sureties, and followed in Frankish custom as a matter of course, apart from any contractual clause to this effect. Sometimes it was used also in the case of the principal debtors themselves, but in its original meaning it developed out of the taking of hostages. The surety subjected to Einlager was a hostage, who by the delivery of a small sum, an 'old groat, could free himself, but only in order to proceed by execution against the debtor himself. The collection of passages from documents of customary law supplied by Mr. Rintelen is very full, and their analytical discussion is carried out in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.

P. V.

Collective Ownership. By C. T. CARR. (Yorke Prize Essay, 1905.) Cambridge University Press. 1907. 8vo. xix and 180 pp. (58. net.)

WE venture to think that this book contains one of the best expositions in existence of the portion of the law of which it treats. The authorities have been mastered and assimilated, and the author has a thorough knowledge of the history and theory of the subject. The result is a readable and well arranged, and at the same time critical, account of the law, which ought to be quite as useful to the practical lawyer as to the theoretical jurist. Altogether it is a worthy addition to the series of Yorke Prize Essays.

The most obvious and useful forms of collective ownership, viz., by corporations or by means of the Trust, were excluded from the subject set for the essay, and the author consequently deals with the other possible forms of such ownership. The first chapter on man and wife is a very interesting one. The title rules out the marriage settlement as arising by means of the Trust, and therefore the relations as determined by Common Law only can be discussed. The English law which, until altered by statute, gave the fullest possession of the wife's lands and goods to the husband is compared with the communio bonorum of France and with Scots law. The peculiarity of our Common Law in denying the collective ownership of the chattels of man and wife is illustrated by Maitland's illuminating suggestion that as the ecclesiastical courts assumed control of the succession to movables, the Common Law could only deal with them during the subsistence of the marriage and therefore gave absolute power to the husband. The theories of Stobbe as to the ownership of husband and wife are stated and criticized in detail-a very interesting piece of analysis which to the best of our knowledge can be found in no other English law book. Another good portion of the same chapter is the discussion of the cases on the rule that a gift to a man and his wife and to a third person, is to be construed as a gift of a moiety to the husband and wife and a moiety to the third person.' The author may well speak of the nice application of the rule.' The spectacle of the courts struggling with a principle which is a logically correct deduction from the premiss that husband and wife are, for most purposes, one person,' and which could not therefore be directly abrogated, is an amusing one. The injustice of the rule under modern conditions seems to be felt throughout the cases, and every straw that could indicate an intention, or could possibly be construed into an indication of an intention, that each should take separately is eagerly clutched at. A further breach both in the premiss and in the deduction has been made by the Married Woman's Property Acts, and the whole subject of this position of the 'spoilt child of the law' needs reconsideration and amendment if the law

is to be made a coherent whole; for at present it is a sad jumble of ancient rules and modern piecemeal attempts to remedy some of their practical inconveniences.

The succeeding chapters of the essay deal with Co-heirs, Joint Tenants, Tenants in Common, and Partners; all containing, as far as we have been able to test them, a good and complete account of the law. The rights and remedies of all classes of co-owners inter se are described in a separate chapter, and nothing could more clearly bring out the apparent disfavour with which the law regards all the forms of co-ownership, except partnership. The pressing necessities of commerce have forced the courts (mostly courts of equity) to provide or to recognize a long series of rules for regulating the mutual relations of partners, but co-owners of other descriptions are in a far less favourable position. The Common Law remedies of an aggrieved co-owner are cumbrous and often ludicrously ineffective, even in the cases where they exist at all, and the statutory rights that have been added to them lie chiefly in the direction of forcing a severance or sale; that is to say, they destroy collective ownership and convert it into several ownership. The chief exception, again pro beneficio commercii, is in the case of ships.

The volume ends with a very instructive chapter on communities (other than corporations) as owners. It is largely historical, and the chief complaint that we have to make about it is that it is too short. We hope that the author may see his way in the future to give us a more detailed study of the same subject, with which he is eminently qualified to deal. H. J. R.

A Treatise on the Law of Easements. By C. J. GALE. Eighth Edition, by R. ROOPE REEVE. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1908. 8vo. xxvii and 660 pp. (258.)

THE position of an editor of a new edition of a standard textbook is not an easy one. He is anxious as far as possible to leave the original text intact, but in so doing he is likely to leave the older cases set out at some length while more recent and more important cases are only shortly referred to or noted in a footnote. Mr. Roope Reeve, the editor of the eighth edition of Gale on Easements, has done his work excellently, but perhaps with too great a respect for the original text. Thus on the difficult subject of the alteration of easements by encroachment, eight pages are devoted to rather full statements of the earlier cases, two pages of Mr. Gale's comment and views follow, and then at last the reader comes to Tapling v. Jones, which decided that Mr. Gale's views were erroneous. But it is better to err on the side of conservatism; a new edition is a different thing from a new book.

Since the publication of the seventh edition there have been two cases of great importance: Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores and Hyman v. Van den Bergh. The first of these has necessitated the rewriting of the chapter on light. The latter was decided so shortly before the appearance of the eighth edition that, although it is duly noted wherever it should be, the whole effect of it is not considered so fully as perhaps might be desirable. These two cases illustrate the two different ways in which the Prescription Act has been construed. In Hyman v. Van den Bergh the Act was construed strictly; the words were taken in their literal meaning, so that a right to light under the Act cannot be obtained without litigation. In Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores the words

or that the right thereto' (namely the access and use of light to the building) shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible' were not construed strictly, but taken to mean the right to so much light as is sufficient for the reasonable enjoyment of the building. Hyman v. Van den Bergh raises the question as to the way in which a claim to rights of light should be pleaded. It seems to be necessary now to plead not only under the Statute but also to plead a lost grant and enjoyment for time immemorial. This, however, is a question which requires full discussion, especially in view of some of the observations of Farwell L. J. in Hyman v. Van den Bergh.

The decision in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores raises the question, which is ably discussed by Mr. Roope Reeve, whether in deciding that the obstruction amounts to a nuisance the amount of light left to a plaintiff is to be taken into consideration. It seems clear that in considering the amount left regard should only be had to that light to which an indefeasible right has been acquired, that is to say, that light to which the plaintiff has already established his right by an action, and no other light, however long it has been enjoyed, should be taken into consideration.

In view of the decision in Re Nisbet and Pott's Contract, in which the Court of Appeal have adopted Jessel M.R.'s view that restrictive covenants are in the nature of negative easements, it would be well that the whole question of restrictive covenants should be discussed in a future edition. The analogy, though close, is in some respects not perfect, and there does not appear to have been any case in which a right to the benefit of restrictive covenants has been set up by prescription or lost grant. Another point which might usefully have been discussed is whether a right of way for horse carriages includes a right for motor vehicles. An argument might be founded on Ballard v. Dyson that it did not; and the question is interesting and important at the present time. It is remarkable that so many questions connected with the law of easements still remain undecided; the careful way in which doubtful points are discussed has given Gale on Easements its position as the standard work on the subject, and the eighth edition fully maintains the high standard of excellence set by the earlier editions.

The Practice on the Crown Side of the King's Bench Division of His Majesty's High Court of Justice. By F. H. SHORT and F. H. MELLOR, K.C. Second Edition. London: Stevens & Haynes. La. 8vo. 1 and 730 pp. (308.)

THE second edition of this valuable book is marked by a change of format and a complete rearrangement of the contents. The bulk of it now appears in the form of a commentary on the new Crown Office Rules of 1906, the substitution of which for the old Rules rendered a new edition of the work necessary. We do not feel altogether sure that this arrangement is preferable to the old one, but the authors, with their experience of the subject, must have been convinced that it was, or they would not have set themselves the task of recasting, which must have involved very great labour. Continuous dissertations on the principal subjects, such as Mandamus, Certiorari, Prohibition, Attachment, &c., are however retained, in addition to the notes to the rules affecting those subjects, and these notes, it should be observed, sweep into this book Mr. Short's separate and older work on the Crown Office Rules.

The task of revision and rearrangement seems in the main, so far as we have tested it, to have been very well done and to have brought the book thoroughly up to date. The statement, however, as to mandamus to Government Departments is not quite clear. It is stated, first of all, that no mandamus will lie to the Lords of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, or the Commissioners of Customs, and then it is stated, quite correctly, that where there is a statutory duty cast upon servants of the Crown to do a ministerial act, mandamus will issue in respect of it. It would lie under such circumstances to the above-named servants of the Crown just as much as to any others. Pro tanto the general objection which the Crown is in the habit of taking when a mandamus is sought against a Government Department is unfounded, and it is almost time that the bubble was pricked. Some other matters appear to be too scantily treated, e. g. the question of Crown costs (p. 389), and the right of the Crown to a trial at bar, and the method of applying for it (p. 298). On the last-cited page, note (1), there is a statement about R. v. Lynch, which is not quite clearly consistent with that in note (5) on p. 297. West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. R. [1905] 2 K. B. 391, should have been added as the most recent instance of a trial at bar, though the fact is not mentioned in the report.

R. v. Douglas (p. 250) is reported in 2 Dowl. (N.S.) 416, and the case and this reference should be added to the Table of Cases.

One minor portion of the book seems not to have been so carefully edited as the rest, namely the section on Inquisitions (pp. 392-7). As to the power of the Court to quash inquisitions of escheat, Ex parte Lord Gwydir (4 Madd. 281, 313) is contrary to the dictum on which the statement in the text is based, and which appears to us to be clearly wrong. A petition for leave to traverse appears to be still necessary, as no rules for traverse have been made and s. 3 (3) of the Escheat (Procedure) Act, 1887, preserves the existing practice. This should have been noticed also on p. 394, where a doubt is expressed as to the practice. A petition was in fact lodged in the last contested case, R. v. Manning. Petty Bag Office Amendment Act, 1849' (p. 393) should be Petty Bag Act, 1849. The statement as to the right of parties interested to traverse lunacy inquisitions (p. 395) is too wide, and a good many more authorities should be cited to qualify it. It would appear that the Crown can have a melius inquirendum in lunacy (Ex parte Roberts, 3 Atk. 5, 6, which is not cited). It is correctly stated that the traverser is a defendant, though other authorities might have been added to support this, and it should be added that a result of this is that the Crown may be ordered to pay or receive costs under the Crown Suits Act, 1855.

The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy. By the Right Hon. Sir ROLAND L. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS. Ninth Edition. By E. W. HANSELL, assisted by A. ROMER MACHLIN. London: Stevens & Sons, Lim., and Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1908. La. 8vo. cvii and 933 pp. (308.)

WHEN reviewing the eighth edition of this work we wrote: "There are few textbooks, if any, that we have found in practice more trustworthy and complete than this, and we have every reason to think that the confidence we have reposed in previous editions will not be betrayed by this.' During the last four years we have had the eighth edition in constant use and have never found it wanting; and a perusal of portions

of the new edition satisfies us that our confidence will again not be betrayed. In preparing this edition Mr. Hansell appears to have used all the diligence and skill in handling new material which he displayed in editing the earlier editions, and he has been assisted in his labours by Mr. A. Romer Macklin.

One of the most interesting of the many cases in bankruptcy that have been decided since 1904 is re Button, ex parte Haviside [1907] 2 K. B. 180, in which the Court of Appeal decided that where an art dealer had in his possession at the date of his bankruptcy goods which had been entrusted to him by a customer to sell for the customer, and by an order made in the bankruptcy it was adjudged that these goods passed to the trustee as being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt within the reputed ownership clause, the customer was entitled to prove in the bankruptcy for the value of the goods. The Master of the Rolls and Vaughan Williams L.J. supported their decision on the authority of Exall v. Partridge (8 T. R. 308) and Edmunds v. Wallingford (14 Q. B. D. 811), the principle of which cases is that where a person's goods are lawfully seized for another's debt the owner of the goods is entitled to redeem and be reimbursed by the debtor against the money paid to redeem them, and in the event of the goods being sold to satisfy the debt, the owner is entitled to recover the value of them from the debtor. This is one of the well-known instances of implied contracts where the law implies a promise to pay, though, in fact, there is none. The extension of this principle to the case of the goods of A vesting in a trustee in bankruptcy to pay B's debts (that is, in effect being lawfully seized to pay B's debts) is perfectly sound, and we certainly prefer to rest the decision on this basis rather than on that upon which Buckley L.J. inclined to rely, namely, that there was in the bankruptcy proceedings a breach of a contract of bailment by reason of the bankrupt's suffering an act which prevented him from performing his contract. It is rather straining the idea of a breach of contract to speak of a man's becoming unable to perform a contract by reason of his bankruptcy as in itself a breach of contract. Before the bankruptcy there had been no breach of contract by the bankrupt by parting with the goods, or refusing to return them, or by repudiation. The breach, if any, was the vesting of the property in the trustee by the bankruptcy.

The Law relating to Income Tax. By ARTHUR ROBINSON. Edition. London: Stevens & Sons, Lim. La. 8vo. 543 pp. (258.)

Second lvi and

MR. ROBINSON's work is in the nature of an annotated code. The sections of the numerous acts dealing with income tax are printed in full, and are arranged in the order in which they would naturally appear in a well-drawn consolidation Act. This is a good, and indeed the only practicable, way of dealing with such an intricate subject as that of the income tax. The notes of the various sections are little more than digests of the decisions upon them, the facts of each case and the decision being clearly and shortly stated, whilst the cases are grouped in appropriate classes with prominent catchwords, and the cases in each group are arranged in order of date. The result is an ideal book of reference, which enables the practitioner to find the authorities he wants with the minimum of trouble. The author does not attempt to comment VOL. XXIV:

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