It is contended by appellant that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the special plea. We are of the opinion that there was no error in this regard. Section 15 of article 2 of the constitution provides that "the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power." Section 1 of the act to secure the peace and good order of society, to quell riots, etc., in force July 1, 1887, (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 613,) provides: "That the sheriff of any county in this State, if in his judgment the preservation of the peace and good order of society shall require it, may summon and enroll any number of special deputies which in his judgment the exigencies of the case require, and such deputies shall be subject to his orders, and shall have all the powers of deputy sheriffs until discharged, or excused from duty by the sheriff." Section 2 provides that the county shall pay for the subsistence of such special deputies while on duty, and all necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duty for which they shall have been summoned. Section 4 is as follows: "The deputy sheriffs appointed under this act shall be paid at the rate of two ($2) dollars per day for the time actually employed, in and about the duties of such appointment, and the county board shall make provision for such payment." Section 5 provides that whenever the sheriff, with the help of his force of special deputies, is unable to preserve the peace, it shall be his duty to notify the Governor of the facts, and to call upon him for such military force as may be deemed necessary to preserve the peace and execute the law. Section 6 provides, that "whenever the military forces shall be ordered out by the Governor on any application of a civil officer as aforesaid, or otherwise, they shall report to such civil officer as the Governor shall designate and shall act in strict subordination to such civil authority, in preserving the peace, quelling riots, or executing the law." Section 7 authorizes the Governor, in certain cases of riot, tumult, etc., to order such military force as he may deem necessary to aid the civil authorities in suppressing violence and executing the law. It sufficiently appears from these provisions that civil authority was not suspended, nor was the power of the sheriff to appoint special deputies to aid him to preserve the peace and protect persons and property, but, on the contrary, the military authority of the State was called on to aid the civil authorities, including the sheriff and his deputies, to suppress riot and to preserve peace and good order. The averment in the plea that the powers, duties and functions of the sheriff as an executive or a peace officer, or to appoint special deputies, and the power of the plaintiff to act as such special deputy, were suspended and no longer in force, is merely the legal conclusion of the pleader, not sustained by the facts pleaded and the laws in force, and is not, therefore, admitted by the demurrer. Facts well pleaded are admitted, but not the legal conclusions drawn from them by the pleader. It is also insisted that the court erred in its instructions to the jury, by virtue of which, and the evidence adduced, the plaintiff was permitted to recover for his subsistence at the rate of fifty cents per day during the time he was on duty as special deputy. The point made is, that only the expenses of subsistence of the sheriff's force of deputies while on duty, and which he was required to provide for, could be charged against the county, and not the value of meals of a deputy provided for himself or eaten at his own table. The point made by counsel is not without force, but we are of the opinion, from the wording of the statute, the county was properly chargeable with the reasonable price and value of the subsistence of each deputy while on duty as such, whether such subsistence was provided for himself at his own home, or elsewhere. The statute declares, in plain terms, that the county shall pay for the subsistence of such special deputies while on duty. We would not be authorized to qualify the words of the statute by an exception or limitation not expressed or fairly implied from the language used. Appellee has assigned cross-errors, and contends that the act making eight hours a legal day's work (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 840,) applies, and that he should have been permitted to recover, under the second count, for one hundred and fifty days of eight hours each; that is, that the plaintiff should have been permitted to divide the days into periods of eight hours when he was engaged in his duties as deputy, and thus permitted to recover, under the statute, for as many days as there were periods of eight hours' actual service. This point was also correctly decided below. We agree with the Appellate Court in its holding that the statute has no application to cases of this kind, (Phillips v. Christian County, 87 Ill. App. 481,) but that it is confined to mechanical trades, arts and employments, and other cases of labor and services of like character, and does not embrace services of an official character. Moreover, if the eight hour statute applied, appellee performed the services required of him each day without any agreement (even if there could be such agreement in such a case) that he should be paid for extra time. In the absence of such an agreement or contract no recovery could be had for extra time employed over eight hours during the same day. (10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.-463; Lusk v. Hotchkiss, 37 Conn. 219.) We are of the opinion that the per diem required by the statute to be paid for the time actually employed was only for one day in each twenty-four hours. It follows that the errors complained of were not well assigned. The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Mr. JUSTICE RICKS, having been of counsel in this case below, took no part in its decision here. THE ELGIN, JOLIET AND EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY 191 489 V. JAMES DUFFY. Opinion filed October 24, 1901. 1. RAILROADS―right of teamster to attempt to save property. A teamster having a break-down on a railroad crossing has a right to try to get his team and wagon off the track if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that he can do so with safety. 2. SAME what evidence tends to show wantonness in the management of train. Evidence that a train was going at a high rate of speed around a sharp cure, where the view was obstructed, approaching a much traveled street, giving no warning by bell or whistle, tends to establish wantonness in the management of the train. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co. v. Duffy, 93 Ill. App. 463, affirmed. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. HENRY B. WILLIS, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court for the Second District, affirming a judgment for $5000 rendered in an action on the case brought by James Duffy against the appellant, in the circuit court of Kane county, to recover damages for the loss of his arm. The accident was occasioned by a collision of the appellant's train with the wagon of appellee at a street crossing in the city of Aurora. The declaration contained nine counts, which, in substance, charged the appellant with negligence in not planking the entire width of the street at the crossing; in running its train at a higher rate of speed than the limit fixed by the ordinance of the city; in permitting a freight car to remain upon the crossing at or near the middle of the street, causing plaintiff to drive off of the beaten track at the crossing; in not ringing the bell or sounding the whistle at the crossing, as required by statute; in running the train at a high rate of speed at a dan 202 2630 191 489 112a 540 gerous crossing; in failing to use sufficient care in coming upon the crossing, which was obscured by buildings, embankments and trees, and the approach to which was sharply curved. It is also charged that the servants of the company willfully and maliciously inflicted the injury in question. Railroad street, where the accident occurred, at the crossing in question runs nearly north-east and southwest, and appellant's main line crosses it almost at right angles. The main line of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroad runs parallel with Railroad street and about two hundred feet west of it. Connecting the main lines of the two roads is a "Y" track, which crosses Railroad street on quite a sharp curve. North of the "Y" track is what is known as the "Esser switch," which branches off from the "Y" track a short distance west of Railroad street and extends south, paralleling the "Y" and also crossing Railroad street. Where the "Y" and the Esser switch cross Railroad street they are six or eight feet apart, and are provided with plank crossings in the middle of the street, about sixteen feet wide. Appellee was engaged in hauling railroad ties from a car on the Esser switch. The ties were unloaded on the north side of the switch, and there were several cars on that track, one of them extending from two to four feet on the plank crossing. On account of an embankment north of the track it was necessary for appellee to drive close to the north side of the cars as he went to Railroad street. At the time of the accident appellee had loaded his wagon and had driven around the end of the car in the street. In going round the end of the car the turn was short and he drove off of the planking on the opposite side of the street. There is a sharp decline from the Esser track to the "Y" track, and when the wagon wheel struck the second rail of the latter track a portion of the load slipped off on the track and between the wheels in such a manner that he could not drive on. A man named Hord was with |