out. The remaining part of the volume contains a summary of the statutory provisions existing in the countries referred to as to the education and care substituted by the State in reformatory and industrial schools and similar institutions for the education and care which in normal cases is provided by the parents. As far as we can judge the information supplied by the author is accurate and complete. The details of the English Children's Bill, which before or shortly after the publication of this notice will probably have been transformed into the Children's Act, 1908, were of course unknown when the book under review was printed, but the existence of the Bill is mentioned in a footnote.

Some reference to the French cantines scolaires' and to the English statutory provisions as to the supply of meals to children attending public elementary schools would have been desirable. Dr. Reicher's book will be of great assistance to any person interested in the important subject with which it deals. E. S.

Butterworth's Ten Years' Digest of Reported Cases, 1898 to 1907. Issued under the general editorship of SIDNEY W. CLARKE, with the co-operation of C. C. M. PLUMPTRE, W. F. LAWRENCE, F. J. COLTMAN, M. R. EMANUEL, W. VALENTINE BALL, E. L. HOPKINS, and HARRY CLOVER. London: Butterworth & Co. 1908. In Four Vols. La. 8vo. Vol. I, 1355 pp.; Vol. II, 1258 pp.; Vol. III, 1246 pp.; Vol. IV, 362 pp. (£3 38. net for the entire work.)

A DIGEST of reported cases is always welcome, and when it covers such a long period as that of ten years it is received with open arms. Messrs. Butterworth's digest is quite an armful with its 4,221 pages and notes of 9,300 cases. The classification of the work is based on that of the publishers' other publications, the Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents and Lord Halsbury's Laws of England, with such modifications as the nature of a digest requires. It is claimed for this digest, in the publishers' note, that it includes practically every case reported during the ten years as decided in the English Courts, together with a large number of cases from Scotland and Ireland. Each page is in two columns, and each main heading is in thick black type. References may easily be made from one heading to another, and when the note of a case refers to some other decision there is a further reference to the column of the digest in which that case can be found. There are, of course, many headings under which will be found cross-references to other headings, but to each of the principal headings such as Bankruptcy and Companies - a separate table of contents is prefixed. The digest proper occupies the whole of three volumes. The fourth and smallest volume contains (1) a list of words, terms and phrases considered or explained in the cases digested; (2) an alphabetical list of cases affirmed, reversed, overruled, followed or considered; and (3) an alphabetical table of the cases digested, stating the year of the decision or the report of it, and referring to the volume of the digest, and the number of the column thereof, in which each case is noted.

It is only after a digest has been frequently consulted that one can give a sound opinion whether it is well arranged or otherwise, but, so far as the reviewer has tested the four volumes, they seem to be very well put together. The Yearly Digest, another work published by Messrs. Butter

worth & Co., has frequently received a favourable review in these columns, and it is announced that the arrangement of the ten years' digest will be followed in future issues of the Yearly Digest, and in the quarterly divisions which are to become a feature of that publication. With so many new law books, new editions of law books, and digests, annual or otherwise, it is to be hoped that practitioners may be relieved from the wearisome task of noting up the reports themselves. To those who have fallen into arrear with such work the Ten Years' Digest will indeed come as a boon. F. E.

Hindu Family Law, as administered in British India. By ERNEST JOHN TREVELYAN, Reader in Indian Law in the University of Oxford; late a Judge of the High Court at Calcutta. London: Thacker & Co. 1908. La. 8vo. 392 pp. (258. net.)

THIS is a work which, when completed, will be of valuable assistance to the Indian practitioner. We say when completed,' because it is in its present shape manifestly incomplete; thus, there is no mention of such important subjects as Wills and Inheritance. We say 'the Indian practitioner,' because the chief value of the book lies in the footnotes, in which are numerous references to the last editions of works of Hindu lawyers (such as G. C. Sarkar's Law of Adoption, and the same author's Hindu Law, Sir Gurudas Banerji's Law of Marriage and Stridhan, Bhattacharya's Law of Joint Hindu Family, and the same author's Hindu Law, and other similar works), which are not generally accessible to students, even in India; also every possible reported case seems to be noted, and not many of the old reports are available, certainly to very few students in England. But as a collection of simple propositions, based on numerous authorities, the references to which are always given, the book will be invaluable. It remains for the practitioner to look up each authority, and note carefully whether the cases can be distinguished.

Where Dr. Trevelyan submits his own opinion, contrary to any authority or reported case, he does so cautiously and on grounds well worthy of consideration.

We are glad to notice that in dealing with the subject of the right of a Hindu widow to adopt a son to her deceased husband, and the consequences of such an adoption--a subject fruitful of litigation in India-Dr. Trevelyan enunciates the law clearly. Thus (pp. 130-1) a widow's power to adopt is at an end for all purposes, as soon as the estate of her husband is vested in an heir (other than herself) of his natural or adopted son, or of his son's son, or son's son's son who has inherited to him, and is not revived by the death of such heir, even when on such death she herself succeeds to the property which was of her husband, and therefore by adopting devests no estate but her own. This rule applies, whether there be an express power given by the husband, or such power be implied, as in the Maharashtra School, or the power be exerciseable with the consent of the sapindas.'

And further on (p. 198), with certain exceptions which it is unnecessary to particularize, adoption by a widow does not devest any estate of inheritance, which has been taken by a person, as heir of a male holder other than the person to whom the adoption was made.' As Chief Justice Peacock said (quoted by Dr. Trevelyan, p. 199) 'there is no case in which an estate vested by inheritance can be devested by the adoption of a son by a widow after her husband's death.' And Dr. Trevelyan adds (p. 201),

'It is submitted that an estate cannot be devested by the mere consent of the person in whom it is vested.'

The foundation for these principles is a ruling of the Privy Council, given so long ago as 1865, in a famous leading case, generally known as Chandrabullee's case. It is that the power of a Hindu widow to adopt a son is limited. Thus, where a Hindu dies, leaving a widow and a son, and that son subsequently dies, leaving no son, but his own widow, the power of the former widow to adopt is at an end, and can never afterwards be revived, even though (as, for instance, by the death of the son's widow issueless, or without having adopted a son) the estate becomes vested in her. It follows that if she cannot by her assent revive an extinct power to adopt, to be exercised by herself, equally she cannot do so, if she intends the power to be exercised by some one else.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of this principle was the following case, which is quoted by Dr. Trevelyan (p. 198) among the numerous illustrations given by him. A died, leaving a widow, B, and a son, C, by another wife (predeceased). C died unmarried, and the estate became vested in a collateral, X, who gave his son, D, to be adopted by the widow B. It was held and this ruling has never been directly disputed—that though X consented to the adoption by B (he was the natural father of the adoptive son), B's power to adopt was at an end, for on her stepson dying unmarried, she did not succeed as heir, and the fact that the heir wished her to adopt could not validate the adoption. It may be said that possibly this principle may not be in accordance with either the strict letter or the spirit of the Hindu law as expounded in the books, or as understood by the Hindus themselves, and that this may be an illustration of a hard and fast line laid down by judges in London, governing all the courts in India, in a matter which, if left to a natural development of the Native Law, might possibly have resulted in a different principle. A learned Hindu judge who, while professing to follow the ruling of the Privy Council, delivered more than one judgment in conflict with it, said :'Nothing is more common in this country than to find that parents when they grow old, and have the misfortune of losing an only son in their old age, leaving a young (and sonless) widow behind, think it their duty to console that widow for the loss she has suffered by permitting her to adopt a son in preference to adopting a son themselves.' This is quite true; and if the widow of the predeceased son exercises the power of adoption during her father-in-law's life, no obstacle can be raised on account of the dictum of the Privy Council. But it must be during the father-in-law's life, for on his death his estate becomes vested by inheritance in his own widow : she can adopt, but she cannot authorize her daughter-in-law to adopt : the latter's power is no longer in existence. Such is the result of the ruling of the Privy Council, and the Courts in India are bound thereby.

No doubt some attempts have been made by the Courts in India to avoid the rule laid down by the Privy Council. The first attempt was made at Calcutta; and, curiously enough, this took place in connexion with the same family and the same property as were the subject of the leading case (Chandrabullee's) in which the ruling was enunciated. The 'adopted son' obtained possession of the property, and resisted the attack made to oust him by the collateral heirs. The High Court at Calcutta supported him, opining that the rejection of his status as adopted son in the leading case was intended by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be limited to the circumstances of that case. But on further appeal to the Privy Council that view was not approved; and the ruling was clearly

enunciated that the adoption was invalid under all circumstances, for the power of the adoptive mother was at an end'; nothing could revive it.

of his predeceased son.

In Western India, besides the judgements of the learned Hindu judge, already referred to, there is a comparatively recent decision of the late Chief Justice, Bombay, which is in conflict with the ruling of the Privy Council. It was a case in which there were two brothers, S and B, found to be divided in estate. S died, leaving his widow B1, and B, the widow Thus on the death of S, his estate was vested in his own widow B. B, adopted a son, who claimed to oust B, on the ground that B, had consented to his adoption. A preliminary question arose whether B, had been legally married to S. In case that is determined in the affirmative,' said the learned Chief Justice, it will be necessary to consider whether B, consented at the time of the adoption of a son by B,.' But such a question could never arise. For, to quote Dr. Trevelyan again, p. 201, an estate cannot be devested by the mere consent of the person in whom it is vested.' And he adds, this seems to be in accordance with the weight of authority,' giving in a footnote a reference to the five Bombay cases, in which a different view was expressed. They are (1) Payapa v. Apamma, 23 Bom. 327, at pp. 331-2; (2) Gopal v. Vishnu, 23 Bom. 250; (3) Babu v. Ratnoji, 21 Bom. 819; (4) Rupchand v. Rakhmabai, 8 Bom., High Court, Appellate Cases, 114, at p. 122; and (5) the case just quoted, Bhimappa v. Bassawa, 29 Bom. 400. It is interesting to note that as recently as June of the present year a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court doubted whether the decision in Payara v. Apamma (see above), which at the time it was given was considered by its authors as finally laying down the law on the point in question, can now be regarded as a binding authority. No doubt in time the five cases noted above will be authoritatively overruled, and the law will then be expounded as shown by Dr. Trevelyan.

Dr. Trevelyan goes on to make a very apposite remark: Even if consent can operate to devest an estate, a distinction might well be made between the cases in which the person so consenting is a full owner, and those in which the estate is vested in a qualified owner; in which latter cases the rights of the reversioners could scarcely be qualified by the consent'; and he shows in a footnote that this distinction was not made in the Bombay cases, to which he takes objection. For instance, in the most recent case just quoted, Bhimappa v. Bassawa, B, as the widow of S was only a qualified owner. Conversely, in the case also quoted above, where the estate was vested in the natural father, his consent was held to be of no avail, though he was the full owner, and had given his son in adoption. On pp. 198, 199, Dr. Trevelyan, in support of his view, has drawn out a series of illustrations, all taken from reported cases, the references to which are given in the footnotes. In Illustration (vi) it should have been noted that the widow D had express authority from her husband to adopt a son; and in the footnote (3) to the case 'E' is clearly a misprint for 'F': also in the same footnote E (F) could have succeeded against C' should be F would have been entitled to share with C.'

Illustration (viii) is given as the case of Rupchand v. Rakhmabai, referred to above, in which the decision of the Bombay High Court was, not as in the illustration, that E cannot oust D, but that E can oust D, because D consented to the adoption which would otherwise have been invalid; and this ground is shown elsewhere by Dr. Trevelyan to be contrary to the weight of authority.

We have thought it well to take one important subject in Hindu Law as illustrative of the exhaustive manner in which Dr. Trevelyan's work has been accomplished. The book is excellently got up and well printed, a contrast to Indian law books which are printed in India, and which irritate the student by numerous errors of the press. Only two slips attracted our notice: on p. 128, l. 14, for 'if' one should read' unless,' otherwise the meaning is exactly the contrary of what the author intends; and on p. 139, note 4, l. 7, for 'marriage' read 'adoption': a male is not removed from his natural family by marriage.

The Common Law and Statutory Duty and Liability of Employers. By His Honour Judge WALWORTH HOWLAND ROBERTS and GEORGE WALLACE, assisted by ARTHUR HARINGTON GRAHAM. Fourth Edition. London: Butterworth & Co. 1908. La. 8vo. lxxxiii and 1014 pp., with index of 120 pp.

THE writer of this notice is the happy possessor of copies of the early editions of this work. The first edition notably, when placed beside its mammoth offspring, cannot fail to recall the parable of the grain of mustard seed which, when it is sown in the earth, is less than all the seeds that be in the earth, but becometh greater than all herbs and shooteth out great branches. The first edition is small amongst pamphlets; in a couple of hours it could be read from cover to cover; this last is become in bulk an encyclopaedia and of respectable rank materially even amongst its portly peers. At the moment amongst single-volume law books, this writer can think of none but itself to be its parallel: unless, perchance, Addison on Contracts; but Addison covers a vastly wider ground, and has, besides, a respectable antiquity with which to palliate portliness and the services of many editors to pamper it; while Judge Roberts's book, so far as the bulk of it goes-650 pages, without reckoning the index, are devoted to the Workmen's Compensation Act alone—is in the swaddling clothes of infancy. What proportions it will attain to after, say, half a century of judicial decisions, if they come in anything like the affluence of those under the earlier Act, is a contemplation not unattended by awe. This book, as a specimen of the printer's, publisher's, and binder's art, leaves nothing to be hoped for; yet, as we admire, the inquiry will intrude, how will its proud possessors bear it from place to place to perform its work of illumination or of confutation? The Times newspaper has provided for any copy of its Encyclopaedia a case of many advertised beauties and virtues wherein its volumes may be fitted and revolve-and of marvellous cheapness. The publishers of this mighty volume might provide some vehicle of the go-cart sort, or gun-carriage perhaps, by which the disputatious solicitor might bear it along to the field of action-the forum of the County Court; for certainly his ordinary bag will not contain it, even if he has the vigour to carry it.

But to dally no longer with its physical features, the book is divided into four portions. Chapters i to vii to page 242 deal with the Master's Common Law and Statutory Duty previously to the Employers' Liability Act. This is familiar ground, and is covered with great detail and minuteness. The arrangement does not seem notably lucid, but everything proper is there, and everything is sufficiently stated.

From Chapter ix to Chapter xii down to page 349 the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, is treated. Then there is a sort of enclave made which logically would seem to belong to the first division, but which for reasons.