date by the board; also, that if the act of 1899 only relates to certificates issued under that act, then that section 10 of the act of 1877 must be held to be still in force, and to give the board the power to revoke certificates issued prior to July 1, 1899.

“An examination of the act of 1887 shows that it is a complete revision of the whole subject matter of the former act of 1877, is a complete and perfect system in itself, and, as we have seen, was an act to regulate the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois, and gave power to the board of health to revoke certificates of persons licensed under the act, for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. This being so, the act of 1887 operated as a repeal of the act of 1877, without any reference to the express repealing clause contained in the former act. (Culver v. Third Nat. Bank, 64 Ill. 528, and cases there cited; Devine v. Board of Comrs. 84 Ill. 590; People v. Town of Thornton, 186 id. 162; Sutherland on Statutory Const. sec. 156; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 438.) In the Devine case the court say: 'A subsequent statute revising the whole subject of a former one, and intended as a substitute for it, although it contains no express words to that effect, operates as a repeal of the former.' In the very recent case of People v. Town of Thornton, supra, the Supreme Court say: 'Where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subject matter and make a revision of the whole subject, there is, in effect, a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and that whatever is excluded is discarded. The revision of the whole subject matter by the new statute evinces an intention to substitute the provisions of the new law for the old law upon the subject.'

"It follows that the claim that the act of 1877 is still in force is untenable, as it is repealed by the act of 1887.

The present act, as has been seen, besides being a complete revision of the whole subject matter of the act of 1887, has an express clause repealing the latter act, and therefore we have only to consider the power of the State Board of Health under the present act.

"The provision in section 2 above quoted, to the effect that no person shall hereafter begin the practice of medicine without first obtaining a license from the State Board of Health, by implication excludes persons practicing medicine prior to the date July 1, 1899, when the act went into effect. The provision in section 4 requiring the certificate or license to be recorded in the county clerk's office within three months from its date, was evidently intended to apply to certificates issued under the act. The provision in section 6 giving the board power to revoke 'such certificates,' plainly refers to certificates issued under the act, because the part of the section relating to the revocation of certificates is contained in one sentence, the first part of which says: "The State Board of Health may refuse to issue the certificates provided for in this act,' and there is no language in the sentence or in this section of the act referring to any other certificates. Section 9, which prescribes the penalty for practicing medicine or surgery, relates to certificates 'issued by this board in compliance with the provisions of this act,' and, as we have seen, the same section provides that it shall not apply to physicians holding certificates issued prior to the time of the taking effect of the act.

"If it was the intention of the legislature to give the board of health the power to discipline the holders of certificates issued prior to July 1, 1899, and to revoke such certificates, it has certainly failed to express such intention by this act. We are of opinion that the language of the act is too plain to admit of the construction contended for by appellant. When the language of a statute is clear and plain there is no room for construction, and we are not at liberty to speculate upon what

was the intention of the legislature. Martin v. Swift, 120 Ill. 488; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. Downey, 127 id. 201; Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Dumser, 109 id. 402; Sutherland on Statutory Const. secs. 235-238.

"If the consequences of interpreting the statute according to its plain and obvious meaning are likely to prove disastrous to the people of the State at large, as contended by counsel and as would seem not improbable, considering the large number of physicians and surgeons throughout the State and the temptations to obtain money and practice by a resort to dishonorable conduct which are supposed to beset professional men, the responsibility must rest with the legislature, and not the courts. If the tendency of a law is vicious, the stricter its enforcement the sooner it will be amended or repealed. This statute is in its nature highly penal, should be strictly construed, and should not be held to include persons not clearly and plainly within the scope of its provisions. People v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172; Siegel v. People, 106 id. 89; Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 245; Sutherland on Statutory Const. sec. 208.

"We do not discuss the several principles in the construction of statutes referred to in the brief of counsel for the appellant, for the reason that in our opinion the principles of construction above stated are controlling in this case.

"The decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed." We have carefully examined all of the questions involved, and considered the criticisms of the opinion by counsel and their arguments against the correctness of the same, and are of the opinion the conclusions reached and announced in the opinion are correct.

The opinion of the Appellate Court is adopted as the opinion of this court, and the judgment of this court is affirmed. Judgment afirmed.

GEORGE S. FOSTER, Exr.

v.

THE ST. LUKE'S HOSPITAL.

Opinion filed June 19, 1901.

1. PLEADING-what necessary to allege in action for accidental death. In an action to recover damages for the death of a person, the plaintiff, in order to be entitled to recover, must allege and prove that the deceased left surviving a husband or wife or next of kin.

2. SAME-effect of failure to allege that the deceased left next of kin— limitations. If a declaration as originally filed in an action for the death of the plaintiff's testatrix fails to allege that the deceased left surviving a husband or next of kin, the declaration fails to state a cause of action, and an amendment filed more than two years after the accident, which alleges that the plaintiff is the surviving husband and sole heir and beneficiary of the deceased, is barred by the Statute of Limitations.

3. SAME when defect in pleading is not cured by verdict. If the declaration omits to allege any substantial fact which is essential to a right of action, and which is not implied in or inferable from the facts which are alleged, a verdict for the plaintiff does not cure the omission.

St. Luke's Hospital v. Foster, 86 Ill. App. 282, affirmed.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. GEORGE W. BROWN, Judge, presiding.

BEACH & BEACH, and M. SLUSSER, for plaintiff in

error.

SYDNEY RICHMOND TABER, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action on the case brought by George S. Foster, executor of the last will and testament of Candis Foster, deceased, against the St. Luke's Hospital, to recover damages for the death of said Candis Foster, which was caused by her falling from the fifth story window of

The suit was com

said hospital on December 6, 1895. menced February 27, 1896, and on the following 10th day of April a declaration was filed, in which the plaintiff failed to allege his relationship to Candis Foster, or that she left her surviving a husband or next of kin, or that any one had sustained any pecuniary loss because of her death. On November 2, 1898, the plaintiff filed an amendment to each count of the declaration, in which it was averred "that said George Foster is the husband and only surviving heir and beneficiary of the said Candis Foster, deceased," and "that said George S. Foster, plaintiff and surviving heir and beneficiary of the said Candis Foster, deceased, became and was deprived of the services and companionship of his said wife." A demurrer to the amended declaration having been overruled, the defendant filed the general issue and a plea of the Statute of Limitations thereto, to which latter plea the court sustained a demurrer, whereupon the case was tried before a jury, and a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $2500, from which judgment the defendant prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, which court reversed said judgment without remanding the cause, and the plaintiff has sued out a writ of error from this court to review such judgment of reversal.

At the time the amended declaration was filed more than two years had elapsed since the accident took place. If the original declaration failed to state a cause of action and by, the amendment thereto a new cause of action was sought to be introduced, the same was barred and the plea of the Statute of Limitations thereto should have been sustained. (Phelps v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 94 Ill. 548; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Jones, 149 id. 361; Eylenfeldt v. Illinois Steel Co. 165 id. 185; Chicago City Railway Co. v. Leach, 182 id. 359.) The con. trolling question therefore is, did the original declaration state a cause of action?