"The rule here announced is not in conflict with Rhawn vs. Pearce, 110 Ill., 350. In that case the assignment was not voluntary but resulted by the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. A statutory assignment will not be enforced against attaching creditors of another State. May vs. First National Bank of Attleboro, supra."

SECTION 8. FOURTH EXCEPTION-LAWS AFFECTING REAL PROPERTY SITUATED WITHIN THE

JURISDICTION OF THE FORUM.

It is of the greatest importance to the welfare of every State that the titles to the lands within its jurisdiction should be clear and perfect. Certainty of titles can only exist where the law governing such titles is certain; and the law can only be certain where the same law governs every transaction relative to the title. Every transaction, therefore, which constitutes a link in the chain of title to a piece of real property must be governed in all respects by the law of the place where the real property is situated. This rule does not apply to collateral warranties, or other matters which in no way affect the question of the title to the land.

SECTION 9. FIFTH EXCEPTION-LAWS PENAL IN THEIR CHARACTER.

It is a fundamental principle of law that the courts of one State or country will never attempt to enforce the criminal laws of another State or country, and this principle is extended to the case of laws not strictly criminal in their character which nevertheless impose penalties under certain conditions.

SECTION 10.

CHAPTER III.

SITUS OF PERSONS.

DEFINITIONS OF SITUS IN GENERAL.

In general the law governing persons, property, or actions is the situs of such persons, property or actions. In the English and American Encyclopedia of Law1 situs is thus defined:

"Situs means site; location; situation; a place where a thing is. Real property has always a fixed situs; and so, of course, the actual situs of tangible chattels can always be readily determined. But it is obvious that the situs of tangible chattels, such as choses in action, must be conventional. At common law, however, rules have been established which assign a situs or locality to every subject of personal property for the purpose of administration and probate, and there seems to be no reason why these rules should not be extended to cases arising under the recording acts."

This definition is too narrow in that it is limited in its application to the case of property, while in the contemplation of the law persons and actions have a situs not less than property.

SECTION 11. ACTUAL AND LEGAL SITUS OF PERSONS.

Every person has both an actual situs and a legal situs or domicile. In addition to these, and distinct therefrom, there is the residence and also the citizenship of the person. The question of citizenship has been already discussed under the subjects of constitu1 Vol. XXV, p. 107D.

tional law and international law. The actual situs of a person is the place where he actually is at any given time. More difficulty is to be found in distinguishing between the actual situs or domicile of a person and the residence of such person.

SECTION 12. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE.

Minor in his "Conflict of Laws,' "2 thus distinguishes between domicile and residence:

"It must be observed that domicile is also to be distinguished from a mere residence, of a temporary character, not intended to be permanent. Residence in a State is usually said to be necessary to domicile, but it must be a residence of a permanent, not of a temporary or limited character. When the term 'resident,' or 'residence,' is used in connection with private international law, it is generally used in the sense of domicile, though not always.

"The Virginia case of Long vs. Ryan is a good illustration of the distinction between mere residence and domicile. In that case, a person domiciled in Washington came to Virginia intending to remain there about nine months, until he should complete a contract into which he had entered, proposing afterwards to leave Virginia. His property was attached in Virginia under a statute permitting attachments against 'non-residents,' but the court, notwithstanding his domicile in Washington, held him to be a resident of Virginia, and dismissed the attachment."

SECTION 13. CLASSIFICATION OF DOMICILES.

Two methods of classifying domiciles are in use. As to the extent of the domicile, domiciles are divided into

• Sec. 20.

(a) National domiciles;

(b) Quasi national domiciles, and

(c) Municipal domiciles.

The national domicile of a person is the country in which a person in domiciled. The quasi national domicile of a person is the State in which he is domiciled. The municipal domicile of a person is the city, town, county, or other political subdivision, in which a person is domiciled.

As to the method of acquiring domiciles, domiciles are subdivided into:

(a) Domiciles of origin;

(b) Constructive domiciles, and

(c) Domiciles of choice.

SECTION 14. DOMICILES OF ORIGIN.

A domicile of origin is one assigned to a child at the time of its birth. The domicile of origin of a legitimate child is the domicile of his father at the time of his birth, of an illegitimate child the domicile of his mother, and of a foundling the place where he is found. Domicile of origin is, strictly speaking, one kind of constructive domicile. Greater importance is attached to domiciles of origin than to other species of domicile. It requires more evidence to prove that a domicile of origin has been given up, and such a domicile after being lost may be more easily re-acquired, at least in the case of national domiciles.

SECTION 15. CONSTRUCTIVE DOMICILE.

A constructive domicile is one created by law. Married women, infants and insane persons have domiciles of this character. The strictness of the old rule as to the domicile of married women has been somewhat modified, as is shown by the decision

of the Supreme Court of New York in the case of "Matter of Florance, " the decision in which case was in part as follows:

"The whole claim of the plaintiff is based upon the old rule that a woman by marriage acquires the domicile of her husband and changes it with him. It is admitted that a wife may procure a separate domicile for purposes of divorce, but it seems to be claimed that such domicile cannot be procured for any other purpose. The old rule in reference to a married woman's domicile cannot, certainly, prevail in view of the rights which are recognized to be hers by the

statutes.

"The property relations between husband and wife have been entirely changed since the rule in question has obtained, and the reasons for the rule no longer exist. The wife is now a distinct legal entity, having in the disposition of her property all the rights, and even more than a husband has ever possessed, and the husband has no control whatever over her movements or her disposition of her property. In the case at bar it appears that in 1875 the petitioner and his wife agreed to separate, she to take their children and maintain them. They did separate, he going to Philadelphia and she living in New York, which had been her home before marriage, and supporting their children from her own means. There is no pretense that the petitioner ever contributed a cent to the support of his wife or their children since 1875, or offered to do so, and the best that he can say in his petition is that he never refused to provide a home for his said wife or her children in the city of Philadelphia. Probably he was never asked to

* 54 Hun., 328.