Slike strani
PDF
ePub

Uttering counterfeit copper coin.

Uttering

medal or piece of metal or mixed metals so uttered being of less value than the current coin as or for which the same is so uttered; or,

(c) utters any counterfeit coin resembling or apparently intended to resemble or pass for any current copper coin, knowing the same to be counterfeit. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 475.

566. Every one who utters any coin defaced by having defaced coin. stamped thereon any names or words is guilty of an offence, and liable, on summary conviction before two justices, to a penalty not exceeding ten dollars. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 476.

• Uttering uncurrent

No proceeding or prosecution for the offence of uttering any coin defaced by having stamped thereon any names or words, shall be taken without the consent of the Attorney General. Code sec. 598.

567. Every one who utters, or offers in payment, any copcopper coin. per coin, other than current copper coin, is guilty of an offence and liable, on summary conviction, to a penalty of double the nominal value thereof, and in default of payment of such penalty to eight days' imprisonment. R.S., c. 167, s. 33; 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 477.

Second offence.

Penalty.

Penalty.

l'enalty.

Sharing fine with informer.]—See Code sec. 1041.

568. Every one who, after a previous conviction for any offence relating to the coin under this or any other Act, is convicted of any offence specified in this Part is liable,

(a) to imprisonment for life, if fourteen years is the longest term of imprisonment to which he would have been liable had he not been so previously convicted;

(b) to fourteen years' imprisonment, if seven years is the longest term of imprisonment to which he would have been liable had he not been so previously convicted;

(c) to seven years' imprisonment, if he would not have been liable to seven years' imprisonment had he not been so previously convicted. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 478.

Previous conviction.]-It is not necessary that any judgment should have been pronounced against the prisoner on the first conviction. R. v. Blaby, [1894] 2 Q.B. 170.

Sections 851 and 963 as to the procedure where a previous conviction is charged seem to imply that the second offence must have been committed subsequently to the first conviction.

As to certificates of previous convictions, see Code sec. 982.

A conviction for an offence charged as a second offence, which second offence was committed prior to the date of the conviction for the first

offence was bad at common law. Ex parte Miller, 2 Pugs. 485; Ex parte McCoy, 7 Can. Cr. Cas. 487.

Advertising Counterfeit Money.

569. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Penalty. to five years' imprisonment who,

counterfeit

money.

(a) prints, writes, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, Advertising circulates or distributes any letter, writing, circular, paper, pamphlet, handbill or any written or printed matter, advertising, or offering or purporting to advertise or offer for sale, loan, exchange, gift or distribution, or to furnish, procure or distribute, any counterfeit token of value, or what purports to be a counterfeit token of value, or giving or purporting to give, either directly or indirectly, information where, how, of whom or by what means any counterfeit token of value, or what purports to be a counterfeit token of value, may be procured or had; or, (b) in executing, operating, promoting or carrying on any Using any scheme or device to defraud, by the use or by means of any papers, writings, letters, circulars or written or printed address. matters concerning the offering for sale, loan, gift, distribution or exchange of counterfeit tokens of value, uses any fictitious, false or assumed name or address, or any name or address other than his own right, proper and lawful name; or,

fictitious

name or

(c) in the execution, operating, promoting or carrying on, Taking from of any scheme or device offering for sale, loan, gift, or the mails distribution, or purporting to offer for sale, loan, gift or a fictitious any letter to distribution or giving or purporting to give information, address. directly or indirectly, where, how, of whom or by what means any counterfeit token of value may be obtained or had, knowingly receives or takes from the mails, or from the post office, any letter or package addressed to any fictitious, false or assumed name or address, or name other than his own right, proper or lawful name; or, (d) purchases, exchanges, accepts, takes possession of or in Purchasing any way uses, or offers to purchase, exchange, accept, take counterfeit possession of or in any way use, or negotiates or offers to negotiate with a view to purchasing or obtaining or using any such counterfeit token of value, or what purports so to be. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 480.

Evidence.]-In Jones' Case (1779), 1 Doug. 300, a prisoner was indicted for having in his custody a certain forged and counterfeited paper

money.

writing purporting to be a bank note, and a special verdict was returned therein that the paper-writing was forged, and that the prisoner well knowing it not to be a bank note averred it to be a good bank note, and disposed of it as such with intent to defraud.

It appeared that the document was made in the form and appearance of a bank note, but was not signed. Lord Mansfield, in directing the prisoner's discharge, said:

[ocr errors]

"The representations of the prisoner after the note was made could not alter the purport, which is what appears on the face of the instrument itself. Such representations might make the party guilty of a fraud or cheat."

Section 569 of the Code covers not only the case of counterfeit money, i.e., false tokens purporting to be bank notes, etc., but false tokens purporting to be counterfeit tokens.

The words "what purports to be" in sec. 569 (formerly 51 Vict. (Can.), ch. 40) import what appears on the fact of the instrument; and therefore what was said to the prisoner, or what he thought or believed, would not be of any moment. Per Rose, J., R. v. Attwood (1891), 20 Ont. R. 574, 578.

When a person exhibits to another bank notes representing them as counterfeit, when in fact they are not so, the offer to purchase such notes cannot be an offence under the Act, as the prisoner was offering to purchase that which the party had to sell, which were not counterfeit tokens of value. Per MacMahon, J., R. v. Attwood (1891), 20 Ont. R. 574, 581.

In the last named case, the defendant was prosecuted for offering to purchase bank notes which were shewn to him as counterfeit, but were in fact genuine bank notes unsigned.

Doubt was also expressed in the Attwood Case as to whether the section applies to counterfeit tokens not in esse, MacMahon, J., saying that it may be that the clause of the statute would require to be amended in order to reach a person offering to purchase such.

A paper which is a spurious imitation of a government treasury note is a counterfeit, or what purports to be a counterfeit, token of value, although there is no original of its description. R. v. Corey (1895), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 161 (N.B.).

As to evidence of admissions made by the accused, see note to sec. 685. Although the taking possession of or using a counterfeit token of value is an offence under sec. 569 (d), if such counterfeit be also a forged bank note the prosecution may be under Code sec. 550 for the offence of having a forged bank note in possession knowing it to be forged. R. v. Tutty (1905), 9 Can. Cr. Cas. 544, 38 N.S.R. 136.

Evidence of fraudulent scheme.]-On the trial of any person charged with any of the offences mentioned in section 569, any letter, circular, writing or paper offering or purporting to offer for sale. loan, gift or distribution, or giving or purporting to give information, directly or indirectly, where, how, of whom or by what means any counterfeit token of value may be obtained or had, or concerning any similar scheme or device to defraud the public, shall be prima facie evidence of the fraudulent character of such scheme or device. Code sec. 981.

PART X.

ATTEMPTS-CONSPIRACIES-ACCESSORIES.

commit

570. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Attempt to to seven years' imprisonment who attempts, in any case not certain hereinbefore provided for, to commit any indictable offence for indictable which the punishment is imprisonment for life, or for fourteen offences. years, or for any term longer than fourteen years. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 528.

other

571. Every one who attempts to commit any indictable Attempt to offence for committing which the longest term to which the commit offender can be sentenced is less than fourteen years, and no indictable express provision is made by law for the punishment of such offences. attempt, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term equal to one-half of the longest term to which a person committing the indictable offence attempted to be committed may be sentenced. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 529.

Attempts.]-An indictment, charging that the accused unlawfully attempted to steal from the person of an unknown person the property of such unknown person, without giving the name of the person against whom the offence was committed, or the description of the property the accused attempted to steal, is sufficient. And where a prisoner is indicted for an attempt to steal, and the proof establishes that the offence of larceny was actually committed, the jury may convict of the attempt. unless the court discharges the jury and directs that the prisoner be indicted for the complete offence (Code sec. 712). R. v. Taylor (1895), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 89 (Que.).

Where on an indictment for a principal offence and for an attempt to commit such an offence, the evidence is wholly directed to the proof of the principal offence. the jury's verdict of guilty of the attempt only. will not be set aside although there were no other witnesses in respect of the attempt than those whose testimony, if wholly believed, shewed the commission of the greater offence. R. v. Hamilton (1897), 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 251 (Ont.)

It is within the province of the jury, to believe, if it sees fit to do so. a part only of a witness's testimony and to disbelieve the remainder of the same witness's testimony, and it may therefore credit the testimony in respect of a greater offence only in so far as it shews a lesser offence. Ibid.

The mere intention to commit an offence is not criminal. Some act is required, and all acts towards committing an offence are not indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be

Attempt to commit statutory offences.

Conspiring

to commit indictable offence.

considered as attempts to commit, but acts immediately connected with
it are.
R. v. Eagleton (1855), 1 Dears. C.C. 515; 6 Cox C.C. 559.
Offences at common law.]—A defendant charged with offering money to
a person to swear that A., B. or C. gave him a certain sum of money to
vote for a candidate at an election, was admitted to bail and the recog-
nizance taken by one justice of the peace. It was held that the offence
was not an attempt to commit the crime of subornation of perjury, but
something less, being an incitement to give false evidence or particular
evidence regardless of its truth or falsehood, and was a misdemeanour at
common law, and that the recognizance was properly taken by one justice,
who had power to admit the accused to bail at common law, and that
sec. 696 of the Code did not apply. R. v. Cole (1902), 5 Can Cr. Cas.
330, 3 O.L.R. 389.

The common law jurisdiction as to crime is still operative, notwithstanding the Code, and even in cases provided for by the Code, unless there is such repugnancy as to give prevalence to the later law. Ibid.

572. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to one year's imprisonment who attempts to commit any offence under any statute for the time being in force and not inconsistent with this Act, or incites or attempts to incite any person to commit any such offence, and for the punishment of which no express provision is made by such statute. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 530.

573. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seven years' imprisonment who, in any case not herein before provided for, conspires with any person to commit any indictable offence. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 527.

What is conspiracy.]—An agreement between two or more persons for any of the purposes following will constitute criminal conspiracy:

[ocr errors]

1. Falsely to charge another with a crime punishable by law, either from a malicious or vindictive motive or feeling toward the party, or for the purpose of extorting money from him.

2. Wrongfully to injure or prejudice a third person or any body of men, in any other manner.

3. To commit any offence punishable by law.

4. To do any act with intent to pervert the course of justice, Archbold's Crim. Plead. (1893), 21st ed., 1100.

The existence of a bad motive in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due. A wrongful act done knowingly and with a view to its injurious consequences may in the sense of law be malicious; but such malice derives its essential character from the circumstance that the act done constitutes a violation of the law. Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1 per Lord Watson at p. 92. In order to constitute legal malice the act done must, apart from bad motive, amount to a violation of law. Ibid.

The common law jurisdiction as to crime is still operative notwithstanding the Criminal Code, but subject to the latter prevailing where there is a repugnancy between the common law and the Code. R. v. Cole

« PrejšnjaNaprej »