of English Civil Law' would, we feel confident, come out with great credit. It is certain that the stirring up of the sort of thorough-going debate we contemplate would vastly extend the knowledge of English law. Vagueness of statement originating, as it generally does, in confusion of thought, is the foe with which every teacher and student of law has to contend. Authors who exhibit the principles of law in clear propositions admitting of definite assent or definite denial render an inestimable service to every man who cares that the law of the land should be studied with intelligence. To stimulate rational controversy is at bottom the same thing as the propagation of sound knowledge. The Anglo-Indian Codes, with all their inequalities of workmanship and occasional deliberate departures from the Common Law, have been found by some students in their early days more profitable than ordinary textbooks, for the reasons pointed out above. A skilfully framed digest of purely English law should be of still greater use: provided always-to repeat a warning we do not scruple to repeat on every convenient occasion-that it is used as a guide to the ultimate authorities and not as a substitute for them. Negligence in Law. By THOMAS BEVEN. THE fact that a work of this magnitude has reached a third edition in a comparatively short time, not being one of the books that profess to make things easy for idle students or ignorant practitioners, is more eloquent than any commendation of ours. Mr. Beven deals with law which is often uncertain, and he cannot make it certain; but seldom, if ever, will it be any one's fault but our own if we do not obtain from him, anywhere within his extensive scope, the fullest means of forming a probable opinion. There is a good deal of alteration in this edition besides the necessary dealing with new cases. Less attention is given to American decisions and more to the Law Reports of our greater Colonies.' By the way, Mr. Beven does not seem to have noted that one 'Mr. Holmes,' who wrote a book on the Common Law, is now Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States; and we think he would be less exercised by the multitude and occasional vagaries of American authorities if he had more rigorously applied the maxim non numeranda sed ponderanda to his consideration of them. One case which puzzles him in the preface may be explained by the fact that the conductor of an American train has larger powers and duties than an English guard. He is not penned in a van, but has the run of the train, and is answerable for keeping order. If, therefore, he assaults a passenger, it is not a collateral 'frolic of his own,' but a direct breach of his duty. And so the Court appears to have thought. Mr. Beven also calls attention in the preface to his strictures on Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 Q. B. 86, which remain unchanged. We agree with him that the judgment, standing alone, is inconclusive. But the importance of the case is that it has been accepted, in the result, as a denial of the oldfashioned doctrine (once in fashion whether really authoritative or not) that a man is generally liable in trespass for all harm ensuing from his voluntary act, though the act itself were lawful and free from both unlawful intent and negligence; this, of course, apart from any question as to remoteness of damage or any special disqualification of the plaintiff in the circumstances. We humbly conceive that some of Mr. Beven's distinctions are too ingenious for this world, or those parts of it in which law has to be explained off-hand to juries; for judges, even if they are as learned as Mr. Beven, cannot always remember all they know. But he is fully entitled to be as dialectic as he pleases, for, though he puts his opinions forcibly, he does not dogmatize. One little critical question: why does Mr. Beven ignore Krüger and Mommsen and cite the Corpus Juris from seventeenth-century editions? Not that the difference can often matter for his purposes, but it looks somewhat out of keeping in a writer so scholarly. Legal Essays. By [the late] JAMES BRADLEY THAYER. Boston, Mass.: The Boston Book Co. 1908. 8vo. xvi and 402 pp. THESE collected essays-of which some are reprinted from publications not usually consulted by lawyers-will be welcome to all readers who appreciate the late Prof. Thayer's combination of exact learning with elegance in the best sense. As might be expected, the prevailing topics belong to the heads of constitutional law and evidence. In the first essay it is explained that the 'American doctrine which allows to the judiciary' (not the Supreme Court of the United States or Federal Courts exclusively, as sometimes supposed in England) 'the power to declare legislative acts unconstitutional, and to treat them as null' was much disputed in more than one jurisdiction before it prevailed. There was a rival doctrine that every branch of the government was the proper judge of the constitutionality of its own acts. And even now it is held that before a Court disregards a statute it must be not only satisfied, but clearly satisfied, that the enactment is contrary to the constitution of the United States, or the particular State, as the case may be. Later in the volume, in the course of an elaborate discussion of the res gesta question, there is a note which should be profitable for English readers, pointing out that the Supreme Court of the United States is not an authoritative interpreter of the common law for the purposes of the several State jurisdictions. · The short paper on Trial by Jury of Things Supernatural' shows how an atmosphere of epidemic delusion could make rules of evidence a snare and trial by jury an oppression, the only safeguard being found in judges like Lord Holt who did not abandon their common sense. Prof. Thayer seems to have thought that certain clouds of superstition (less pernicious than the belief in witchcraft) had gathered round the Constitution of the United States in the matter of the Philippines. By Frederic William Maitland: two lectures and a bibliography. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1908. 8vo. 72 pp. A. L. SMITH. 28. 6d. net. THIS is a tribute to Maitland's work from a lifelong worker in the History School of Oxford. As such it is welcome, and especially to Cambridge men. Mr. A. L. Smith's cordial appreciation leaves in substance nothing to be desired. We cannot all expect to agree in the order of merit we assign to Maitland's writings, and therefore the present reviewer notes merely as his personal taste that he puts the Rede Lecture on English Law and the Renaissance among the first. Mr. A. L. Smith says nothing of it (at least, nothing of his own), and in the bibliographical appendix its name is misprinted as the 'Bede' lecture. There is just one real matter of difference. On behalf of the Common Law we cannot assent to the rather patronizing tone of History as represented by Mr. A. L. Smith. He seems almost to think of the Faculty of Law as a kind of Gehenna from which deserving brands are plucked, ere they be too dry, to adorn the Paradise of History and flourish there as green trees. Now Maitland was a good lawyer before he was a historian; no one who was not a good lawyer could have done his historical work; and he never ceased to be zealous for the law. Some purely legal lectures of which no part is yet in print will, we believe, shortly prove this better than any other man's word. Mr. A. L. Smith asks, near the end,' What did Maitland mean by choosing for his epitaph, Hic iacet persona ficta?' We have no doubt what he ought to have meant, though the answer may be hardly consistent with Maitland's almost excessive shrinking from self-assertion. To us it means that, if he did not start the hunt of that monstrous beast the Fiction Theory of the corporation, he was the first English scholar to join in the adventure, and lived to be well in at the death. An Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents other than Court Forms, by Eminent Conveyancing and Commercial Counsel. Under the general editorship of ARTHUR UNDERHILL, assisted by HAROLD B. BOMPAS, HUMPHREY H. KING, F. G. UNDERHAY, and W. M. CROWDY. Vol. XII. Sale of Land; Vol. XIV. Shipping Documents to Tramways. London Butterworth & Co. 1907, 1908. La. 8vo. lxxxvii and 981 pp. and xlv and 661 pp. VOLUME XII, which discusses the sale of land, is perhaps the most useful volume of the work. The preliminary note, which is divided into two heads, (1) the Contract and (2) the Assurance, is very good. At p. 29 will be found a list of corporations who can buy and sell land and a statement of the formalities necessary to make the transaction valid. The list of searches which ought to be made by a purchaser at p. 115 appears to be accurate. We may, however, point out that searches in the registry at Durham cannot be made, as that Registry has been closed for many years, and that as searches for lis pendens of land in Lancashire are sometimes registered in the District Register at Liverpool, searches in that Registry should be made if the land is in Lancashire. The discussion at p. 129 as to what matter should be recited is one which should be carefully considered by young practitioners. Nothing is more aggravating to a person perusing a deed than to find long recitals of irrelevant facts, and, on the other hand, the absence of relevant recitals may render it difficult to understand the effect of the operative part of the deed. Under the heading Agreements for Sale' will be found a large number of precedents. At p. 152 the editors express an opinion that trustees selling land are not at liberty to sell the timber on it at a valuation. While perhaps it may be difficult in theory to defend a sale made in this manner, it is the only possible manner of arriving at the true value of the timber. Where the quantity of timber is but small, it is common to sell it with the land as a whole, but where it is large it is impossible for a purchaser to |