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this matter under consideration, and in a well-considered opinion reviewed and upheld a former decision of the department, in the course of which the following words were used: "The decision, which was in favor of the mineral claimant, was nevertheless an adjudication to the effect that oil lands are mineral lands subject to location and entry under the mining laws, if the requisite conditions as to value are shown to exist; otherwise the mineral locations could not have been sustained as against the homestead entry subsequently allowed. The principle, though not discussed, was necessarily involved, and the decision sustaining the mineral locations and entry is therefore not without weight." In approval of the policy enunciated in the above decision, congress enacted a law of which the following is an extract: "That any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable therefor, under the provisions of the laws relating to placer mining claims: Provided, that lands containing such petroleum or other mineral oils which have heretofore been filed upon, claimed or improved as mineral, but not yet patented, may be held and patented under the provisions of this act the same as if such filing, claim or improvement were subsequent to the date of the passage thereof." 2

1 Union Oil Co., on review, 25 in House Report No. 2655, 54th L D. 351. See also Re Piru Oil Cong., 2d Sess., that under decisions Co., 16 L. D. 117; Roberts v. Jepson, of the interior department, there 4 L. D. 60; Gird v. Cal. Oil Co., 60 cited, public lands containing peFed. Rep. 531. troleum, with other mineral oils, were held subject to entry and patent under the placer-mining laws. R. S. 2329. By a later decision the previous executive rule was reversed, rendering new legislation necessary to authorize the entry and patent of petroleum lands, as formerly."

2 Act authorizing the entry and patenting of lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils under the placer mining laws of the United States, approved Feb. 11, 1897, 29 Stat. at L. 526, 2 Supp. R.S.U.S. 549, to which is appended the following note: "It is explained

§ 146. Same- Petroleum and natural gas mineral and part of the soil. It may thus be safely said to be settled that, so far as public lands are concerned, petroleum must be classed as a mineral, as must natural gas and all other forms of natural carbon or hydro-carbons. Nor is the rule different when we come to deal with the question as a subject of contract or grant in a deed, whether such act be by the voluntary act of a party, as a deed, lease, will, or the like, or whether it be the involuntary act through a public officer, as a judicial sale by a sheriff or administrator. In either case mineral oils or gas in situ must be held to be a part of the soil, owned, in the absence of severance, by the owner of the surface. They are as much so as are timber, coal or iron ore, or any other ores or minerals.1 It was contended in the principal case mentioned in the note, that because of its fugitive nature, such is not the law, and that it belongs to him who first appropriates it. The decision, however, which is manifestly correct, was against this contention, though of course it only applies where the minerals are taken lawfully, without trespassing, and by proper observance of all safeguards, including provision for the protection strip, of which we shall speak later.

§ 147. Salt springs, lakes, ponds and saline lands.We have already seen that the early policy of the government was to specially reserve from sale, and from the operation of all grants, all salt licks, salt springs and saline lands. Salt deposits, while not specially included, would probably be considered to be within the spirit of the law. The policy of this law was evidently that of preventing a

1 Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. Rep. 436. See also Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229; Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. St. 351; Hake v. Reed, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 479; Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia Transp. Co., 28 W. Va. 210; Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 198; Westmoreland

& C. Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130
Pa. St. 235; Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa.
St. 57; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa.
St. 324; Ontario Nat. Gas Co. v.
Besfield, 18 Ont. App. 626; State v.
Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & M. Co.,
120 Ind. 575; People's Gas Co. v.
Tyner, 131 Ind. 277.

monopoly of those things, and especially this one thing, so necessary to common use. But the discovery of immense. bodies of salt deposit in many forms, as well as of salt lakes, taken in connection with the improved methods of extracting salt from the ocean water, abrogated the necessity of a further observance of this policy. The land department, however, was hampered by the positive law of congress, and repeatedly refused to permit locations upon any saline lands under the placer law as valuable deposits. Happily, however, the old condition has been partially abrogated by the act of congress found in full in the Appendix. This, like many other primary enactments, is incomplete in that, by the proviso, the right of location and patent is restricted to one claim of twenty acres for each person. There is absolutely no reason for this provision, because experience has demonstrated that any attempt to restrict monopoly in this manner falls far short of the mark, if it is not absolutely futile. We have elsewhere noticed that gravel deposits beneath unnavigable waters are locatable as placer. It would seem to follow that the ground and deposits around and beneath salt ponds or lakes, including the lakes themselves, are likewise locatable.

2

§ 148. Review of the chapter.-It will appear from the foregoing that the term "mining" includes all manner of digging and removing the mineral substances composing the earth's crust, where the object is to obtain the substance itself, except, possibly, gravel for macadamizing streets.

That the term "mine" includes not only the excavation, shaft, tunnel, drift, adit, or other opening made for the purpose of removing the mineral bodies contained in the earth's crust, but also the substance itself so removed when in place. After it is moved, of course, it is personal property, and becomes a chattel under the name of ore, stone, or the like; also that the term "mine" includes the body or mass of

1 Appendix" A,” IV, C.; Act Jan. 2 Post, § 310.

31. 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 145).

mineral land, not only the vein substance, but the entire group of mining claims operated as a mine.

That, in a general sense, all the substances sought for and removed for their intrinsic value, by the operations of mining, may be classed as mineral, and especially that all substances recognized as mineral by the standard authorities, and found in sufficient quantities to make the land more valuable therefor than for agricultural purposes, should be so classed.

That the matter is set forever at rest, so far as the government and the department are concerned, that petroleum and natural gas, which, of course, include all hydro-carbons, are minerals and locatable as such; that, independent of the precious metals, the department has especially ruled in respect to certain enumerated minerals. The ruling of the department, as we shall see further on in this work, is controlling upon matters committed to its charge. And where the duty devolving upon the department is executive merely, the supreme court will adopt and follow it. It is also entitled to consideration in its contemporaneous construction of statutes. But by this it is not meant that the rulings of the department, except upon matters of fact, are absolutely controlling. The supreme court may, and often does, overrule them, and, of course, is the final arbiter in respect of all matters properly coming before the courts.*

1 Post, Part IX, chs. I, II, III.

4 Pacific Coast Marble Co. v.

2 United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233; 760. Union Oil Co., id. 351; Del Monte

3 Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. M. & M. Co. v. Last Chance M. & M. Co., 171 U. S. 55.

568.

CHAPTER II.

PUBLIC MINERAL LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES, IN WHAT STATES SITUATED.

§ 151. Introductory - Observations of a general nature.

152. Historical observations - Territory of the United States, how and when acquired - What classed as mineral land.

153. States excepted from the operation of mineral lands acts. 154. Only unoccupied, unclaimed public mineral lands locatable as a mining claim - Occupied land or Indian reservations not open. 155. What sort of occupancy will exclude the mineral locator - Distinctions-Mineral lands and land valuable for mineral. 156. Same subject - Reservation by a previous locator - Overlapping locations valid.

157. Character of land - How determined - Return of surveyor. 158. Conclusiveness of department decisions upon itself and upon the

courts.

159. More valuable for mineral than agriculture - Distinction. 160. Summary.

151. Introductory - Observations of a general nature. Not all the public lands of the United States containing minerals are open to exploration, location and purchase as such. Some states have been excepted from the operation of the mining statutes by special provisions of law. We have already ascertained, in a general way, what substances are classed as minerals. Of course it follows that the lands wherein those minerals are found are mineral lands. Whence the further deduction that when those mineral lands are in one of the states or territories to which the mining statutes apply - that is to say, the public mineralland states of the Union,- they are open to exploration, location and purchase in some one of the ways pointed out and authorized by the statutes of the United States. It is the purpose of this chapter to designate those states and to point out the states which have been excepted from the

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