stolen such document, security or instrument. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 353.

Maliciously destroying an information or record of a police court is an offence within this section. R. v. Mason (1872), 22 U.C.C.P. 246.

For the statutory definitions of the terms "valuable security," "testamentary instrument," "document of title," see sec. 2.

397. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Concealing to two years' imprisonment who, for any fraudulent purpose, capable of anything takes, obtains, removes or conceals anything capable of being being stolen. stolen. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 354.

Fraudulent concealment of goods.]-The gist of the offence is the concealing for a fraudulent purpose and it is not incumbent on the prosecution to shew that the fraudulent purpose was accomplished. R. v. Goldstaub (1895), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 357, 10 Man. R. 497. The subject matter of the offence must be something which is "capable of being stolen"; and sec. 344 declares, subject to the exception therein stated as to productions of the soil, that "every inanimate thing whatever which is the property of any person, and which either is or may be made movable shall henceforth be capable of being stolen as soon as it becomes movable, although it is made movable in order to steal it.

The words "capable of being stolen" as used in sec. 397 do not, however, imply that they are capable of being stolen by the accused, but are used in their general sense as in sec. 352 which deals with the statutory offence of theft by a co-owner of the stolen goods. R. v. Goldstaub (1895), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 357, 10 Man. R. 497.

A conviction on a charge of fraudulent concealment of goods with intent to defraud an insurance company will not be set aside because it appears in evidence that a part of the goods had been removed a month before the date of removal of the remainder, which latter removal took place on the date charged in the indictment as the date of concealment. The date of removal is not necessarily the date of concealment, and the conviction would be valid if the accused were still keeping the goods in concealment on or about the date charged in the count, although the removal took place a month prior thereto. R. v. Hurst (1901), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 338, 13 Man. R. 584.

On a further count for fraudulent removal of goods with intent to defraud, a removal of part of the goods a month prior to the time of the offence as charged is not to be presumed to be a part of one continuous taking with the removal of the remainder on the date charged. Although evidence of the first taking was admissible to shew the intent on the second taking which constituted the charge against the accused, the judge should not have told the jury that they could convict for either the first or the second taking or for both, and the judge having certified his opinion that the jury were materially influenced by the evidence of the first taking the conviction on the count for fraudulent removal should be set aside. R. v. Hurst (1901), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 338, 13 Man. R. 584.

398. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Bringing to seven years' imprisonment who, having obtained elsewhere stolen prothan in Canada any property by any act which if done in Canada. perty into Canada would have amounted to theft, brings such property into or has the same in Canada. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 355.

Receiving property obtained by crime.

Evidence.]-When the Crown has proved that the prisoner had taken the goods in the foreign country under such circumstances that if they had occurred in Canada it would have been theft, and that he has the goods in his possession in Canada, a prima facie case is proved without evidence that by the foreign law the taking was felonious, but under certain circumstances it may be necessary to prove the foreign law as an element in the moral quality of the act. Reg. v. Jewell, 6 Man. R. 460.

Receiver.]-The receiver of property obtained out of Canada by any acts which would if committed in Canada constitute an indictable offence, is liable under sec. 399, if he knew such thing to have been so obtained.

Property.]—Deeds and instruments relating to or evidencing the title or right to any property real or personal or giving a right to recover or receive any money or goods, are included in the term "property." Seotion 2(32).

Receiving Stolen Goods.

399. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment, who receives or retains in his possession anything obtained by any offence punishable on indictment, or by any acts wheresoever committed, which, if committed in Canada would have constituted an offence punishable upon indictment, knowing such thing to have been so obtained. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 314.

Receiving stolen property.]—In the offence of receiving stolen goods the stolen goods must have been taken and stolen by a person other than the person accused of receiving. R. v. Lamoureux (1900), 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 101. The essential elements of the offence of receiving stolen goods are not included in the offence of "housebreaking and theft," and a conviction for receiving stolen goods cannot be rendered on the "speedy trial" of a person charged only with housebreaking and theft. Ibid.

A person having a joint possession with the thief may be convicted as a receiver. Section 402; McIntosh v. R. (1894), 23 Can. S.C.R. 180, 193; R. v. Smith (1855), Dears. C.C. 494; R. v. Wiley (1850), 2 Den. C.C. 37. And so may the person who aids in concealing or disposing of it. Section 402.

And a person may steal, hand over to another and afterwards receive from him, and so be both a principal and a receiver just as a person may be an accessory before the fact and afterwards receive the goods knowing them to have been stolen. R. v. Hughes (1860), Bell C.C. 242.

Exception when legal title acquired after theft.]-See sec. 403.

Indictment.]-It is legal to charge a stealing and a receiving in the same indictment. Code sec. 856. Where a prisoner is charged in two counts with stealing and receiving, the jury may return a verdict of guilty on the latter count, if warranted by the evidence, although the evidence is also consistent with the prisoner having been a principal in the second degree in the stealing. McIntosh v. The Queen (1894), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 254 (Can.); Reg. v. Hilton, Bell C.C. 20.

Every one charged with receiving any property knowing it to have been stolen, may be indicted, whether the person by whom such property was obtained has or has not been indicted or convicted, or is or is not amenable

to justice. Section 849. When any property has been stolen any number of receivers at different times of such property, or of any part or parts thereof, may be charged with substantive offences in the same indictment, and may be tried together, whether the person by whom the property was so obtained is or is not indicted with them, or is or is not in custody or amenable to justice. Section 849 (2).

Having in possession.]—Having in one's possession includes not only having in one's own personal possession, but also knowingly (i) having in the actual possession or custody of any other person, and (ii) having in any place (whether belonging to or occupied by one's self or not) for the use or benefit of one's self or of any other person. Code sec. 5.

If there are two or more persons, and any one or more of them, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, has or have anything in his or their custody or possession, it shall be deemed and taken to be in the custody and possession of each and all of them. Code sec. 5 (2).

Guilty knowledge.]-Knowledge of the party receiving stolen goods that they were stolen may be established by facts and circumstances, such as possession of property recently stolen, disposing of it for much less than its value, making contradictory statements as to how possession of the same was obtained, secreting it or dealing with it in a way it would not be dealt with by an honest person. Desaulniers v. Hird (1906), 15 Que. K.B. 394, 398; and by falsely denying possession. Archbold Cr. Pl.

519.

And see as to evidence of finding other stolen goods in receiver's possession as proof of guilty knowledge. Code secs. 993 and 994.

Recent possession as evidence.]-Recent possession of stolen property is evidence either that the person in possession stole the property or that he received it knowing it to be stolen, according to the circumstances of the case. So, where goods have been stolen from a dwelling house, if the defendant were apprehended a few yards from the outer door with the stolen goods in his possession, there would arise a violent presumption of his having stolen them; but if they were found in his lodgings some time after the larceny, and he refused to account for his possession of them, this, together with proof that they were actually stolen, would amount not to a violent, but to a probable presumption merely. Archbold's Crim. Pleading (1900), 312. But if the property were not found recently after the loss, as for instance not until sixteen months after, it would be but a light or rash presumption and entitled to no weight. Anon (1826), 2 C. & P. 459; R. v. Adams (1829), 3 C. & P. 600; R. v. Cooper (1852), 3 C. & K. 318.

See also notes under sec. 347 as to recent possession and giving a reasonable account of possession.

Receiver controverting guilt of principal.]-Where the principal and receiver are joined in the same indictment and tried together, the receiver may enter into the full defence of the principal, and avail himself of every matter of fact and every point of law tending to his acquittal. 2 Russell Cr., 4th ed., 571.

Where the principal has been previously convicted, though the record of the conviction will be sufficient presumptive evidence that everything in the former proceeding was rightly and properly transacted, yet it is competent to the receiver to controvert the guilt of the principal, "and to shew that the offence of which he was convicted did not amount to a felony in him, or not to that species of felony with which he was charged." 2 Russ. Cr. 4th ed., 571; McIntosh v. The Queen (1894), 23 Can. S.C.R. 180, 189; Smith's Case, 1 Leach 288; Rex v. Dunn (1831), 4 C. & P. 377. In the latter case Bosanquet, J., thought that the record of the principal's

Receiving stolen property.

Receiving property

conviction on his own confession was prima facie evidence against the accessory; but where two persons were indicted together, the one for stealing and the other for receiving, Wood, B., refused to allow the plea of guilty to establish the fact of the stealing by the principal as against the receiver. Anon, cited in Rex v. Turner, R. & M. C.C. 347, I. Lewin C.C.

119.

Thief's confession.]-The confession of the thief is not evidence against the receiver unless made in the presence of and concurred in by the latter. R. v. Cox (1858), 1 F. & F. 90; R. v. Turner (1832), 1 Mood. 347. But the evidence of the thief was admissible against the receiver even before the Canada Evidence Act; R. v. Haslam, 2 Leach C.C. 467, subject, however, to proper directions being given to the jury as to its weight if uncorroborated, it being the evidence of an accomplice. R. v. Robinson (1864), 4 F. & F. 43.

400. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to five years' imprisonment who receives or retains in his possession, any post letter or post letter bag, or any chattel, money or valuable security, parcel or other thing, the stealing whereof is hereby declared to be an indictable offence, knowing the same to have been stolen. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 315.

As to the offence of theft of post letters and mailable matter, see secs. 364-366, and as to indictments for offences respecting letters and property sent by post see secs. 850, 867 and 869.

401. Every one who receives or retains in his possession anything, knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, obtained by the stealing of which is punishable on summary conviction, punishable either for every offence, or for the first and second offence only, on summary is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction, for

offence

conviction.

When receiving is complete.

Receiving

after restoration to

owner.

every first, second or subsequent offence of receiving, to the same punishment as if he were guilty of a first, second or subsequent offence of stealing the same. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 316.

402. The act of receiving anything unlawfully obtained is complete as soon as the offender has, either exclusively or jointly with the thief or any other person, possession of or control over such thing, or aids in concealing or disposing of it. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 317.

A person having a joint possession with the thief may be convicted as a receiver, although a conviction for stealing would have been supported by the same evidence if the jury had so found. McIntosh v. R. (1894). 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 254 (Can.); R. v. Smith, Dearsley Rep. 494; R. v. Wiley, 2 Den. 37.

403. When the thing unlawfully obtained has been restored to the owner, or when a legal title to the thing so obtained has been acquired by any person, a subsequent receiving thereof

shall not be an offence although the receiver may know that the thing had been previously unlawfully obtained. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 318.

The leading English case on the subject-R. v. Villensky, [1892] 2 Q.B. 597-is in accordance with the law as here declared.

False Pretenses.

404. A false pretense is a representation, either by words Definition. or otherwise, of a matter of fact either present or past, which representation is known to the person making it to be false, and which is made with a fraudulent intent to induce the person to whom it is made to act upon such representation.

2. Exaggerated commendation or depreciation of the quality Exaggeraof any thing is not a false pretense, unless it is carried to such tion. an extent as to amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation of

fact.

3. It is a question of fact whether such commendation or Question of depreciation does or does not amount to a fraudulent misrepre- fact. sentation of fact. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 358.

By words or otherwise.]-The false pretence need not be made in words or writing, it may be made "otherwise" and it will suffice if it is signified by the conduct and acts of the accused. R. v. Létang (1899), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 505. As put by Bishop (on Crimes, vol. 2, par. 430): "The pretence need not be in words, but it may be sufficiently gathered from the acts and conduct of the party."

False pretence by conduct.]-A false pretence need not be in words or in writing but may be in the conduct and acts of the accused. R. v. Létang (1899), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 505. In that case a debtor had made a judicial abandonment for the benefit of his creditors whereby his property became vested in another, and, knowing that he was no longer entitled to receive the rent, he presented himself afterwards as the landlord to a tenant of the property and received the rent as he had formerly been accustomed to do. It was held that he was properly found guilty of a false pretence by his acts and conduct.

A person who is present when a false representation is made by another person acting in conjunction with him, and who knows it to be false, and gets part of a sum of money obtained by such false pretence, is guilty of obtaining such sum of money by false pretences. R. v. Cadden (1899), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 45 (N.W.T.).

It has been held that a false pretence may consist of being garbed in a university cap and gown for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining credit. R. v. Bernard (1837), 7 C. & P. 784. Or falsely pretending to be one of a class of traders at a market. R. v. Burrows (1869), 11 Cox C.C. 258.

Obtaining goods by giving a cheque on a bank, with which the defendant has no account in an offence. R. v. Flint, R. & R. 460; R. v. Jackson, 3 Camp. 370.

But giving of a post-dated cheque without any representation other than the document itself may contain, implies no more than a promise to