In Reg. v. McDonald, 8 Man. R. 493, a case that was decided on the provision of the criminal law that is now found in this section, it was held, following Reg. v. Southerton (1805), 6 East 126, that sending a letter threatening a prosecution for a breach of the Liquor License Act unless a sum of money was paid, was not an offence within this section, because the threat was not one that would be likely to overcome a man of an ordinarily firm and prudent mind. But in the recent case of Reg. v. Tomlinson, [1895] 1 Q.B. 706, 18 Cox C.C. 75, the court, took a less restricted view of the meaning to be given to the word "menaces" in this section than had been taken in previous cases. For this reason it was intimated in R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. at page 345, that when a case arises again under section 451, it may be desirable to reconsider the decision in Reg. v. McDonald. Under this section what is made criminal is the sending a letter demanding money with menaces; and in these cases it must always be a question of law, whether the menaces in the letters sent are such as are contemplated by the statute. R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. at page 345, per Bain, J. Under sec. 452, however, the offence is demanding money or property with menaces with intent to steal it. Without reasonable or probable cause.]—The words "without reasonable or probable cause" apply to the demand for the money and not to the accusation threatened to be made (following R. v. Hamilton (1843), 1 C. & K. 212, a prosecution under 7 and 8 Geo. IV., ch. 29, sec. 8, the wording of which section is identical with the words of Code sec. 403). R. v. Mason (1847), 24 U.C.C.P. 58. On a charge of delivering a letter demanding property with menaces and without reasonable or probable cause, the question as to whether the demand was made without reasonable or probable cause is one of fact, and the onus of proof is upon the prosecution to prove the want of reasonable or probable cause. R. v. Collins (1895), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 48 (N.B.). The words "without reasonable or probable cause" have reference to the state of the prisoner's mind when making the demand. R. v. Miard (1844), 1 Cox C.C. 22; R. v. Chalmers (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 450. If the money were actually due, the demand of same with menaces would not come within the section. R. v. Johnson, 14 U.C.Q.B. 569; but see sec. 501. A person who threatens to make an accusation with intent to extort money is equally guilty whether the accusation threatened was or was not true. R. v. Richards (1868), 11 Cox C.C. 43; R. v. Gardner, 1 C. & P. 479. Property.]-As to meaning of this term see sec. 2(32). Valuable security.]—See sec. 2(40). to steal. 452. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Demanding to two years' imprisonment who, with menaces, demands from with intent any person, either for himself or for any other person, anything capable of being stolen with intent to steal it. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 404. With intent to steal.]-Under sec. 451 what is made criminal is the sending a letter demanding money with menaces; and in such cases it must always be a question of law, whether the menaces in the letters sent are such as are contemplated by the statute. R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. at page 345, per Bain, J. Under sec. 452, however, the offence is demanding money or property with menaces with intent to steal it. An essential element of that offence is the intent to steal; and any menace Penalty. Intent to extort. Accusation of crime. or threat that comes within the sense of the word menace in its ordinary meaning, proved to have been made with the intent of stealing the thing demanded, would bring the case within the section. For that reason it cannot be determined as a question of law, and without reference to the circumstances of the particular case whether a demand for money with menaces is within sec. 452 or not. Ibid. Evidence.]-A demand of money from a hotel keeper under threat of prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor in prohibited hours contrary to a liquor license statute if the demand be not complied with, may constitute the offence of demanding money with menaces, "with intent to steal the same." R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 340 (Man.). And see note to sec. 454. Such a threat of prosecution made to a licensee, who to the knowledge of the prisoner had been previously convicted of an offence under the liquor license laws and who was therefore liable to concellation of his license, as well as to heavy penalties, is such a threat as is calculated to do him harm and as would be likely to affect any man in a sound and healthy state of mind, and any such threat is an illegal menace. Ibid. Demanding with menaces money actually due is not a demand with intent to steal. Where prisoner who owned a house deserted his wife, who in his absence rented the house to P., and on returning demanded the rent with menaces from P., who had in the meantime paid it over to the wife, it was held that if he had succeeded in inducing P. thus to pay him the rent he claimed he never could be held to have stolen that money from him, and that his demanding it with threats under such circumstances could not be held to have been a demand with intent to steal. R. v. Johnson (1857), 14 U.C.Q.B. 569. See, however, sec. 501, as to the offence of intimidation. For the purpose of proving the "intent to steal" it is sufficient if an inference of such intent is deducible from the acts and conduct of the prisoner as shewn by the evidence. The question of "intent to steal" is one entirely for the jury, and cannot be determined as a question of law by the judge. R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 340 (Man.). To demand and obtain possession of goods from a debtor for the purpose of holding them as security for a debt actually owing, is not a demand with menaces made with "intent to steal," although such possession is obtained by means of an unjustified threat of the debtor's arrest made by the creditor's agent without any honest belief that the debtor was liable to arrest. R. v. Lyon (1898), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 242 (Ont.). Theft.]-See definition in Code sec. 347. Capable of being stolen.]-See secs. 344-346. 453. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who, with intent to extort or gain anything from any person,— (a) accuses or threatens to accuse either that person or any other person, whether the person accused or threatened with accusation is guilty or not, of (i) any offence punishable by law with death or imprisonment for seven years or more, (ii) any assault with intent to commit a rape, or any attempt or endeavour to commit a rape, or any indecent assault, (iii) carnally knowing or attempting to know any child (iv) any infamous offence, that is to say, buggery, an (v) counselling or procuring any person to commit any (b) threatens that any person shall be so accused by any Threats. other person; or, document. document. (c) causes any person to receive a document containing such Threatening accusation or threat, knowing the contents thereof; or who by any of the means aforesaid compels or attempts to Compelling compel any person to execute, make, accept, endorse, alter or execution of destroy the whole or any part of any valuable security, or to write, impress or affix any name or seal upon or to any paper or parchment, in order that it may be afterwards made or converted into or used or dealt with as a valuable security. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 405. Accuses or threatens to accuse.]-The accusation need not be one made or to be made before a judicial tribunal; a threat to charge before any third person is sufficient. R. v. Robinson (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 14. It is immaterial whether the prosecutor be innocent or guilty of the offence imputed to him if the accused intended to extort money. R. v. Richards (1868), 11 Cox C.C. 43; R. v. Gardner (1824), 1 C. & P. 479. Although the prosecutor may be cross-examined as to his guilt of the offence imputed to him with a view to shake his credit, yet no evidence will be allowed to be given by another witness even in cross-examination to prove that the prosecutor was guilty of that offence. R. v. Cracknell (1866), 10 Cox C.C. 408. Where an information for rape or other offence under sec. 453 is laid with the sole intent to extort money or property from the person against whom the charge is made, the informant thereby "accuses" such person with intent to extort or gain something from him under sec. 453; and commits an indictable offence thereunder. R. v. Kempel (1900), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 481 (Ont.). A crime punishable by law with imprisonment for seven years or more means a crime the minimum punishment for which is seven years; and the section does not apply where no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed. R. v. Popplewell (1890), 20 Ont. R. 303. If a person has been indicted for an offence or is in custody therefor it is not an offence under this section to threaten to procure witnesses to prove the charge. Archbold Cr. Pl. (1900), 505. Valuable security.]-For the statutory definition of this term see sec. 2(40). Separate civil claim.]-Where the prisoner is being tried on a charge of having, with intent to extort money, accused or threatened to accuse a physician of having procured an abortion on the prisoner's wife, the evidence for the prosecution being to the effect that the demand for the money was on a claim of seduction as well as abortion, and the defence Penalty. Intent to extort. Accusation of crime. Threats. Threatening document. document. claiming that the demand was in respect of the seduction only, evidence is not admissible on behalf of the defence to prove that the charge of seduction was true. R. v. Wilson (1902), 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 131. 454. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for seven years who, (a) with intent to extort or gain anything from any person (c) causes any person to receive a document containing such accusation or threat, knowing the contents thereof; Compelling or who by any of the means aforesaid, compels or attempts to execution of compel any person to execute, make, accept, endorse, alter or destroy the whole or any part of any valuable security, or to write, impress or affix any name or seal upon or to any paper or parchment, in order that it may be afterwards made or converted into, or used or dealt with as a valuable security. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 406. Document containing accusation.]-Upon a charge of extortion in causing a person to be summoned for ill-treatment of a horse with intent to extort money, a letter written by the person summoned to a third person, on whom he had given an order for the money demanded to settle the charge, is not admissible in evidence against the accused charged with the extortion, unless the latter is shewn to have known its contents, although it was written concurrently with the order and was delivered therewith to such third party by the accused. A summons by a justice of the peace requiring the person summoned to answer a charge punishable on summary conviction under the Criminal Code is a "document containing an accusation" within the meaning of Code sec. 454. And it is an offence under Code sec. 454 for any person, with intent to extort or gain, to cause another person to be served with a justice's summons charging the latter with a criminal offence, notwithstanding that the information was laid by a third person without any such intent to extort. The King v. Cornell, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 416. The "offence" to accuse, or threaten to accuse, a person of which with intent to extort or gain anything from him is here made an indictable offence, need not be an offence under the Code or other Dominion law, but may be an offence under a provincial law, ex gr., an offence under a Liquor License Act. R. v. Dixon (1895), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 589 (N.S.), and see R. v. Gibbons (1898), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 340. Where. in a charge of sending a threatening letter to a person with intent to extort money, it is proved that the accused had stated that he had written a letter to such person, and that he had stated its purport in language to the like effect as the threatening letter, it is not error for the court to admit the threatening letter in evidence without further proof of the handwriting, and to submit to the jury for comparison with an A jury exhibit, already in evidence, admittedly written by the accused. (c) "Causes any person to receive,” etc.]—Clause (c) will probably be construed as if the words "with such intent as aforesaid" in clause (b) had been repeated at the beginning of clause (c). Burglary and Housebreaking. 455. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Breaking to fourteen years' imprisonment who breaks and enters any place of place of public worship and commits any indictable offence worship and therein, or who, having committed any indictable offence therein, offence. breaks out of such place. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 408. committing with intent 456. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Breaking to seven years' imprisonment who breaks and enters any place to commit of public worship, with intent to commit any indictable offence offence. therein. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 409. 457. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Penalty. to imprisonment for life who, dwelling by night. night. (a) breaks and enters a dwelling-house by night with intent Breaking to commit any indictable offence therein; or, (b) breaks out of any dwelling-house by night, either after Breaking committing an indictable offence therein, or after having out of dwelentered such dwelling-house, either by day or by night, ling by with intent to commit an indictable offence therein. 2. Every one convicted of an offence under this section who Committing when arrested, or when he committed such offence, had upon when armed. his person any offensive weapon, shall, in addition to the imprisonment above prescribed, be liable to be whipped. 63-64 V., c. 46, s. 3. "Breaks and enters."]-To "break" means to break any part, internal or external, of a building, or to open by any means whatever (including lifting, in the case of things kept in their places by their own weight), any door, window, shutter, cellar-flap or other thing intended to cover openings to a building, or to give passage from one part of it to another. Code sec. 335 (c). An entrance into a building is made as soon as any part of the body of the person making the entrance, or any part of any instrument used by him, is within the building. And every one who obtains entrance into any building by any threat or artifice used for that purpose, or by collusion the offence |