invention, or to determine that one invention is the same as another and different one; or that two inventions essentially distinct constitute but one. In this case, it is not necessary for us to decide, and we express no opinion as to the precise meaning and extent of the final clause of sect. 53, to which we have referred; as, whether it relates to all patents, or only to patents for machines. But as it relates to the matter of evidence alone, it cannot enlarge the power of the commissioner in reference to the invention for which a reissue may be granted. That power is restricted, by the general terms of the section, to the same invention which was originally patented. Conceding that the commissioner had a right, in this case, by virtue of the clause in question, to examine the original application of Nobel, as it stood before it was amended, in order to ascertain what his invention really was, it would only show that he described, in that paper, two different inventions, one for a composition, and another for a process distinct from the composition. It would not prove that the two inventions were the same; and it would not authorize the commissioner, on a reissue, to add the one to the other, as a part thereof. The complainant insists, however, that the present reissues are for the same invention which was patented in the reissued patent, No. 3380, granted in April, 1869; and that the latter reissue was granted before the passage of the act of 1870. But this fact does not help the complainant. The law relating to reissues was substantially the same under the act of 1836 as it is under the act of 1870. As before remarked, the former act as well as the latter restricted the power of the commissioner, in granting reissues, to "the same invention" which was the subject of the original patent. It has been repeatedly so held by this court, as the following cases will show: Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. 531; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 id. 516; Gill v. Wells, 22 id. 1; The Wood Paper Patent, 23 id. 566. Since, therefore, the reissues in question are not for the same invention for which the original patent was granted, it follows that they are void; and the bill must be dismissed so far as relates to the said reissued patents numbered respectively 4818 and 4819. As nothing is shown, however, in the statements of the bill, which affects the validity of the third patent sued on, the bill should not have been dismissed as a whole, but only as to the said reissues 4818 and 4819. For this error the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion, dismissing the bill as to all relief sought therein in respect of, or in reference to or founded upon, the said reissued patents numbered respectively 4818 and 4819, and, as to the residue of the bill, overruling the demurrer and directing the defendants to answer in accordance with the rules and practice of the court. So ordered. CITIZENS' BANK v. BOARD OF LIQUIDATION. 1. Where the record shows that a Federal question was not necessarily involvea, this court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that the act passed Jan. 24, 1874, does not authorize the funding board of that State to fund the bonds of a railroad company, whereon the State is liable only as a guarantor. 2. Brown v. Atwell, Administrator (92 U. S. 327), cited and approved. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Mr. Armand Pitot and Mr. Edward Janin for the plaintiff in error. Mr. John Q. A. Fellows, contra. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This was an application for a mandamus to compel the funding board of Louisiana to fund, under the funding act of that State, passed Jan. 24, 1874, $60,000 and accrued interest of the second-mortgage bonds of the New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga Railroad Company, guaranteed by the State under the alleged authority of act No. 26, approved Feb. 16, 1869. The averment in the petition is "that the refusal of the board to fund the bonds and coupons presented by the petitioners is in violation of the compact entered into between the people of the State of Louisiana and the bondholders." In the answer, several defences were set up, but in none was any Federal question in terms presented. In one, which was separate and distinct from the others, and in no manner connected with them, it was alleged "that the bonds presented in this case, and the funding of which is claimed, are not included among the obligations permitted to be funded by the act, . . . and are not the bonds of this State." This defence was sus tained by the Supreme Court of the State because the act only permitted the funding of "valid outstanding bonds of the State, and valid warrants drawn previous to the passage of the act," and the bonds held by the relator were not bonds of the State, but bonds of the railroad company, on which the State was liable only as guarantor. No Federal question was involved in this decision, but it determined the cause. The relator had no contract which the funding act impaired. The State being in debt, passed the funding law. The relator, claiming the benefit of the privileges conferred by the law, asked for a mandamus to compel the State officers to issue funding bonds in exchange for the obligations the relator held and offered to surrender. This was refused, because, in the opinion of the court, the act did not provide for that class of State obligations. Over this decision we have no control. In fact, being the construction of a State statute by a State court, it controls us. Under these circumstances, if we should take jurisdiction we would be compelled to affirm the judgment, whether we found any error in respect to questions arising under the other defences or not. This defence is complete in itself, and sufficient to support the judgment we are asked to review. To give us jurisdiction under sect. 709, Rev. Stat., it is not only necessary that some one of the questions mentioned in the section should exist on the record, but that the decision was controlling in the disposition of the cause. Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 125; Klinger v. State of Missouri, 13 Wall. 257. As the State court has decided as a question of State law that even if the guaranties of the bond are valid obligations of the State, they are not fundable under the act, it matters not in this suit whether the decision against their validity was erroneous or not. The judgment would have been the same whether the guaranties were held to be valid or invalid. No Federal question having been specially raised by the pleadings, and the record showing clearly on its face that the decision of such a question was not necessarily involved, we will not go through the opinion of the court, even in Louisiana, to ascertain whether one was in fact decided. In no event could it have affected the determination of the cause. There is nothing in Murdock v. City of Memphis (20 Wall. 590) to the contrary of this. In that case the decision of the Federal question raised was necessary. The judgment as given could not have been rendered without passing upon it. We have often since that case reaffirmed the old rule. Moore v. Mississippi, 21 Wall. 636; Brown v. Atwell, Administrator, 92 U. S. 327. In the last case, citing numerous authorities, we say, "We have often decided that it is not enough to give us jurisdiction over the judgments of the State courts for a record to show that a Federal question was argued or presented to that court for decision. It must appear that its decision was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it actually was decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it." It follows that the writ must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and it is So ordered. DUMONT v. UNITED STATES. 1. A bond given at the port of New York, when certain goods were imported, was conditioned that the importer should pay $425,- that being the estimated duty based on the invoice, -or the amount which should be subsequently ascertained to be due, or that he should within three years withdraw and export them, or transport them to a Pacific port. That sum was paid on the withdrawal of the goods, but it was less than the duty which was afterwards regularly liquidated. A suit was brought against the surety for the balance. Held, that he was not liable therefor. 2. The importer is liable for the duty; but the bond is discharged as to the surety by the performance of one of its alternative conditions. 3. "Or" is never construed to mean "and," when the evident intent of the par ties would be thereby defeated. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. W. Willoughby for the plaintiff in error. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action against the surety upon an ordinary bond for duties, given at the time of importation, upon the estimated amount, before the duties were regularly liquidated. The estimated duties, based on the invoice shown by the importer, were $425; and the condition of the bond was, that within one year the importer should pay to the collector $425, or the amount of the duties which should be ascertained to be due, or should within three years withdraw and export them, or transport them to a Pacific port. About a month after importation the goods were withdrawn by the importer, upon payment of the sum named in the bond; but the duties were not regularly liquidated until about a month later. The liquidation showed that the duties payable were $676.75, instead of the $425 which had been paid. This suit was brought to recover the balance. The surety pleaded payment of the sum named in the bond, as a fulfilment of one of the alternate conditions. The counsel for the government contended that the condition ought to be construed not alternatively, but as intended to secure the payment at all events of the true amount of duties, unless the goods should be exported or sent to the Pacific coast within three years. It was shown that the bond was in the form long in use, and had been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury; and it was undoubtedly intended to cover the full amount of the duties, whether the original estimate reached that amount or not. frequently construed to mean "and," and vice versa, in order to carry out the evident intent of the parties. But such a change cannot be made in this case; for if we make "or" to read "and," the condition would require the importer to pay the actual duties in addition to the $425. Besides, there are two other alternate conditions dependent upon the same word "or;" namely, that the bond should be void if the goods should The word "or" is |