cording to the course or strike of his vein as he determines it. We do not wish to be understood by this, however, as undertaking to lay down the rule that a prospector who fails to follow up his discovery of mineral by any effort toward completing the statutory location of a mining claim will be permitted, at any considerable time thereafter, to assert any claim as against intervening rights.2 § 236. Summary of naked possession and its effect as a reservation. It will thus be seen that by some of the earlier decisions it was held that one in possession of the public domain of the United States was deemed rightfully in possession, and in California and other western states this possessory right was recognized by statute. Following the common-law principle, which recognized the sacredness of the possession of real property, the courts generally upheld the possession against one who sought to invade it even for the purpose of making a mining location. But by later decisions it was held, and this we take it as the rule to-day, that a mere squatter upon the public domain had not the right to maintain possession against one peaceably seeking to effect the location of a mining claim in a lawful way upon the public lands of the United States.5 Whence it follows that whatever may have been considered the rule heretofore, it cannot now be said that mere naked possession, without any attempt to comply with any of the laws of the United States, will reserve the land possessed from location, 1 Marshall v. Harney Peak T. M. & M. Co., 1 S. Dak. 350, 47 N. W. Rep. 290; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527; Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 300; Patterson v. Hitchcock, 3 Colo. 533; Gregory v. Pershbaker, 73 Cal. 109, 14 Pac. Rep. 401. See also Gleason v. Martin White M. Co., 13 Nev. 459; Golden Fleece M. Co. v. Cable Cons. M. Co., 12 Nev. 312. 2 See Pelican & Dives M. Co. v. Snodgrass, 9 Colo. 339, 12 Pac. Rep. 206; O'Reilly v. Campbell, 116 U.S. Hughes v. Devlin, 23 Cal. 501; even for an instant. But a contrary rule applies when one is in possession exploring the ground with the bona fide intention of searching for mineral, and, if found, to make a location. As to all such the rule is that they are protected in their possession for a reasonable time, for the purpose of making a location, and where there is a statute allowing a fixed time in which to complete a location, they are entitled to all that time.1 $237. The statutory tunnel as a reservation. We come now to the most striking reservation which congress has enacted with reference to mineral lands, and it may now be said to be settled that a statutory tunnel, duly located under the law, and which is prosecuted with diligence thereafter, creates a reservation in favor of the locator as to all veins or lodes, no matter which way they dip, which may be encountered by said tunnel, at any point within three thousand feet of the face thereof; and that the reservation is of such an extent along the strike of any such lode that the tunnel claimant may claim any fifteen. hundred feet of the lode he may choose to claim so long as one end of it crosses his tunnel; that is to say, he may claim fifteen hundred feet of the lode, measured from either side. of his tunnel, in the opposite direction. Unquestionably, the policy of this legislation is a twosided proposition. On the one hand, is the question of properly compensating the miner for running a blind tunnel, as it is called, for the discovery and development of unknown and undiscovered veins or lodes; that it was granted upon the theory, seldom a fact in experience, that veins or lodes preserve approximately a perpendicular position in their descent into the earth, seems indisputable, whereas in experience they are found upon every conceivable angle, from the vertical to the horizontal; and it is easy to see that this 1Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527. M. Co., 167 U. S. 108, 42 L ed. 96; R. S. U. S., § 2323. Campbell v. Ellet, 167 U. S. 116, 42 legislation may authorize the claiming of a vein running at right angles with the tunnel, dipping towards the tunnel, and having its apex many miles away. On the other hand, this reservation presents the serious evil, amounting almost to a monopoly in the case suggested in the last portion of the last sentence, of reserving a consequent extensive area of land. But whatever the evil, if any, the remedy is only with the legislative power. As to the tunnel itself, and the various rights of the locator, see the chapter on that subject.1 1 See post, Part VI, ch. IL. PART V. LOCATION AS A MODE OF ACQUIRING TITLE-OF CHAPTER I. DEFINES CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO HAVE DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO BECOME SUCH, AND OF LOCATIONS MADE BY THEM AND BY ALIENS. § 241. Citizenship defined. 242. Of the different kinds of citizens-Native-born - Naturalized – Many definitions. 243. Born or natural citizens-Constitutional and statutory definitions. 244. Alien parents - Children of, born in the United States - Chinese children. 245. Indians held not to be citizens - Corrected by legislative au thority. 246. Interpretation of phrase "under the jurisdiction thereof." 247. Of the different modes of naturalization. 248. Purposes of the foregoing-Who may locate mineral lands Citizens of the United States - Purposes of the statute. 249. Qualifications elsewhere- Canada and Canadian provinces. § 241. Citizenship defined.- Citizenship is said to be the state of being vested with the rights and privileges of being a citizen,1 and by a leading authority a citizen is thus defined: "A person, native or naturalized, who has the priv 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2d ed.), p. 15, citing Webster's Dict.; Century Dict.; Abrigo v. State, 29 Tex. App. 149; 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (1st ed.), 242. ilege of voting for a public officer, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people; also, any native-born or naturalized citizen, of either sex, who is entitled to full protection in the exercise and enjoyment of the so-called private rights." 1 There are many other definitions of citizenship, but the purposes of this work do not require nice distinctions or elaborate reproductions. One more will suffice: "A citizen is one who owes to the government allegiance, service and money by way of taxation, and to whom the state, in turn, grants and guarantees liberty of person, and of conscience, and the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and social relations, of suit and defense, and security in person, estate and reputation." 2 $242. Of the different kinds of citizens-Native-bornNaturalized-Many definitions.-Citizenship, under this branch of the law, is again divided into, first, native or natural-born citizens, and second, naturalized citizens. Until the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States there was no constitutional definition of the term "citizen," although there were several definitions by the courts. In the succeeding sections we shall examine this question at some length, for the reason that the question more frequently arises in litigation under the mining law than perhaps any other branch of the law; and first $243. Born or natural citizens- Constitutional and statutory definitions.- All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside. A natural-born citizen is one who is born in the United States. One born in a foreign country is a 1 Webster's Dict., tit. "Citizen." 23 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (1st ed.), p. 242; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 332. 3 Const. of U. S., art. XIV, sec. 1, 14th amendment. See also United 4 Lynch v. Clark, 4 Sandf. Ch. |