shall be entitled to discovery as in other actions, and all persons shall be obliged and compelled to answer, upon oath, such bills as shall be preferred against them for discovering the sum of money or other thing so won as aforesaid. Upon the discovery and re-payment of the money or other thing so to be discovered and re-paid, the person who shall discover and re-pay the same, as aforesaid, shall be acquitted, indemnified and discharged from any other or further punishment, forfeiture or penalty which he might have incurred, by the playing for, or wining such money, or other thing, so discovered or re-paid as aforesaid."

In Lamson v. Boyden, 160 Ill. 613, we said that said section would be an unconstitutional enactment if so construed as to compel a party to answer questions which might subject him to a criminal prosecution, but it is insisted that the validity of the statute cannot be questioned in this suit because the appeal was taken from the decree of the circuit court to the Appellate Court, which had no jurisdiction of that question. The question whether the statute has any validity or could be effective in any case was waived by the appeal to the Appellate Court. But we do not understand it to be claimed that the statute is void, but that it should not be construed to sustain this bill. It is conceded to be valid in certain classes of cases, and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to construe the statute and decide whether it is applicable to this case. (State Board of Health v. People, 181 Ill. 512.) To hold that section 137 was designed to apply to a discovery such as is asked for in this case, would be to impute to the legislature an intention to pass a statute in violation of the plain prohibitions of the State and Federal constitutions, and we should not do so if any other reasonable construction can be adopted. If any reasonable construction can be placed upon the statute by which it will not be in conflict with the fundamental law, and therefore void, it is our duty to so

construe it. (Town of Middleport v. Etna Life Ins. Co. 82 Ill. 562; People v. Peacock, 98 id. 172.) The presumed intention of the legislature is to obey the constitution, and if that presumed intention can be found by any reasonable construction of the statute, it will be done.

The first words of the section are broad enough to include the suits brought by complainant, since they are actions under the provisions of the sections mentioned. But the provision is that the party shall be entitled to discovery as in other actions. There is no other action in which a discovery can be compelled which would subject the defendant to a penalty or forfeiture. Courts of equity have never lent their aid to the collection of penalties or enforcement of forfeitures. If the discovery is to be such as a party is entitled to in other actions, it would not include a discovery by which the defendant is called upon to convict himself in a criminal prosecution for a penalty. The section provides that the defendant shall be compelled to answer discovering the sum of money or other thing won, and it is not contended that this provision would not be a valid one where a party sues for losses which he is entitled to recover where the offense is barred by the Statute of Limitations and the conditions are such that the constitution would not be violated by compelling the answer. If it should be construed to require the discovery called for in this case, it would not be such a discovery as is allowed in other actions, but one that has never been allowed in any other action and in direct violation of the constitution. The legislature, having provided for the discovery, attempted to provide for indemnity to the defendant against prosecution. Whether they succeeded according to their intention is not material in discovering what the intention was. The latter part of the section relates to that subject, and in construing it, it is not to be assumed that the legislature would attempt to furnish protection to the defendant in one class of suits authorized by the

section and not in other suits which were intended to be embraced within it. The provision apparently is intended to include every case where a discovery could be required under the section, and it provides, upon the discovery and re-payment of the money or other thing to be discovered and re-paid, the person who shall discover and re-pay the same shall be acquitted, indemnified and discharged from any other punishment, forfeiture or penalty. The suits brought by complainant are not for the discovery and re-payment of money alleged to have been won by the defendant, for that right of action, if it existed, was in Dutch and Geddes. If complainant should recover in his suits it could not be said that the penalties were re-paid to him and the county of Cook. Neither of them paid or lost anything, and the money could only be re-paid to the party who paid it. Complainant's suits are popular actions by an informer for penalties in a special action on the case, and not for the recovery and re-payment of anything which he has lost or which he ever had. The provision for indemnity manifests the intention of the legislature as to what classes of cases are intended to be embraced in the section. It cannot be supposed that they intended to protect the defendant against prosecutions under his disclosure if the loser sued merely for the amount that he had lost, and to furnish no protection if an informer sued for three times the amount. We do not find it necessary to construe the statute so as to bring it in conflict with the constitution, but conclude that the legislative intention was that the discovery should only be such as may be had in other actions for the discovery and re-payment to the loser of money or property or other thing to be discovered and re-paid to the one who lost it.

The judgment of the Appellate Court and the decree of the circuit court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court, with directions to sustain the demurrer.

Reversed and remanded.

THEODORE S. CHAPMAN, Exr.

V.

ALEXANDER M. CHENEY.

Opinion filed October 24, 1901.

1. WILLS-rule where will is susceptible of two constructions. When a will is susceptible of either of two constructions without doing violence to the intention of the testator as disclosed by the instrument, one of which would render the will void and the other valid, the latter construction should be adopted.

2. SAME-when limitation over is void for remoteness. A limitation over to the testator's great-grandchildren upon the contingency of the death of their parent before the age of thirty is void for remoteness, but the devise to the grandchildren is not necessarily thereby rendered void.

3. SAME-devise construed as passing a base or determinable fee. A devise of the fee simple title to the testator's real estate to his grandchildren, subject to their father's life estate therein, but providing that they shall acquire no interest or estate of inheritance before reaching the age of thirty years, passes a base or determinable fee, which vests in such grandchildren at birth, and which may ripen into a title in fee simple absolute upon their attaining the age of thirty years.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. ROBERT B. SHIRLEY, Judge, presiding.

Prentiss D. Cheney, a resident of Jerseyville, in Jersey county, died testate in that city on July 3, 1900, leaving Annette H. Cheney his widow, and Alexander M. Cheney, the appellee, his only son and only heir-at-law. His will, which bore date January 11, 1896, was admitted to probate in said county in August, 1900. The substance of the will is stated in the opinion of the court.

Upon the probate of the will, letters testamentary were granted to appellant, who thereupon qualified and accepted the trust and entered upon the discharge of his duties as executor and trustee under the will. Afterward, on the 17th day of August, 1900, the appellee, Alexander M. Cheney, mentioned in said will and the sole heir of the testator, filed his bill of complaint in the circuit

court of Jersey county, alleging that certain of the principal provisions of the will (naming them) violate the rule against perpetuities, and are therefore void and should be set aside as of no effect. The bill also asked that a certain deed made by the appellee to the testator in his lifetime be set aside and that the appellant be required to account, and also prayed for general relief. Afterward the bill was amended by eliminating so much of it as called for an accounting and for the setting aside of said deed. The bill, as amended, sought a construction of the will that said provisions alleged to be void for remoteness be declared void and the property thereby attempted to be devised and bequeathed be declared to be intestate estate and to be vested in the complainant, as the only heir of the testator, and for general relief. The widow was made a party, and answered, but there was no controversy as to her interest and none between her and the appellant or appellee. The appellant answered the amended bill, admitting the facts alleged but denying that the will, or any of its provisions, violates the rule against perpetuities, or was or were void. Replication was filed, but the cause was, in effect, heard on the amended bill of appellee and the answer of appellant.

The circuit court, on the hearing, sustained the charges of the bill, and entered a decree whereby it was adjudged that by the seventh paragraph of the will the property devised might be taken out of commerce for a longer period than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter, and is therefore void for remoteness; and that the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth and fifteenth paragraphs of said will are dependent for their force and validity upon said seventh paragraph, as being a part of a general scheme of the testator for the disposition of his property, and that he did not intend that they should operate unless said seventh paragraph should be valid, and that they are therefore also void; and it was adjudged that the testator died