"Wherever a man calls public attention to his own grievances or those of his class, whether by letters in a newspaper, by speeches at public meetings or by the publication of pamphlets, he must expect to have his assertions challenged, the existence of his grievances denied, and himself ridiculed and assailed." Odgers on Libel, 3rd ed., 57; Odger v. Mortimer, 28 Eng. L.T. 472; Koenig v. Ritchie, 3 F. & F. 413; R. v. Veley (1867), 4 F. & F. 1117; O'Donoghue v. Hussey, Ir. R. 5 C.L. 124; Dwyer v. Esmonde, 2 L.R. Ir. 243.

But where the defendant, in answering a letter which the plaintiff had sent to the paper, does not confine himself to rebutting the plaintiff's assertions, but retorts upon the plaintiff by inquiring into his antecedents, and indulging in other uncalled-for personalities, the defendant will be held liable, for such imputations are neither a proper answer to nor a fair comment on the plaintiff's speech or letter. Murphy v. Halpin, Ir. R. 8 C.L. 127.

Comments, however severe, on the advertisements or handbills of a tradesman will not be libellous, if the jury find that they are fair and temperate comment not wholly undeserved, on a matter to which public attention was expressly invited by the plaintiff. Paris v. Levy, 9 C.B.N.S. 342; Morrison v. Harmer, 3 Bing. N.C. 759, 4 Scott 524.

What are matters of public interest.]—Matters of public interest may be classified as follows:

1. Affairs of state.

Every subject has a right to comment on those acts of public men which concern him as a subject of the realm, if he do not make his commentary a cloak for malice and slander. Parmiter v. Coupland (1840), 6 M. & W. 108; Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. & F. 376; Kelly v. Sherlock, L.R. 1 Q.B. 689.

2. The administration of justice.

3. Public institutions and local authorities.

4. Ecclesiastic matters.

5. Books, pictures and architecture.

6. Theatres, concerts and other public entertainments.

7. Other appeals to the public.

A man who has commenced a newspaper warfare cannot complain if he gets the worst of it; but if such answer goes further, and touches on fresh matter in no way connected with the plaintiff's original letter, or unnecessarily assails the plaintiff's private character, then it ceases to be an answer; it becomes a counter-charge, and, if defamatory, will be deemed a libel. And, generally, when a man puts himself prominently forward in any way, and acquires for a time a quasi-public position, he cannot escape the necessary consequence the free expression of public opinion. Odgers on Libel (1896), 3rd ed., p. 56.

It is a question for the judge, and not for the jury, whether a particular topic was or was not a matter of public interest. Weldon v. Johnson (1884), per Coleridge, C.J., cited in Odgers on Libel, 3rd ed., page 46.

It has been held that the sanitary condition of a large number of cottages let by the proprietors of a colliery to their workmen is a matter of public interest. South Hetton Coal Co. v. N.E. News Association, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (C.A.).

Where on the trial of a criminal information for libel the judge in substance told the jury that the defendant, under the pleas of justification, was bound to shew the truth of the whole of the libel to which the plea is pleaded, and that in his opinion, the evidence fell far short of the whole matter charged; such a direction is not so much a direction on the law as

Plea of

necessary to try truth.

a strong observation on the evidence, which may be made in a proper ease without being open to the charge of misdirection. R. v. Port Perry. etc., Co., 38 U.C.Q.B. 431; R. v. Wilkinson (1878), 42 U.C.Q.B. 492, 505 (per Harrison, C.J., Wilson, J., diss.).

Form of plea of justification.]—The following form of a plea of justification added to a plea of not guilty is adapted from form 81 of the English Crown Office Rules, 1886:

"And now, that is to say on the day of 190 before our said Lord the King in the (court) at comes the said A. B. (the defendant) by his solicitor [or in his own proper person], and having heard the said indictment read he says that he is not guilty thereof, and hereupon he puts himself upon the country."

"And for a further plea the said A. B. pursuant to the statute in that behalf [or to the Criminal Code sec. 331] savs that our said Lord the King ought not further to prosecute the said indictment against him because he says that it is true that [here allege the truth of every part of the publication charged as a libel set out in the indictment]."

"And the said A. B. further says that before and at the time of the publication in the said indictment mentioned [here state facts which rendered the publication of benefit to the public], by reason whereof it was for the public benefit that the said matters so charged in the said indictment should be published, and this he the said A. B. is ready to verify."

"Wherefore he prays judgment, and that by the court here he may be dismissed and discharged from the said premises in the said indictment above specified."

911. The truth of the matters charged in an alleged libel justification shall in no case be inquired into without the plea of justification aforesaid unless the accused is put upon his trial upon any indictment or information charging him with publishing the libel knowing the same to be false, in which case evidence of the truth may be given in order to negative the allegation that the accused knew the libel to be false.

Not guilty 2. The accused may, in addition to such plea, plead not guilty in addition. and such pleas shall be inquired of together.

Effect of plea on

3. If, when such plea of justification is pleaded, the accused is convicted, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider punishment. whether his guilt is aggravated or mitigated by the plea. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 634.

Publication by order of a legislative body.

912. Every person against whom any criminal proceedings are commenced or prosecuted in any manner for or on account of or in respect of the publication of any report, paper, votes or proceedings, by such person or by his servant, by order or under the authority of any legislative council, legislative assembly or house of assembly, may submit to the court in which such proceedings are so commenced or prosecuted, or before any judge of the same, upon twenty-four hours' notice of his intention

or clerk.

so to do, to the prosecutor in such proceedings, or to his attorney or solicitor, a certificate under the hand of the speaker or Certificate clerk of such legislative council, legislative assembly or house of speaker of assembly, as the case may be, verified by affidavit, stating that the report, paper, votes or proceedings, as the case may be, in respect whereof such criminal proceedings are commenced or prosecuted, was or were published by such person, or by his servant, by order or under the authority of the legislative council, legislative assembly or house of assembly, as the case may be.

dismissal.

2. Such court or judge shall, upon such certificate being so Stay of prosubmitted, immediately stay such criminal proceedings, and ceedings and the same shall thereupon be deemed finally ended, determined and superseded. R.S., c. 163, s. 6.

913. In any criminal prosecution for or on account or in Copy of rerespect of the publication of any copy of such report, paper, laid before port may be votes or proceedings, the defendant may submit to the court or the court. judge before which or whom such prosecution is pending a copy of such report, paper, votes or proceedings, verified by affidavit, and the court or judge shall immediately stay such Stay of procriminal prosecution, and the same shall thereupon be deemed ceedings and to be finally ended, determined and superseded. R.S., c. 163, s. 7.

dismissal.

conviction or

914. In making up the record of any conviction or acquittal Form of on any indictment it shall be sufficient to copy the indictment record of with the plea pleaded thereto, without any formal caption or acquittal. heading.

record.

2. The statement of the arraignment and the proceedings Entry of subsequent thereto shall be entered of record in the same manner as heretofore, subject to any such alterations in the forms of such entry as are, from time to time, prescribed by any rule or rules of the superior courts of criminal jurisdiction respectively.

3. Such rules shall also apply to such inferior courts of Inferior criminal jurisdiction as are therein designated. 55-56 V., c. 29, courts. s. 726.

Record of proceedings on indictment.]—Section 914 of the Code makes provision for "making up the record of any conviction or acquittal,” etc., and the entry of record of "the arraignment and the proceedings subsequent thereto," but none of these provisions relates to a case where there was no indictment, no arraignment and no trial, and consequently the expression "making up of the record" in the ordinary sense of the word does not apply to a case where the grand jury found "no bill." Tanghe v. Morgan (1905), 11 B.C.R. 455, 462. In such a case the original bill of indictment so indorsed proves itself. Ibid.; and see Hewitt v. Cane (1894), 26 O.R. 133,

147.

Form of record in case of amendment.

Corporations

Inspection of records of criminal courts.]-Under the ancient law of England, declared by an Act of Parliament, 46 Edw. III., search and exemplification must be made for all persons "of whatever record touches them in any manner, as well that which falls against the king as other persons."

In The King v. Scully (1901), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 1, and (on appeal) Attorney-General v. Scully (1902), 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 167, the question presented was whether a subject who has been prosecuted for a criminal offence which prior to the Criminal Code was classed as felony, and acquitted, is obliged to procure the fiat of the Attorney-General as a condition to obtaining an exemplification or copy of the record to be used in an action for malicious prosecution as evidence of the favourable termination of the criminal proceedings.

Both the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal for Ontario held in favour of the subject, that he is entitled as of right to an exemplification or copy, upon payment or tender to the proper officer having custody of the record or the materials from which it may be made up in the form prescribed by sec. 914 of the Criminal Code, of the fee or charges to which he is entitled, and that the ancient statute 46 Edw. III. is in force in Ontario.

The decision in Attorney-General v. Scully (1902), 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 167, in effect overruled the decisions in Regina v. Ivey (1874), 24 U.C.C.P. 78; O'Hara v. Dougherty, 25 Ont. R. 347, and Hewitt v. Cane (1894), 26 Ont. R. 133.

The present sec. 11 of the statute R.S.O. vol. 3, ch. 334 (cited as of 1897, but in fact issued in 1902) came into force on June 2nd, 1902, by proclamation of 29 May, 1902, after the argument of the appeal in Attorney-General v. Scully, and seems to have been intended merely as a reenactment in Ontario of the ancient English statute, 46 Edw. III., above referred to.

A person charged with receiving stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen is a "person affected" by the record of the prosecution and conviction of the parties from whom he is charged to have received the property for the theft thereof, and is entitled to inspection of such record in Ontario under R.S.O. 1897, ch. 324, sec. 11. Where one of the persons so convicted of theft had also been convicted of the theft of other similar property as to which no charge for receiving had been laid against the applicant, and no connection was shewn between that charge and the one for receiving, the applicant is not a "person affected" by the record of the prosecution for the theft of such other property, and is not entitled under said statute to inspection of such record. Re Chantler, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 245.

915. If it becomes necessary to draw up a formal record, in any case in which an amendment has been made, such record shall be drawn up in the form in which the indictment remained after the amendment, without taking any notice of the fact of such amendment having been made. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 725.

Proceedings in Case of Corporations.

916. Every corporation against which a bill of indictment may appear is found at any court having criminal jurisdiction shall appear by attorney. by attorney in the court in which such indictment is found and plead or demur thereto. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 635.

Indictment of corporation.]—An obiter dictum of Sedgewick, J., in Union Colliery v. R. (1900), 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 400, 31 Can. S.C.R. 81, is as follows: "I am strongly inclined to the view that where the Code specifies an offence and provides for the punishment by imprisonment only, it does not necessarily follow that a corporation may not be indicted and fined for the offence so described."

In a Manitoba case it was held that a corporation is not subject to indictment upon a charge of any crime the essence of which is either personal criminal intent or such a degree of negligence as amounts to a wilful incur ring of the risk of causing injury to others, and that secs. 247 and 252, as to want of care in the maintenance of dangerous things, do not extend the criminal responsibility of corporations beyond what it was at common law. There being no power under sec. 920 or otherwise to impose a fine or any other punishment, in lieu of imprisonment, for the offence of manslaughter, it was held that there is consequently no judgment or sentence applicable to a conviction of a corporation for that offence. R. v. Great West Laundry Co. (1900), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 514 (Man.).

But it has been held in Ontario that a corporation may be indicted under sec. 489 for selling goods to which a false trade description has been applied; and that the proceedings upon such a charge should be instituted by indictment under secs. 916-920, and not by a preliminary inquiry before a magistrate. R. v. T. Eaton Co. (1898), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 252.

A municipal corporation may be indicted for a nuisance in respect of their non-repair of a highway. Sec. 223; but the consent or order of the judge or the consent of the Attorney-General must first be obtained to the preferring of the indictment. Sec. 873; R. v. City of London (1900), 37 C.L.J. 74.

A justice of the peace cannot compel a corporation to appear before him in respect of an indictable offence, nor can he bind the corporation over to appear and answer to an indictment; and he has no jurisdiction to bind over the prosecutor to present an indictment against the corporation. Re Chapman v. City of London (1890), 19 Ont. R. 33.

As there is no jurisdiction to bind over the prosecutor to prefer a bill of indictment before the grand jury against a corporation, it is necessary that such an indictment should be preferred-(1) by the Attorney-General, or (2) by some one preferring the indictment by the direction of the Attorney-General, (3) or with the written consent of the Attorney-General, (4) or with the written consent of a judge of any court of criminal jurisdiction, or (5) by a person authorized to do so by the court of criminal jurisdiction before which the indictment is sought to be preferred. Sec. 873. It is not necessary that the counsel or order should be stated in the indictment. Section 873. In default of the corporation appearing by attorney the trial may proceed in the absence of the defendant. Section 920. By sec. 871 an objection to an indictment for want of the consent or order required by law in order to prefer an indictment, must be taken by motion to quash the indictment before the accused person is given in charge. By the Interpretation Act, sec. 34, the word "person" includes, unless the context requires otherwise, a body corporate, societies, companies, etc., in relation to such act and things as they are capable of doing and owning respectively. It may be considered as doubtful whether or not a corporation can be properly said to be "given in charge" of the jury, and consequently whether the time limited by sec. 871 applies to indictments of corporations.

Mere acquiescence by a director in prohibited acts of a corporation is not such a participation therein as will constitute him an aider or abettor or make him criminally liable as a party under Code sec. 69 for the illegal acts of the corporation. R. v. Hendrie, 19 Can. Cr. Cas. 298, 11 O.L.R. 202.