then remarked, that if they found that the injury received by the plaintiff was by the neglect of the railroad, then it would be their duty to ascertain the extent of the injury from the evidence, to which no objection can properly be made.

Reference was then made to the evidence, and comments of a general character followed; and at the close of the judge's remarks upon that subject is another exception, in the words following: "To which instruction the counsel for the defendants then and there excepted." Discussion of that exception may well be omitted, as the remarks made in respect to the preceding exception are believed to be sufficient to show that it is not sufficiently explicit, and that it must be overruled.

Expert witnesses were called and examined in the case, and the third exception has respect to the remarks of the judge upon that subject. Neither the exception nor the assignment of error designates any particular remark of the judge as erroneous, and in view of the fact that the exception is addressed to the entire remarks as an instruction, the court is of the opinion that it requires no further examination.

Extended remarks were made by the judge upon the subject of damages, in case the jury came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, to which two exceptions are appended, to the effect that the defendants then and there excepted to the remarks which preceded the note of exception. Exceptions put in that general form are certainly not entitled to favor; but it is proper to remark that those under consideration stand in a worse condition than those previously examined, for the reason that the attention of the judge after the charge was concluded was directed to many passages in his remarks as objectionable, every one of which the judge either corrected as requested, or, where the suggestion of error was in respect to the testimony, he referred the question to the recollection of the jury. Such corrections must, of course, be considered in connection with the antecedent remarks of the judge; and when that part of the charge is viewed in that light, the court is of the opinion that the exceptions must be overruled.

Two prayers for instruction were presented by the defendants: 1. That the court should instruct the jury that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any thing for the services of

the physicians or other expenses, as there was no testimony to show the amount of money, if any, he paid on that account. 2. That the court should instruct the jury that in estimating the damages of the plaintiff they must take into consideration his advanced age as lessening his capacity for earning money.

Responsive to the first request, the judge remarked to the jury that there being no evidence on the subject of the specific amount of the physician's bill, "you will not take that into consideration, unless there is doubt," evidently leaving the sentence incomplete; but his attention was not called to the omission, and the court here is of the opinion that the defendants have no cause to complain of that part of the charge as an error of law.

Both requests were refused, and in response to the second the judge remarked to the effect that the jury acting reasonably must ascertain the proper amount of the damages; that if they found damages, they must be reasonable, as they could not tell whether a man would live one, two, or five years. Probably no one will think that these remarks of the judge were very instructive to the jury; but it is not possible to hold that they show any legal error for which the judgment should be reversed.

Where the charge of the judge to the jury is of a character to mislead the jury, the error is one of law, and may be corrected in an appellate court; but in every such case the part of the charge to which the exception is addressed ought to be distinctly pointed out. Unless that be done, the exception cannot be sustained as a ground for reversing the judgment, as that can only be done for error of law.

For these reasons, the court is of the opinion that there is no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. THOMPSON.

The United States, whether named in a State statute of limitations or not, is not bound thereby; and when it sues in one of its own courts, such a statute is not within the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which declare that the laws of the States, in trials at common law, shall be regarded as rules of decision in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.

The United States sued, Dec. 6, 1875, Clark W. Thompson, and his sureties on his official bond, as superintendent of Indian affairs in Minnesota. The breach alleged was that he, as such officer, had, prior to March 30, 1865, received $10,562.27 of the moneys of the United States, which he had neglected and refused to account for, and had converted to his own use.

The defendants pleaded that the cause of action did not accrue within ten years next preceding the commencement of the suit. The United States demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and judgment rendered for the defendants. The United States has brought the judgment here for review.

The statutes of Minnesota (c. 66, tit. 11, sect. 6) provide that an action upon a contract, express or implied (unless it be founded upon some judgment or decree of a court), shall be barred if not commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues. 2 Minn. Stat. at Large, 782.

The twelfth section of that title further provides that "the limitations prescribed in this chapter for the commencement of actions shall apply to the same actions when brought in the name of the State, or in the name of any officer, or otherwise, for the benefit of the State, in the same manner as to actions brought by citizens." Id. 783.

While a Territory, the following statute was in force in Minnesota: "The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply to actions brought in the name of the United States, in the same manner as to actious by private parties." Rev. Sts. of 1851, c. 70, sect. 13, p. 331; Revision of 1858, p. 533, sect. 13.

This statute was first passed by the territorial legislature of Wisconsin, and was continued in force over that portion of it

which, in 1848, became the Territory of Minnesota. It was modified, several years after Minnesota became a State, to read as it now does. When Wisconsin became a State, its legisla tion underwent the same change.

Mr. M. S. Wilkinson in support of the judgment below.

The real question here is, not whether the Statutes of Limi tations bar the State, where she is not designated, but whether when they extend and apply to actions brought by her, they are "rules of decision" in the Federal courts, where the United States is a party. It is submitted,

First, That the terms of the thirty-fourth section of the Ju diciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 92, Rev. Stat., sect. 721) give the same efficiency to the State statutes of limitations in the Fed eral courts that they have proprio vigore in the State courts.

Second, That the Statute of Limitations of the State of Min nesota bars in her courts all plaintiffs, including the sovereign and it therefore, in the Federal courts sitting within that State, operates to bar all plaintiffs, including the sovereign.

There has never been a time since it became possible to institute a suit in Minnesota, when, by the express words of the Statute of Limitations, it did not apply to actions brought by the government to the same extent that it applied to private parties.

The statutes of the Territory had within its limits the force of acts of Congress, because its legislative power was delegated to it by Congress. All its laws were required to be submitted to Congress, and, if not disapproved, were to be in force and effect. Organic Act of Wisconsin, sect. 6, 5 Stat. at Large, p. 12; Organic Act of Minnesota, sect. 6, 9 Stat. at Large, p. 405.

The Statutes of Limitations of the Territory were not disapproved by Congress; and afterwards Minnesota was admitted into the Union, with a constitution which continued those statutes with others in force until repealed. Const. of Minnesota, sect. 2 of schedule.

It is an elementary principle that the Statutes of Limitations constitute a part of the lex fori, and this court, in construing them, conforms to the exposition given by the courts of the State.

Third, If the United States is not amply protected by the present exceptions in the Judiciary Act, Congress can at any time remedy the evil by an amendment.

Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the United States

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case turns upon a statute of the State of Minnesota which bars actions, ex contractu, like this, within a specified time, and the same limitation is applied by the statute to the State. The United States are not named in it. The court below held that the statute applied to the United States, and rendered judgment against them.

There is no opinion in the record, and we are at a loss to imagine the reasoning by which the result announced was reached. The Federal courts have been in existence nearly a century. The reports of their decisions are numerous. They involve a great variety of questions, and the fruit of much learned research. We have been able to find but two cases in the lower Federal courts in which it appears the question was raised. They are United States v. Hoar, 2 Mas. 311, and United States v. Williams, 5 McLean, 133. In both it was held, without the intimation of a doubt, that a State statute cannot bar the United States. The same doctrine has been several times laid down by this court; but it seems always to have been taken for granted, and in no instance to have been discussed either by counsel or the court. United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12; Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee, 6 id. 666; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.

This state of things indicates a general conviction throughout the country that there is no foundation for a different proposition. There are also adjudications in the State reports upon the subject, but they concur with those to which we have eferred. Among the earliest of them is Stoughton et al. v. Baker et al., 4 Mass. 521. In that case, Chief Justice Parsons said: "No laches can be imputed to the government, and against it no time runs so as to bar its rights." The examination of the subject by Judge Story, in United States v. Hoar (supra), is a fuller one than we have found anywhere else